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For more than a century, the "dormant Commerce Clause"' has
safeguarded our "national 'common market"' 2 from undue state interference.3
Time and again, the Supreme Court has drawn on this principle to strike down
laws that favor local businesses over competitors engaged in interstate
operations.4 Invoking the Commerce Clause, the Court has condemned state
"customs duties. 5 It has outlawed price controls that strip away advantages
of out-of-state producers.6 It has held unconstitutional even facially neutral
buyer-protection legislation that diverts market share to in-state sellers. The
Court has been especially aggressive in applying the dormant Commerce
Clause to invalidate discriminatory state tax laws, including credits or
exemptions that favor local businesses.' Running through these decisions is
a "strict rule of equality," 9 which mandates that a state treat out-of-state
commercial interests no worse than it treats its own."
Despite the sweeping character of this dormant Commerce Clause
nondiscrimination principle," the cases suggest that states can favor local
1. As stated in a leading treatise:
The text of the commerce clause does not explain what happens if a state law affects
interstate commerce but there is no direct federal legislation on point. The Court has responded
by interpreting the affirmative grant of commerce power ... as imposing some self-executing
limitations on the scope of permissible state regulation.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITTIONAL LAW § 8.1. at 281 (Sth ed 1995) These self-
executing limitations-which reflect the underlying "rationale of the commerce clause . to create and
foster the development of a common market among the states." id. at 282--are sometimes referred to in
shorthand form as the "dormant commerce clause," id. at 281. Professors Nowak and Rotunda explain.
"Without a dormant commerce clause, states would be free to enact legislatton favoring local commerce
and discriminating against out of state commerce in all case where Congress has not legislated on a
particular matter." Id.
2. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy. 117 S. Ct. 811, 825 (1997) (quoting Hunt v Washington State
Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977)).
3. See id. at 820, 825.
4. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST1TIr1ONAL LAW §§ 6-1 to -20. at 401-69 (2d
ed. 1988) (discussing key cases); Donald H. Regan. The Supreme Court and State Protectionism Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIcti. L. REV. 1091 (1986) (same).
5. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
6. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.. 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935).
7. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350.
8. See I JEROME HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN. STATE TAXATION U 4 01 to .14 (1993 &
Supp. 1996) (collecting numerous cases); TRIBE. supra note 4. § 6-17. at 453-58 (same)
9. Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reilly, 373 U.S. 64. 73 (1963): see also. e.g.. Maryland v Louisiana.
451 U.S. 725, 759 (1981) (noting the requirement of "equality of treatment")
10. See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577. 581 (1937) (upholding a compensating use
tax imposed by a state that collected a local sales tax, because the use tax permitted resident and
nonresident sellers "to compete upon terms of equality").
11. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality. 511 U S, 93. 99 (1994) (noting
that "discrimination" in Commerce Clause terms "simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-
state economic interests"); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources. 504
U.S. 353, 361-63 (1992) (reaffirming application of the principle to discrimination favoring in-county, as
well as in-state, interests); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt. 504 U.S. 334. 342 (1992) (claiming that
"[o]nce a state tax is found to discriminate against out-of-state commerce, it is typically struck down
without further inquiry"); Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638. 642 (1984) (reiterating that a state may
not use an "interstate element" as a basis for discrimination): City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U S
617, 627 (1978) (holding that the nondiscrimination principle targets government means as well as ends).
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businesses in one particular way: by awarding outright monetary subsidies. 2
Because such bounties typically are made available only to in-state operations,
they appear on their face to abridge the "prohibition against discriminatory
treatment of interstate commerce."'' 3 At least before 1994, however, the Court
seemed set in its view that monetary business subsidies lay beyond the reach
of the dormant Commerce Clause. "Direct subsidization of domestic industry,"
the Court had decreed, "does not ordinarily run afoul of this prohibition."' 4
In its seminal decision in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,15 however,
the Court signaled a potential retreat from this stance. In footnote fifteen of its
opinion, which invalidated a discriminatory tax "rebate,"' 6 the Court pointedly
noted: "We have never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies,
and we need not do so now."'17 Many observers, as well as the concurring and
dissenting Justices in West Lynn Creamery itself, read footnote fifteen as
putting back on the table the question whether outright business subsidies
violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 8 The Court still has not ruled on the
issue. Indeed, in its most recent dormant Commerce Clause decision, Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,'9 the Court reiterated its
footnote fifteen disclaimer.20 In short, both Camps Newfound/Owatonna and
12. See infra text accompanying notes 41-45.
13. Boston Stock Exch, v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
14. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
15. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
16. Id. at 197.
17. Id. at 199 n.15.
18. See, e.g., Peter Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State
Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 431 n.295 (1996) ("The Court left open the question
whether a subsidy restricted to in-state businesses is constitutional if funded in a manner that does not
burden out-of-state competitors .... ); id. at 443 (claiming that West Lynn Creamery "leaves serious
doubts about the Court's view of tax-financed subsidy programs"); Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial
Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 217, 232 ("[In West Lynn Creamery,] the Court pointedly refused to
express general approval of subsidies for in-state business."); William L. Oemichen, Milk, State Taxes, State
Subsidies, and the Commerce Clause: When States Cannot Tax an Agricultural Commodity To Fund a
Subsidy for Its Struggling Industries, 18 1-IAMLINE L. REV. 415, 428 (1995) (stating that West Lynn
Creamery "places in constitutional jeopardy the ability of states to subsidize domestic industries");
Christopher P. La Puma, Note, Massachusetts Tax and Subsidy Scheme Violates Commerce Clause: West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 48 TAX LAW. 641, 653 (1995) (concluding that West Lynn Creamery "has
inadvertently cast doubt on the validity of subsidies themselves"); George P. Patterson, Note, Does the
Commerce Clause Value Public Goods?: West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 977, 984
(1995) ("In [West Lynn Creamery], the Court failed to resolve the issue of subsidies."); see also
Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Mahany (Cumberland Farms II), 943 F. Supp. 83, 90 (D. Me. 1996) ("in West
Lynn Creamery, the Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of whether subsidies to in-state
businesses are, in themselves, constitutional."); cf. Regan, supra note 4, at 1196 (arguing that the "Court
should stand ready to reconsider what it has said about direct subsidies"); Michael Wells & Walter
Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073, 1130
(1980) ("[Tlhere is considerable room for controversy over whether the conflict between the purposes of
the commerce clause and the power of the states to dispose freely of their own resources ought to be
resolved in favor of the latter."). For discussions of the concurring and dissenting opinions in West Lynn
Creamery, see infra Sections III.B-C.
19. 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997).
20. See id. at 1605. In particular, while concluding that "tax exemptions and subsidies ... differ in
important and relevant respects," the Court declared that it would only "[a]ssum[e] arguendo .,. that a
direct subsidy ... would be permissible." Id. For a further discussion of Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, see
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West Lynn Creamery pointedly invite a comprehensive reconsideration of the
permissibility of subsidies under the dormant Commerce Clause.
In this Article, I seek to respond to the Court's overture with a treatment
of this subject that moves progressively from the general to the specific. Part
I examines key Supreme Court cases to show that the basic question of
whether state business subsidies are constitutional remains open and important.
Part II then turns to how that question should be resolved, focusing on whether
subsidies are fairly distinguishable from ostensibly equivalent, and concededly
unlawful, discriminatory tax relief. The thrust of Part II is that both precedent
and policy support the traditional, pre-West Lynn Creamer" view that state
subsidies almost always comport with the dormant Commerce Clause principle.
In particular, Part II emphasizes that four considerations-rooted in form,
fairness, federalism, and political processes-render subsidies less threatening
to Commerce Clause values than economically comparable tax deductions,
credits, and exemptions.
Part III then addresses the major question that Part II leaves open: How
should courts distinguish the ordinary subsidy that is constitutional from the
exceptional subsidy that is not? Part III suggests that none of the opinions in
West Lynn Creamery-in which an exceptional subsidy was struck down-
offers much useful guidance on this critical question. As a result, Part IV
offers an alternative analytical framework for distinguishing the constitutional
grant-in-aid from the unconstitutional assault upon our "federal free trade
unit."' In essence, this proposal calls upon courts to draw the line between
permissible and impermissible subsidies by focusing on the same four factors
already identified in Part II to distinguish ordinary subsidies from
discriminatory tax breaks as a general matter. Accordingly, Part IV advocates
an approach that asks whether the challenged subsidy-because of its linkage
to a particular tax-shares the essential constitutional defects of a
discriminatory tax break. Using the four factors, courts would consider the
following: (1) whether, consistent with conventional property-based notions of
fairness, the subsidy merely permits state residents to reap where they have
sown; (2) whether invalidation of the subsidy frustrates the state's federalism-
based interest in experimenting with responses to distinctive local needs; (3)
whether the same political dynamics that unduly encourage adoption and
retention of discriminatory tax relief (i.e., reduced visibility, heightened risks
of entrenchment, lowered administrative costs, and the like) mark the
challenged subsidy scheme; and (4) whether the subsidy is part of a program
that resembles in form a protective tariff or kindred types of unconstitutional
discriminatory taxation.22
infra text accompanying notes 64-68.
21. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond. 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949)
22. Part IV also suggests that the Court has effectively endorsed this sort of analysis in it long-
established "market participant exception" to the dormant Commerce Clausc See W)oning v Oklahoma.
19981
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Finally, Part V considers how the analytic structure outlined in this Article
will operate in the real world. Evaluating a range of hypothetical and actual
cases, including West Lynn Creamery itself, Part V offers evidence that this
policy-centered approach is as workable in practice as it is sound in theory. 3
The questions addressed here involve high stakes24 and knotty analytical
problems? 5 Because business bounties take myriad forms, it would be
impossible to address every constitutional question they might present.
Nonetheless, this Article offers something that neither courts nor commentators
have yet begun to supply: an analytic superstructure for evaluating monetary
subsidies in the post-West Lynn Creamery era.
I. THE PROBLEM OF SUBSIDIES AND THE WEST LYNN CREAMERY CASE
Although "[g]overnments have long used subsidies as economic-
development tools, ' '26 state awards of cash grants to businesses raise obvious
dormant Commerce Clause problems. 7 In case after case, the Supreme Court
502 U.S. 437, 459 (1992) (recognizing the existence of the exception but finding no need to explore its
applicability on the facts presented); South-Cent. Timber Dev. Co. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99 (1984)
(plurality opinion) (detailing the Court's earlier market participant decisions). For treatments of the market
participant exception, see Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce
Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71 (1980); Benjamin C. Bair, The Dormant
Commerce Clause and State-Mandated Preference Laws in Public Contracting: Developing a More
Substantive Application of the Market-Participant Exception, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2408 (1995); Dan T.
Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICiH. L.
REV. 395 (1989); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (1988); Paul
S. Kline, Publicly-Osvned Landfills and Local Preferences: A Study of the Market Participant Doctrine, 96
DICK. L. REV. 331 (1992); and Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CiIi.
L. REV. 487 (1981).
23. This mode of analysis requires several revisitations of West Lynn Creamery during the course of
this Article: first, in investigating what the Court has decided so far about the constitutionality of state
subsidies, see infra Part II; second, in examining whether there is merit in any of the methodologies
suggested by the Justices in West Lynn Creamery for sorting good from bad subsidies, see infra Part III;
and finally, in investigating whether the alternative methodology proposed here comports (as it surely must)
with the actual outcome of the case, see infra Section V.A. Although this Article concerns far more than
the propriety and impact of West Lynn Creamery, the recurring references to that case signal its centrality
in any inquiry about the constitutionality of business subsidies.
24. See, e.g., WILLIAM SCHWEKE ET AL., BIDDING FOR BUSINESS: ARE CITIES AND STATES SELLING
THEMSELVES SHORT? 19 (1994) (suggesting that nontax subsidies "are the fastest growing type of
development incentive").
25. To gain a sense of these problems, see infra Section V.B.
26. Karen Tumulty, Why Subsidies Survive, TIME, Mar. 25, 1996, at 46, 46.
27. A number of articles touch upon the general subject of subsidies and the dormant Commerce
Clause. See Coenen, supra note 22, at 473-78; Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional
Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 98-105 (1988); Enrich, supra note 18, at 441-43; Heinzerling, supra note
18, at 232-34, 257-64; Regan, supra note 4, at 1193-202; Varat, supra note 22, at 540-45. Another
treatment of subsidies appears in Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on
State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996), which looks generally at both
tax and nontax incentives for business development. That article, however, focuses on two subjects not
addressed here: (I) whether the constitutionality of a subsidy should depend on its generality of application
and, more particularly, on the state's targeting of a single firm with the design of attracting it to the state;
[Vol. 107: 965
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has relied on the Commerce Clause to strike down state laws that "favor local
businesses over out-of-state businesses. 28 On their face, state subsidies seem
to violate this principle because their availability to targeted businesses
invariably hinges on engaging in business operations within the subsidy-
granting state. Similarly, the Court often has decried state action that
"neutraliz[es] the advantage possessed by lower cost out-of-state producers." '
Yet monetary subsidies-no less than the protective tariffs that the Court
repeatedly has condemned'--have precisely this effect."' It is not
uncommon for international free trade pacts to restrict member nations' power
to dole out monetary subsidies because such subsidies distort the efficient
distribution of productive activities.3 2 Symmetry of logic suggests that state-
paid subsidies should likewise offend any principle designed to safeguard our
own "common national market among the states."33
The case against subsidies draws its greatest strength from the Court's
unstinting use of the Commerce Clause to outlaw discriminatory tax breaks."
Assume, for example, that the State of Oregon, wishing to help along a
fashionable industry, enacts a law that gives any business that operates a
and (2) whether the constitutionality of subsidies should depend on the form of benefit the state awards
(e.g., on whether the subsidy is a cash grant, a land grant, a forgivable loan. etc ) Thcsc important
subjects-as well as the problem of coupling subsidies with so-called "downstream restraints"--are not
further considered in this Article. The "downstream restraints" problem, which is particularly important and
complex, is separately considered in a number of other articles, including Coenen. supra note 22. at 468-73.
476-78, Kline, supra note 22, at 380-83; and Varat, supra note 22. at 560-64
28. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias. 468 U.S. 263. 272 (1984).
29. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186. 194 (1994): see also. eg. Bald%in v G A F
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935) (asserting that states "may not insist that producers in other
states surrender whatever competitive advantages they may possess"). Alliance for Clean Coal v Miller.
44 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 1995) (striking down the Illinois Coal Act because it "has the same effect as
a 'tariff or customs duty-neutralizing the advantage possessed by lower cost out of state producers"
(quoting West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194)).
30. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Varat, supra note 22. at 543 (stating that a "'direct subsid) seeks to reduce the
competitive edge possessed by out-of-state business"): Note. Functional Anals-sts. Subsidies. and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1537. 1542 (1997) ("Both tariffs and subsidies, assuming
no countervailing retaliatory action, allow in-state producers 'who produce at higher cost to sell at or below
the price charged by lower cost out-of-state producers."' (footnote omitted) (quoting West Lynn Creamer-.
512 U.S. at 195)).
32. For example, Professor Gergen reports that "Itlhe European Economic Communit) (EEC) generally
prohibits subsidies that threaten to disrupt competition." Gergen. supra note 22. at 1137 n.209 (citing
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY. Mar. 25. 1957. art. 92(). 298 U N T S.
11, 51); see also General Agreement on Trade in Services. Apr. 15. 1994. Annex lB. art XV. 33 I L-M.
1167, 1179; RAi BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 790-800 (1996) (detailing restictions imposed by
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures).
33. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525. 538 (1949): see also Christopher R. Drahozal. On
Tariffs v. Subsidies in Interstate Trade: A Legal and Economic Analssis, 74 WASte U L Q 1127. 1143
(1996) ("The analogy between international trade and interstate trade is a close and useful one, states and
nations undertake similar sorts of actions that have comparable economic effects "1
34. See Coenen, supra note 22, at 479-80 (discussing, among other cases. New Eiergs Co r Limbach.
486 U.S. 269 (1988); and Bacchus Imports Lid. v. Dias. 468 U S. 263 (1984))
HeinOnline  -- 107 Yale L.J. 971 1997-1998
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 965
winery in the state an annual $25,000 credit against state income taxes. What
will happen if the law is challenged by an out-of-state winery that markets its
product nationwide and thus owes and pays income taxes in Oregon? Existing
authorities indicate that the credit would be unconstitutional because
entitlement to it is overtly conditioned on wineries' conducting business
operations in the taxing state.35
Now assume that Oregon takes another route. Instead of giving local
winery operators the $25,000 tax credit, the state collects in full all income
taxes owed by wineries but also grants local wineries an annual $25,000
monetary subsidy. As a matter of "economic realities" 36-which the Court
has often declared the proper focal point of Commerce Clause analysis 37-the
cash bounty produces the same result as the tax credit.38 The subsidy, after
all, merely puts back in the local producers' coffers the same $25,000 that the
credit had kept there. Each mode of preference thus permits the in-state
35. See, e.g., Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984) (finding a violation of the
antidiscrimination principle because "the gross receipts tax at issue ... provides that two companies selling
tangible property at wholesale in West Virginia will be treated differently depending on whether the
taxpayer conducts manufacturing in the State or out of it"); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429
U.S. 318, 337 (1977) ("[N]o State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business
operations performed in any other State."). Indeed, the credit most likely would be held unconstitutional
even if it were conditioned on the establishment of new and additional winery operations in the state.
Support for this conclusion comes from, among other sources, Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466
U.S. 388, 402-07 (1984), and a variety of lower court decisions, see Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 27,
at 815 n.139, 818-19 (citing cases). To be sure, as Professor Hellerstein and I have noted, it is possible to
distinguish Westinghouse from the tax-credit-for-a-new-business case. See id. at 814; see also Enrich, supra
note 18, at 429 (noting that "the precedential value of the Westinghouse Electric ruling may be limited by
the attention paid by the Court to idiosyncratic features of the New York credit provision"); Philip M.
Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to State Tax Discrimitation Under the
Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879, 936 (1986) (emphasizing the distinctive feature of the credit
at issue in Westinghouse, which not only provided an incentive for in-state business activity, but also
penalized additional out-of-state activity); infra Subsection IV.A.2 (setting forth an argument for
distinguishing development incentives from protectionist devices). Professor Hellerstein and I have also
explained, however, that this narrow reading of Westinghouse is probably unwarranted. See Hellerstein &
Coenen, supra note 27, at 814-15. Indeed, even the leading proponents of a narrow reading of that case
acknowledge that the Westinghouse Court "used language that suggested a very broad scope might be given
to the concept of tax neutrality." Tatarowiez & Mims-Velarde, supra, at 935.
36. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
37. See infra notes 189-190, 405 and accompanying text.
38. See Fireside Nissan, Inc. v. Fanning, 30 F.3d 206, 216 (Ist Cir. 1994) ("[W]e see no practical
difference between the tax break offered to local liquor producers in Bacchus ... and a 'direct' cash
subsidy to those same industries .... ); Carlson v. State, 798 P.2d 1269, 1278 (Alaska 1990) ("[Permitting
a] state [to] subsidize its own residents in the pursuit of their business activities and not similarly situated
nonresidents ... seems economically indistinguishable from imposing a facially equal tax on residents and
nonresidents while making it effectively unequal by a system of credits and exemptions. Such schemes have
been struck down by the United States Supreme Court."); Enrich, supra note 18, at 442 (noting the
"structural similarities between tax incentives and direct governmental subsidies and ... their comparable
practical effects on business decisionmaking"); Heinzerling, supra note 18, at 263 (noting the tariff-
duplicating effects of subsidies); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implenentitg
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 717
(1970) ("A dollar is a dollar-both for the person who receives it and the government that pays it, whether
the dollar comes with a tax credit label or a direct expenditure label.").
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operator to reduce prices and thereby increase market share in equal
measure. 39 In fact, the monetary subsidy may favor local winery operators
even more than the tax break because the subsidy goes to all local operators,
whether or not they generate sufficient income to produce a $25,000 tax
bill .
40
Does it follow that the monetary subsidy for local wineries is
unconstitutional? At least before the Supreme Court decided West Lynn
Creamery, the answer seemed to be "no."' In New Energy Co. v.
Limbach,42 for example, the Court distinguished an Indiana subsidy for
locally produced ethanol while invalidating an Ohio tax exemption that had
essentially the same economic effect. 3 Unlike a resident-favoring tax break,
the Court explained, "[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul of [the dormant Commerce Clause] prohibition." The
New Energy case, along with earlier authorities, signaled that states possess
broad powers to award monetary subsidies for the exclusive benefit of in-state
producers.45
39. See Chemical Waste Mgmt.. Inc. v. Hunt. 504 U S. 334. 351 (1992) (Rehnquist. CJ . dissenting)
(describing a subsidy as equivalent to a tax break); Texas Monthly. Inc. v Bullock. 489 U S 1. 34 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "tax exemptions may have the same economic effect as state subsidies".
Larry Alexander, A Unifying Theory?: Impossible, 72 DENv. U. L. REv. 1007. 1007 (1995) (strcssing the
difficulties of "draw[ing] the line between illegitimate tax and regulatory discrimination on the one hand.
and legitimate subsidy on the other"): Collins, supra note 27, at 98 ("Direct cash substdies to local
producers, if derived from general tax revenues, have almost the same economic effect on external
competition as tariffs."); Saul Levmore. Interstate E.xploitation and Judicial Intervention. 69 VA L_ REV
563, 566 (1983) (noting that subsidies and taxes "may have the same effects"); Surrey. supra note 38, at
714 ("[B]udgetary experts can take any tax expenditure and devise a budgetary expenditure approach to
serve the same goals as a direct expenditure."); Varat. supra note 22. at 544 (noting that the "result of an
effective local subsidy program will be the same as that of a tax"): The Supreme Court. 1975 Term-
Leading Cases, 90 HARV. L. REV. I, 60 (1976) (noting that subsidies "may provide local firms with a
competitive edge by creating price differentials between local and out-of-staie firms") For an article that
emphasizes this point in attacking current doctrine, see Michael J. Polelle. A Critique of the Market
Participant Exception, 15 WHITTIER L. REv. 647 (1994).
40. See Surrey, supra note 38, at 721 (noting that, unlike a monetary substdy, a tax credit "would not
help a new business experiencing initial losses and struggling to sta) alive. or it would help only by
deferring into the future, through a carry-forward provision, benefits needed at once") Notably. much
literature is devoted to the business of distinguishing subsidies from tariffs. See. e.g.. Drahozal. supra note
33, at 1143-56; Levmore, supra note 39, at 577-80. But the difficult question is not whether subsidies differ
from tariffs; instead, it is whether subsidies differ from discriminatory tax expenditures. That is the subject
of this Article.
41. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
42. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
43. See infra notes 242-250 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reasoning)
44. New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278.
45. See Hellerstein & Coenen. supra note 27. at 840-46 (discussing pre-West Lynn Creamery subsidy
cases in detail); see also Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec. Free Trade and tire Regulator State A
GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 47 VAsND. L. REv. 1401. 1412 n 32 (1994) ("Cascs
involving state proprietary functions and subsidies belong to yet another category, such laws being
generally immune from [dormant Commerce Clause] scrutiny.").
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Against this backdrop, West Lynn Creamery came before the Court. At
issue was the constitutionality of a Massachusetts law designed to shore up the
state's small and struggling dairy industry. The program had two components.
First, it forced Massachusetts milk dealers to pay into a segregated fund a
charge on all milk sold, regardless of its place of origin. Second, it mandated
periodic distributions from this fund exclusively to in-state dairy farmers.46
Writing for five members of the Court, Justice Stevens found that the
Massachusetts tax-and-subsidy package was unconstitutional. The scheme, the
Court ruled, operated "in effect" as a "protective tariff."47 Because the
subsidies constituted a de facto "rebate" of the milk sales levy,48 the program
"as a whole"4 9 offended the Court's ban on "'state statutes that clearly
discriminate against interstate commerce.'" '50
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia faulted
the majority for writing so broadly as to imperil all state subsidy programs.
Justice Scalia was prepared to declare the distinctive Massachusetts scheme
unconstitutional, but only on the narrow ground that the milk taxes had gone
into and back out of a "segregated fund." 51 For Justice Scalia, if the milk
producer subsidy had been paid "from the general revenues," it would have
been constitutionally unobjectionable "with or without nondiscriminatory
taxation of the [milk] industry. 52
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Blackmun. In their view, the Massachusetts program embodied nothing more
than a constitutionally "evenhanded" tax combined with the sort of local
producer subsidy that cases like New Energy had endorsed. 3 The dissenters'
focus of concern, however, was not the majority's invalidation of the program
at issue in West Lynn Creamery itself. Instead, tracking the mood of Justice
Scalia, the Chief Justice voiced alarm that the majority's reasoning might well
portend the demise of all state monetary subsidies.5 4 Justice Scalia found that
the majority opinion created this risk because, in his view, it invoked "every
free-market snippet of reasoning" discoverable in "the entire corpus of
negative-Commerce-Clause opinions. 55 For Justice Scalia, the majority's
noncontextual parroting of these passages reflected the "sweeping" principle
"that every state law which obstructs a national market violates the Commerce
46. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1994).
47. Id. at 197.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 201.
50. Id. at 192 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988)).
51. Id. at 210 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 214 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 213.
55. Id. at 207 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Clause," including the inevitably market-distorting state law that bestows a
business subsidy.
56
The central flaw in Justice Scalia's depiction of the majority opinion is,
ironically, that he focused only on "snippets" of the majority's analysis. In
fact, the West Lynn Creamery majority signaled-at no fewer than three
separate points in its opinion-that its decision was not meant to undermine
the ordinary producer subsidy.57 Justice Scalia simply did not deal with these
telling passages in a satisfying way. Instead, he dismissed them as susceptible
to meaning at most that the Commerce Clause countenances subsidies paid to
"the local hardware store" and other businesses so small that they "are not
competing with businesses out of State."5' This reading of the majority
opinion is hard to comprehend, however, because the majority's reasoning did
not focus at all on whether subsidies were paid to small or large businesses.
Instead, in striking down the Massachusetts program, the Court emphasized the
distinctly problematic economic and political effects it perceived in the state's
"conjoining a tax and subsidy."59 As the majority stressed, the case involved
neither a freestanding tax nor a freestanding subsidy but rather a novel
program that "coupled" a subsidy with a simultaneously enacted tax.60 It was
this program "as a whole" that raised constitutional difficulties and this "entire
program" that the Court accordingly invalidated.6' In short, the majority's
analysis permitted, and indeed encouraged, lower courts to distinguish the
subsidy that is "standing alone ' 62 from an "integrated" program that involves
both "contributions to" and "distributions from" a subsidy fund.63
56. Id.
57. First, the Court expressly assumed that a subsidy paid to Massachusetts dairy farmers "would be
constitutional standing alone." Id. at 199 (majority opinion). Second. after noting that the Court had never
"squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies." the majority swiftly (and wi.th an unquestioning
citation to New Energy) added: "We have, however, noted that '[dlirect subsidization of domestic industry
does not ordinarily run afoul' of the negative Commerce Clause." ld at 199 n. 15 (quoting New Energy Co
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)). Finally. tn the body of its opinion, the majont asserted-agam
without qualification-that "[a] pure subsidy funded out of the general revenue ordmanly imposes no
burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 199.
58. Id. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurrng).
59. Id. at 199-200 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). see also Heinzcing. supra note 18. at 263
("[I]n West Lynn Creamery, the Court took pains to distinguish 'a pure subsidy funded out of the general
revenue' from the tax and subsidy scheme developed by Massachusetts."); Patterson, supra note 18. at 1001
("In [West Lynn Creanierv]. the Supreme Court held that even though a tax and a subsidy may not
individually violate the Commerce Clause, a violation may occur when the tvo are used in conjunction ")
60. West Lynn Creamers, 512 U.S. at 200.
61. Id. at 201.
62. Id. at 199.
63. Id. at 201; see also Drahozal. supra note 33. at 1165 n 194 ("Some commentators argue that W1eui
Lynn Creamer' casts doubt on the constitutionality of all state subsidies. .. (But that] fear should be
unwarranted."); Heinzerling, supra note 18, at 221-22 ("State and local governments (probably) may
favor their own citizens in distributing subsidies from general tax revenues "'
1998]
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The Court's recent decision in Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of
Harrison64 swept away any doubt about whether West Lynn Creamery
embodied a de facto disallowance of state subsidy programs. At issue in the
case was whether a state could condition a property tax exemption for
nonprofit corporations, claimed by fee-charging camps, on their provision of
services primarily to residents of the state. In defending the tax exemption, the
state relied on the Court's earlier subsidy-endorsing authorities, particularly
New Energy. The Court, however, invalidated the discriminatory exemption,
noting that the distinction between subsidies and tax breaks "is supported by
scholarly commentary as well as precedent, and we see no reason to depart
from it."'65 The Court's logic in Camps Newfound/Owatonna thus seems to
provide support for the conclusion-diametrically opposed to the one drawn
by Justice Scalia in West Lynn Creamery-that state subsidies (unlike
equivalent tax breaks) are ipso facto constitutional. The Court, however, made
no such pronouncement, for its critical observation on this score came only in
the context of refusing to uphold a discriminatory tax break on the ground that
it was functionally indistinguishable from a purportedly constitutional
subsidy.66 As a result, the Court deemed it appropriate to do nothing more
than "[a]ssum[e], arguendo, that ... a direct subsidy benefitting only those
[businesses] serving [local] residents would be permissible., 67 In other words,
the Court did not reach the question whether the hypothesized subsidy, or any
subsidy, should itself survive constitutional challenge. Instead, the Court
cautiously reserved judgment on all such matters, emphasizing-just as clearly
as it had in West Lynn Creamery-that "we need not address these questions
today.' 68
What should the Court do tomorrow when it encounters challenges not to
discriminatory tax rebates or credits, but to business subsidies that take the
form of outright cash grants? I now turn to this question.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINARY BUSINESS SUBSIDIES
The largest question raised by West Lynn Creamery and Camps
NewfoundlOwatonna is the one that the Court expressly reserved: whether
ordinary state subsidy programs comport with the dormant Commerce Clause.
This question, in turn, requires an inquiry into whether there is a basis for
64. 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997).
65. Id. at 1606 (citing Enrich, supra note 18, at 442-43; Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 27, at 846-
48).
66. See id. at 1605-06.
67. Id. at 1605.
68. Id.
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treating subsidies differently from the economically comparable discriminatory
tax breaks the Court often has invalidated.69 Notwithstanding the Court's
ardent aversion to discriminatory taxation, both precedent and policy support
the traditional view that ordinary subsidies are exempt from Commerce Clause
attack.
A. Precedent
Professor Hellerstein and I have demonstrated elsewhere that abandonment
of the traditional hands-off approach to subsidies would mark a striking
departure from a long and strong line of Supreme Court precedents. Perhaps
most significantly, abandoning the traditional view would seem at odds with
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,7" a case decided within five
weeks of West Lynn Creamery itself.72 In Carbone, the Court struck down an
ordinance that required delivery of local trash to a single, town-approved waste
treatment facility. In finding that the ordinance unlawfully discriminated
against out-of-state waste handlers, however, the Court emphasized that
municipal subsidization of the facility provided a permissible, less restrictive
alternative for ensuring the facility's continued operation." In other words,
the Court in Carbone specifically endorsed the town's ability to direct a
monetary subsidy to a local competitor in an interstate market."
As Professor Hellerstein and I have noted, it is possible to read Carbone
in a narrow way that does not necessarily approve of discriminatory
subsidization of local industry:
Carbone does not say that the power to subsidize includes the power
to discriminate; it would be consistent with Carbone, for example, for
the Court to require the extension of any state subsidy presently
69. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
70. See Hellerstein & Coenen. supra note 27. at 839-46. For post-West L'nn Creamery case law that
supports this view, see USA Recycling, Inc. %: Town of Babylon. 66 F.3d 1272. 1291 (2d Cir 1995). in
which the court declared that "'local governments are perfectly free. as market participants, to use economic
incentives to benefit local businesses." The most significant pre-lest Lynn Creamerv cas may be Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). See. e.g.. Regan. supra note 4. at 1196 n 202 (noting that
Hughes suggests that a straightforward production subsidy for local producers is constitutionally
permissible).
71. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
72. Carbone was decided on May 16. 1994. See 511 U.S. at 383. West Lynn Creamery was decided
on June 17, 1994. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy. 512 U.S. 186. 186 (1994).
73. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394.
74. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 27. at 842 (noting, in particular, that all nine Justices in
Carbone recognized the state's power to subsidize). For a recent decision that draws on this feature of
Carbone, see USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1292, which relied on Carbone to uphold a spending sebeme that
channeled local waste to a local facility.
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awarded operators with in-state facilities to similarly situated out-of-
state operators, at least if those out-of-staters pay state taxes.75
This tightfisted translation of the approved power to subsidize, however,
should strike most readers as farfetched. First, when one learns that "the town
may subsidize the facility through general taxes, ' 76 one is not likely to
assume that the same support must be channeled to other facilities as well.
Second, a requirement of nondiscriminatory subsidization conflicts with the
Court's overarching goal of identifying an alternative means of ensuring the
long-term operation of the particular waste treatment facility involved in the
Carbone case. After all, if the government must subsidize local and nonlocal
waste-handling facilities in a nondiscriminatory way, there can be no assurance
that the local facility will prosper. In fact, in light of the competitive
advantages nonlocal facilities presumably already enjoy," nondiscriminatory
subsidization may not advance the government's purposes at all. In sum, the
more natural and policy-sensitive reading of Carbone indicates that the Court
approved the power of state and local governments to subsidize local business
operations without subsidizing nonlocal operations. Thus, Carbone strongly
supports the constitutionality of ordinary state subsidy programs.
B. Policy
Carbone and other cases-including West Lynn Creamery itself-provide
ammunition for the argument that monetary subsidies are constitutional as a
general rule.78 The cases, however, can hardly be deemed dispositive,
particularly in light of footnote fifteen in West Lynn Creamery and its
reiteration in Camps Newfound/Owatonna.79 The question thus remains
whether the Court's traditional acceptance of discriminatory subsidies makes
good sense. In particular, when one looks at the full body of dormant
Commerce Clause cases, a single key question arises: How can the tolerance
the Court has shown toward discriminatory subsidies be squared with the
intolerance it has directed toward discriminatory tax breaks?
75. Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 27, at 843-44.
76. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).
77. See id. (acknowledging the town's argument that "special financing is necessary to ensure the long-
term survival of the designated facility").
78. See Zenith/Kremer Waste Sys., Inc. v. Western Lake Superior Sanitary Dist., 558 N.W.2d 288,
292 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing West Lynn Creamery as "approving of subsidies funded out of
general revenues"); see also Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1144 (asserting that "the Court seems likely to
continue to approve of state subsidies" after West Lynn Creamery); Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 27,
at 839-40 (arguing that West Lynn Creamery supports the constitutionality of most state subsidies); supra
notes 57-63 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of West Lynn Creamery).
79. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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1. The Search for a Middle Ground, Considerations of "'Form. " and
Constitutional History
One way to approach this question is from a "big picture" point of view.
The theme of this picture is that the task of reconciling interests in federalism
and nationalism in dealing with financial preferences afforded local businesses
is one of enormous difficulty.80 There is much room for disagreement in this
field, and battles over constitutional policy are destined to be hard-fought.8 t
Against this backdrop, common sense suggests the wisdom of avoiding an all-
or-nothing approach. 2
The most apparent first step toward a middle ground position is to say that
(in general) local favoritism worked through tax breaks is unconstitutional,
while (in general) local favoritism effectuated through monetary payments is
not. From this perspective, it is not persuasive to say that subsidies and tax
breaks must be treated identically because "in substance" they operate the same
way.83 Instead, the substance of the matter-at least if some plausible
distinction between subsidies and tax breaks can be found-is that the Court's
general willingness to uphold monetary subsidies itself tends to justify its
unwillingness to uphold comparable tax breaks (and vice versa).
As one assesses this half a loaf approach, Carbone may again be
instructive. The issue in that case was whether the town could insist that all
solid waste within its borders be shipped to a local waste treatment facility for
disposal at an above-market price." The Court recognized that this forced use
rule was simply a "financing method" put in place to keep the local facility in
operation. 5 The Court struck down the rule, however, because monetary
80. Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully. 466 US 388. 403 (1984) (citing "'the delicate balancing
of the national interest in free and open trade and a State's interest in exercising its taxing powcr").
81. An interesting illustration of the divergence of stances in this area is provided by commentators
treatments of tax-based business development incentives. various obserers hac suggested that (I)
virtually all such business development incentives are unconsitutional. see Ennch. %upra note 18. at 380-
81, 448-67; (2) virtually no such business development icentices are unconstitutional. see Tatarowicz &
Mims-Velarde, supra note 35, at 928-37; (3) a distinction should be drason bet%%en incentives that
accompany an income or gross receipts tax as opposed to those that accompany a property or sales tax. see
Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 27, at 816-34: and (4) a distinction might be drawn between exemptions.
deductions, or credits that accompany a 'broad-based state tax" and those that accompany an "industry-
specific" tax, see Drahozal. supra note 33. at 1167. For an indication of the different views on how courts
should treat monetary subsidies, see infra Section W.A.
82. Cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56. 68 n.9 (1981)) (lauding "the Court's demonstrated success in
steering a middle course among proposed alternatives" in the jurisprudence concerning hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause).
83. E.g., Associated Indus. v. Lohman. 511 U S 641. 655 (1994) (suggesting that judicial analysis
under the dormant Commerce Clause should focus not on "'matters of form." but on ho%% state laws work
"in substance").
84. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstosn. 511 U S 383. 383 (1994) (noting that the "tipping
fee ... exceeded the disposal cost of unsorted solid waste on the pnate market")
85. Id. at 393.
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subsidization provided a "less restrictive alternative" for achieving this end. 6
In other words, the accepted availability of one form of state action that
advantaged local over nonlocal operations served to justify the rejection of
another. And the form that the Court deemed acceptable was the monetary
subsidy.
Perhaps Carbone is not helpful in this context because to say that a
subsidy is a less restrictive alternative to a forced use rule is not to say that a
subsidy is a less restrictive alternative to an economically equivalent tax break.
Indeed, the very statement that the subsidy and the tax break are "economically
equivalent" suggests that, in terms of financial and competitive consequences,
the former is not "less restrictive" than the latter. But maybe that does not
matter. Tax breaks and subsidies differ at least as a matter of form," and the
Court has found this formal difference significant outside the dormant
Commerce Clause context.88 In addition, despite decades of hand-wringing
about the controlling force of substance,89 the Supreme Court has recognized
more than once that form can play a dispositive role in dormant Commerce
Clause cases.9°
Does it follow that the Court should build its dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine around the "formal" difference between subsidies and tax breaks even
assuming their "functional" equivalence? There are at least historical reasons
for saying that it should. The Framers of the Commerce Clause, after all, took
focused aim, not at subsidies, but at disfavored forms of taxation, 91
particularly the protective tariff.92 Under the Articles of Confederation, states
86. Id. at 394 (citing New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
87. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 27, at 868-70.
88. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 n.6 (1983) (distinguishing "outright grants" from "a
genuine tax deduction" in applying the Establishment Clause even though "the economic consequences of
the program in Nyquist and that in this case may be difficult to distinguish" (citing Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973))); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (holding that
a tax break for church property did not violate the Establishment Clause, in part because the difference
between subsidies and tax exemptions is one of constitutional significance). Notably, the Court drew upon
this aspect of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence in finding no dormant Commerce Clause
violation in Camps Newfound/Owatonna. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct.
1590, 1605 nn.23-25 (1997).
89. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
90. See Dan T. Coenen & Walter Hellerstein, Suspect Linkage: The Interplay of State Taxing and
Spending Measures in the Application of Constitutional Antidiscrimination Rules, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2167,
2191-93 (1997) (discussing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995); Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298
(1992)).
91. See Letter from James Madison to J. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829). in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 14-15 (Congress ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865) (noting that the
Commerce Clause "grew out of the abuse of power by the importing states in taxing the non-importing").
92. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 27, at 80 (citing tariffs as the "paradigm examples" of "categorical
discrimination" barred by the Commerce Clause).
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could and did impose tariffs on the importation of out-of-state goods. 9" These
tariffs (along with other protectionist measures) precipitated retaliation by
neighboring states.94 And it was primarily the pre-constitutional proliferation
of such commercial impediments that brought about the Philadelphia
Convention and the Commerce Clause itself.9
Responding to the Framers' focused concern about protective tariffs, the
Court condemned them in its earliest expositions of the dormant Commerce
Clause principle.96 Building on this foundation, the Court also has struck
down discriminatory tax exemptions and credits,97 in large part because states
can use these devices to disassociate taxes from tariffs in name while
duplicating tariffs in effect. If, for example, a state puts a one percent tax on
all goods sold at wholesale, but then exempts from the tax all goods produced
in the state, the tax will operate just like a tariff: Charges will be imposed on
all imported goods, while no charge comes to rest on goods made by local
firms.98 To be sure, there are differences between many discriminatory tax
93. See JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 14445 (1916) ("IThe different
states, with their different tariff and tonnage acts, began to make commercial war upon one another");
Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1180 n.267 ("Without a doubt . . . there were significant disputes between the
states during the confederation era concerning tariffs on goods imported from other states."); Note.
Problems with State Aid to New or Expanding Businesses. 58 S. CAL. L. REV 1019. 1026 (1985) ("Before
ratification ... individual states levied tariffs on the products of other states.")
94. See Regan, supra note 4, at 1114 ("[The Framers) sa, states enacting protectionist restrictions.
they saw other states retaliating."); see also Hughes %. Oklahoma. 441 U.S. 322. 325-26 (1979) (noting
"tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among
the States under the Articles of Confederation")- Baldwin v. G.A.F Seelig. Inc. 294 U S 511. 522 (1935)
(pointing to "rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted"); cf C & A Carbone, Inc v Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (citing as a rationale for the prohtbition on protectionist laws the
prevention of retaliation by other states); THE FEDERALLIST No. 42. at 268 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (bemoaning duties as inviting "unceasing animosities" and "serious interruptions of the
public tranquility").
95. See, e.g., Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525. 533-34 (1949) (citing "commercial warfare"
among the states following the American Revolution as the condition prompting the movement for the
Constitution and asserting that the need for "centralized regulation of commerce" was fully understood by
all states); Collins, supra note 27. at 52 ("Most historians believe that commercial issues galvanized the
call for the Convention and were an important incentive for ratification."). For a recent recapitulation of
this point, see Carbone, 511 U.S. at 414 (Souter, J.. dissenting), which notes that "the Framers sought to
dampen regional jealousies in general and, in particular, to eliminate retaliatory tariffs, which had poisoned
commercial relations under the Articles of Confederation."
96. See. e.g., Guy v. Baltimore. 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1879): Collins. supra note 27. at 81 (noting that
"the Court has consistently struck down state and local 'drummer' taxes on local agents of outside
producers" because they "'had precisely the same effects as tariffs")- see also W C M. Window Co. v.
Berardi, 730 F.2d 486, 493 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[Olne thing is clear a state may not erect a tariff wall
protecting its industries from the competition of industries in other states . . .").
97. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully. 466 U S 388 (1984); Maryland v. Louistana. 451
U.S. 725 (198 1). See generally Associated Indus. v. Lohman. 511 U.S. 641. 647 (1994) (charactenzing "the
fundamental command of the Clause as being that 'a State may not tax a transaction or incident more
heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State' (quoting Armco Inc. v
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984))).
98. See Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1167 n.198 ("Of course. if the exemptions from a broad-based tax
were extensive enough-such as an exemption for all domestically produced goods.-evcn such a tax could
operate as a tariff (on all imports into the state).").
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laws and the archetypical protective tariff.99 But there is enough resemblance
in general that the Court has stood on steady ground in broadly holding
discriminatory taxation unconstitutional.
The anti-tariff principle, however, does not comfortably reach the simple
subsidy precisely because it is not "analogous in form" to a discriminatory
tax.'t° As we have seen, "economic equivalence alone has ... not been (and
should not be) the touchstone of commerce clause jurisprudence."' 0', Thus the
distinct formal difference between the cash subsidy and the protective tariff
suggests the dubious legitimacy of any effort to strike down the former by way
99. In particular, many resident-favoring tax breaks-unlike true tariffs-favor in-state business
producers not only at the expense of direct out-of-state competitors, but also at the expense of other in-state
producers, including producers of substitute goods. This renders such tax breaks less problematic than
tariffs both as a matter of economic effect (because discrimination in favor of in-state producers is not
complete) and as a matter of political process theory (because in-state producers of substitutes can act as
"surrogate representatives" of out-of-staters disadvantaged by the discriminatory tax). See infra text
accompanying note 202. As discussed below, see infra notes 365-370 and accompanying text, Bacchus
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984), provides an example of the sort of targeted tax break that is
less problematic than a true tariff.
The differing impacts of a targeted tax break and of a true tariff on differing categories of producers
are shown in the following chart:
PARTIES AFFECTED TARIFF TARGETED TAX BREAK
In-State Producers of the Product Helped Helped
In-State Producers of Substitutes Helped Hurt
Out-of-State Producers of the Product Hurt Hurt
Out-of-State Producers of Substitutes Helped Hurt
It may be said that tariffs are rendered less problematic than targeted tax breaks because out-of-state
producers of substitutes are helped by a tariff but hurt by a targeted tax break. For example, the tax in
Bacchus Imports hurt out-of-state producers not only of fruit wine, but also of sherry because it is a fruit-
wine substitute; in contrast, if Hawaii had put a tariff only on out-of-state fruit wine, the economic
disadvantaging of that product would have helped out-of-state producers of sherry. This "helping" effect
of the tariff on out-of-state producers of substitutes, however, is not nearly as significant as the help tariffs
give to in-state producers of both the tariffed product and the tariffed product's substitutes. Why? Because
this dual effect predictably sweeps away (at least in substantial part) all in-state producer opposition to the
protective tariff.
The targeted tax break, in contrast, must pass and persist in the face of inevitable opposition by in-
state producers of substitutes because of the "price differential that the exemption will permit." Id. at 269.
In short, at least from a political process perspective, a true tariff is more constitutionally problematic than
a tax break afforded to a specific industry from a generally applicable tax that reaches substitutes produced
in-state. Of course, the extent of this difference will vary as the number and strength of in-state substitutes
grows. At least when there are substantial in-state substitutes, however, it seems clear that the targeted tax
break is less problematic than the tariff. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 27, at 70-71 (noting the importance
of market substitutes); Note, supra note 93, at 1031 (noting that "consumption of steel substitutes, such as
aluminum, will be depressed if aluminum producers do not enjoy comparable external subsidies").
100. Regan, supra note 4, at 1201.
101. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 196 n.7 (1995); see supra text
accompanying note 90 (noting the Supreme Court's prior recognition of this point).
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of a principle directed at the latter. '02 This is especially true because the
historical evidence suggests that subsidies were in fact uncontroversial in the
pre- and post-framing period. 0 3 Plainly, if the Framers drew a distinction
between tariffs and subsidies, there is a powerful originalist argument for the
Court to draw that distinction too."3
2. Functional Considerations
Even if we dismiss this history-driven argument as unduly formalistic,
matters of substance lie behind the traditional judicial unwillingness to equate
subsidies and tax breaks." 5 Commentators and courts have argued, for
102. See Coenen. supra note 22, at 478-79; Hellerstein & Coenen. supra note 27. at 847-48. Regan.
supra note 4, at 1194 ("[A] discriminatory law is not analogous in form to the traditional instruments of
protectionism if the discrimination consists solely in channeling to locals benefits . . simply consisting
of... state funds."); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota. 504 U.S. 298. 312 (1992) ("Under the Articles
of Confederation, state taxes and duties hindered and suppressed interstate commerce: the Framers intended
the Commerce Clause as a cure for these structural ills . . It is in this light that %%e have interpreted the
negative implication of the Commerce Clause."): Henneford v Silas Mason Co. 300 U S 577. 586 (1937)
(upholding a compensating use tax because it cannot be "stigmatized as equivalent to a protective tanff")
103. As Drahozal writes:
[The historical record supports the view that bounties should be constitutional Bounties %ere
plentiful during the colonial period. Although the use of bounties declined dunng the
confederation era (mainly for budgetary reasons), they continued to be used with little or no
complaint. Moreover, states continued to enact bounties after the ratification of the Constitution.
suggesting that bounties had not become unlawful
Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1191-92.
104. A more general historical reason-rooted in our long "cultural hostility to taxation without
representation," Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr.. Losing Face bur Gaining Power- State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, 16 VA. TAX REV. 347. 383 (1997) (citing numerous soures)-also supports the traditional
distinction between affirmative subsidies and tax programs accompanied by exemptions for local business.
As I have noted elsewhere:
It runs deep in the American marrow that tax laws are susceptible to abuse when they disfavor
those with no say in the political process. Indeed, it was 'taxation without representation' that
in large measure accounted for the birth of the nation that the commerce clause seeks to hold
together.
Coenen, supra note 22, at 481.
105. These "matters of substance" do not-at least in an immediate sense-reflect economic
differences. Instead, as we soon shall see. they focus on propcrty-dnven notions of conventional fairness
and state autonomy, as well as on an elaborate cluster of political considerations. At the same time. these
considerations-particularly insofar as they concern political dynamics-have much to do with "economic
realities." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U S. 274. 279 (1977). The key point is that while any
particular tax break and any particular subsidy, once put in place, will operate in much the same way. it
is less likely that monetary subsidies will be adopted or retained. As a result, according to the argument
made here, the economic consequences of subsidies and tax breaks will differ greatly in the aggregate and
do so in a way that renders subsidies less threatening to our unitary national market For this reason. it
would be wrong-or at least a significant oversimplification---to suggest that the "functional" differences
between subsidies and tax breaks marshaled here are divorced from practical economic concerns
It is also worth noting that this Article's focus on political process considerations does not reflect
advocacy of a position in any debate about whether the dormant Commerce Clause pnmarily concerns
counteracting the political incapacities of "outsiders." see, r g. Jolt- HART ELY. DEOItCRACY AND
DIsTRUsT 83-84 (1980), advancing the reality of an efficiency-enhancing economic union. iee. eg.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 638-39 (4th d 1992). or achieving national political
integration and harmony, see. e.g.. Regan. supra note 4. at 1114 My own (preliminary) sense is that each
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example, that "political communities ... have a prima facie justification for
limiting distribution of their public goods to those who combine to provide
them."' 6 Others have argued that considerations of state autonomy reach
their highest ebb when "a state's use of its own tangible resources" is at
stake.10 7  These considerations, driven by policies of fairness and of
federalism, have been developed and defended elsewhere, and shall be touched
on again in due course.'0 8 For now, it suffices to observe that, if these
policies counsel relaxed application of the antidiscrimination principle in any
setting, they do so in cases that involve outright payments of a state's own
cash.
Even more important, the differences between outright subsidization and
the grant of tax breaks reflect the ways in which voters and their
representatives think and act. The existing literature touches on these political-
of these strands of thinking about the dormant Commerce Clause has a useful role to play and that these
different points of emphasis are more mutually reinforcing than mutually exclusive. I also believe that the
full argument advanced here readily comports with each of these overarching conceptions of the dormant
Commerce Clause.
106. Varat, supra note 22, at 523; see also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915) ("[Dlistribution
of the public domain, or of the common property or resources of the people of the State ... may be limited
to its citizens as against ... the citizens of other States .... "); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon,
66 .3d 1272, 1288 (2d Cir. 1995) (refusing to invalidate a "subsidy" given to the town-hired waste hauler,
by way of affording free access to the town incinerator, because such a plan involves "a local government
spending tax dollars for the benefit of its citizens"); LAURENCE 1I. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHoicEs 145
(1985) (noting the "sense of fairness in allowing a community to retain the public benefits created by its
own public investment"); Alexander, supra note 39, at 1007 ("If... subsidies ... were unconstitutional,
little sense would remain of the idea of separate states with particular concern for their own citizens'
welfare."); Bair, supra note 22, at 2420 (referring to "the moral and political entitlement of state residents
to the benefit of state funds"); Levmore, supra note 39, at 584 (citing the "failure of commerce clause
objections to a state's expenditures in favor of its own citizens"); Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation
Is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASt. L. REV. 47, 68 (198 1)
("[A]lthough some rights stem from residence in the United States as a nation, many others derive from
residence in a particular state. Prominent among the latter is the right to receive largesse from the state
government.").
107. Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 22, at 99 (concluding that "federalism demands a respect for
state decisions of political economy that the Court never has accorded in traditional dormant Commerce
Clause cases, a respect that the Court is institutionally ill-suited to reconcile with national economic
concerns"); see Heinzerling, supra note 18, at 259 ("[lIt does not seem an overstatement to say the very
idea of a town or a county or a state ... would become incoherent if these units of government were not
allowed to distinguish between insiders and outsiders in distributing government resources .... "); Twyman,
supra note 104, at 429 ("The most significant element [behind the market participant exception] seems to
be ... the use of resources which belong to the state itself."); Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 18, at 1130
("Proprietary activity [may be] viewed as an exercise of state fiscal autonomy in spending its money .... "
(emphasis omitted)); see also Gergen, supra note 22, at 1134 ("A rule prohibiting subsidies would be
difficult to administer because of the problems in distinguishing preferences in the allocation of public
services from subsidies that improve the position of a state's citizens in the market.").
108. See infra notes 343-355 and accompanying text. For an elaboration of the fairness- and
federalism-based arguments for state autonomy in resource distribution programs, see Coenen, supra note
22, at 421-30. In particular, for the reasons that state funds-including monies raised from out-of-staters
through generally applicable taxes-may properly be deemed "owned" by and fairly returnable to only the
state's own residents, see id. at 425-26.
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process-based distinctions.'19 Prior treatments, however, identify these
differences in abbreviated-and therefore greatly understated-terms."' In
fact, a host of functional considerations suggest that subsidies in the aggregate
do not threaten distortions of our "unitary national market" as much as
discriminatory tax breaks."'
First, a state's imposition of costs on its citizens is more visible when the
state awards outright subsidies than when it doles out tax relief." It is
sometimes said that subsidies pose a reduced risk of disrupting interstate
markets because they are inherently expensive to pursue." 3 This argument,
however, is open to question because basic tax expenditure theory teaches that
tax breaks and outright payments are functionally the same in this respect."'
109. Among the principal treatments of this topic are id. at 475.480-81; Ennch. supra note 18. at 442-
43; Gergen, supra note 22, at 1138; Hellerstein & Coencn, supra note 27, at 846-47. Kline. supra note 22.
at 370-91; and Regan, supra note 4, at 1194-97. See also Collins, supra note 27. at 103
110. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186. 211-12 (1994) (Scalia. J. concumng
in the judgment) (noting, in one sentence, the possible political process distinction betseen affirmative
subsidies and tax relief, but adding that this "'is not . . . the basis for my position").
I11. West Lynn Creamer., 512 U.S. at 193. It is possible, of course, that the distinctions described
here may prove to be of interest not only to lawyers, but also to those who work in the fields of economics.
political science, state and local government, accounting, and business. Among the nonlegal materials that
I found especially illuminating are: CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, TuE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1997): HERMAN B LEONARD. CHECKS
UNBALANCED: THE QUIET SIDE OF PUBLIC SPENDING (1986); SCiiWEKE Er AL. supra note 24; and Helen
F. Ladd, The Tax Expenditure Concept After 25 Years. in NATIONAL TAX ASS'N. 1994 PROCEi-EDINGS OF
THE EIGHTY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 50 (1994). Additional valuable materials include:
TAX EXPENDITURES AND GOVERNMENT POLICY (Neil Brce ed.. 1988): Karen M. Benker. Tat Expenditure
Reporting: Closing the Loophole in State Budget Oversight. 39 NAT'L TAX J. 403 (1986); J.E. Hams &
S.A. Hicks, Tax Expenditure Reporting: The Utilization of an Innovation. 12 PUB. BUDGETING & FiN. 32
(1992); Ronald F. King, Tax Expenditures and Systematic Public PolicY: An Essay on the Political
Economy of the Federal Revenue Code, 4 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 14 (1994): Allen Schick. Controlling
Nonconventional Expenditure: Tax Expenditures and Loans. 6 PUB. BUDGETING & FiN. 3 (1986). Aaron
Wildavsky, Keeping Kosher: The Epistemology of Tax Expenditures. 5 J. PUB. POL'y 413 (1985). and
Michael J. Wolkoff, The Nature of Property Tax Abatement Awards, 49 J. AM. PLAN ASS'N 77 (1983)
See also JAMES MOSES, STATE INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TIiE USA (The Economist Intelligence Unit
Special Report No. 187, 1985); NORTHEAST MIDWEST INST.. THE GUIDE TO STATE AD FEDERAL
RESOURCES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Charles Bartsch ct al. eds.. 1988); WILuAM SCHwEKE ET AL..
IMPROVING YOUR BUSINESS CLIMATE: A GUIDE TO SMARTER PUBLIC INVEsThMEN"I'S IN ECOOMtIC
DEVELOPMENT (1996); Robert H. Gleason, Reevaluating the California Sales Tar. Extemptions. Equaltv.
Effectiveness, and the Need for a Broader Base. 33 SAN DIEGO L REV. 1681 (1996). Richard D Pomp,
State Tax Expenditure Budgets-And Beyond. in THE UNFINISHED AGENDA FOR STATE TAX REFORM 65
(Steven D. Gold ed., 1988). The classic works on tax expenditure theory include STANLEY S SLRREY &
PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985). and Surrey. supra note 38
112. See Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors. Inc. v. Edwards. 901 F Supp 1125.
1137 (M.D. La. 1995) (recognizing that tax exemptions differ from subsidies because "'an exemption assists
the exempted enterprise passively" whereas subsidies are subject to "'heightened political visibility");
GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 300 (2d ed. 1991 ) (noting the suggestion that outright
subsidies have greater "political visibility"); Gergcn, supra note 22. at 1111-12 (distinguishing subsidies.
which signal costs to the state, from measures "[whose] cost is hidden").
113. See Regan, supra note 4, at 1194; see also Varat. supra note 22. at 541 ("[Mlonetary resources
are finite; making funds available for one purpose, or for one group. makes them unavailable for use by
another.").
114. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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A better formulation holds that it is easier for a legislator or a voter to see that
a state is spending its money when it actually writes and sends out a
check." 5 And when state spending is more easily seen, it is more easily
scrutinized, second-guessed, and blocked."
16
Second, the extent of cost-no less than the fact of cost-is more readily
perceptible when the state's support of local industry takes the form of a
monetary subsidy." 7 This is the case because the total amount of subsidy
115. See LEONARD, supra note I 1, at 108 ("Since no funds need be appropriated, tax subsidies seem
less expensive."); id. at 205 ("Public financing through the appropriations process ... provides some sense
of actual spending taking place."); SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note I ll, at 105 ('The relative invisibility
of tax expenditures inevitably causes many congressmen to think almost immediately of a tax response to
a particular social, business, or other problem of concern to them."); Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1153-54
n.143 (describing the phenomenon of the relative transparency of subsidies as compared to tariffs or
quotas); Enrich, supra note 18, at 395 ("[T]he costs of tax incentives remain largely invisible in the
political process."); Surrey, supra note 38, at 721-22 ("[Mlany tax incentives look, and are, highly irrational
when phrased as direct expenditure programs structured the same way. Indeed, it is doubtful that most of
our existing tax incentives would ever have been introduced, let alone accepted, if so structured, and many
would be laughed out of Congress."). As one commentator observes:
If tax expenditures were administered as grants out of annually appropriated funds, they would
quickly be subject to the same scrutiny as other grant programs. As soon as we started issuing
actual checks, we would become more curious about whose names are on them. Disbursing real
money has a way of galvanizing public attention.
LEONARD, supra note I11, at 127.
116. See Ladd, supra note Ill, at 53 ("(A]lthough many tax provisions function like spending
programs, they are not subject to the same scrutiny as direct spending programs."); Neil Bruce, Pathways
to Tax Expenditures: A Survey of Conceptual Issues and Controversies, in TAX EXPENDITURES AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY 21, 45 (Neil Bruce ed., 1988) ("[Tihe main difference between taxes and direct
expenditures is the government processes involved in their approval and administration. As Leonard ...
states, funds administered through the expenditure process are 'deliberated, approved, recorded and
revealed."' (quoting LEONARD, supra note Il l)); see also LEONARD, supra note Il l, at 147 ("State use
of tax expenditures seems part of a general pattern described in the discussion of federal tax expenditures:
when governments want to foster a public purpose, but do not want the exposure and scrutiny of the
appropriations process, they turn to tax expenditure devices."). The low visibility of the "cost" of a tax
break may be especially problematic when (as is often the case) the tax break is enacted contemporaneously
with the tax to which it applies because the overall effect of such legislation is to raise revenue and thus
reduce budget-balancing problems. See Levmore, supra note 39, at 584-85. Of course, as others have
observed, "[s]ubsidies can be made less transparent." Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1153 n. 142. For example,
visibility concerns may well explain states' avoidance of "lump-sum payments" in favor of subsidization
"based on the level of production" and "government loan programs." Id. Professor Hellerstein and I have
argued elsewhere that-while the costs of some subsidies (including forgivable loans) may have somewhat
reduced visibility-this reality does not justify placing them in a separate category from ordinary subsidies.
See Hellerstein & Cocnen, supra note 27, at 865-66.
117. See Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1153 ("[S]ubsidies, at least in their pure form, are more
'transparent' than tariffs-that is, their costs are more obvious to voters."); Enrich, supra note 18, at 396
("Indeed, because many tax breaks focus on new or expanded business activity, their advocates commonly
argue that the incentives entail no loss of revenue at all, for in the absence of the incentives, the businesses
that receive the tax breaks would have located elsewhere and the state revenues foregone by the incentives
never would have been available in the first place."); id. at 443 ("[Tax breaks) are less politically
visible-indeed, their actual costs are often unknown .... ); Kline, supra note 22, at 374 n.202
("[S]pending ... generates a direct cost to the state visible to the state legislature."). One observer notes:
A subsidy financed by tax revenue and hence going through the budget makes it obvious that
an industry is protected. A clear sum of money stands witness to the cost .... By
contrast, . . . [q]uite elaborate research may be needed to calculate the subsidy-equivalent of the
tariff .... For this very reason free-trade-minded economists preferred subsidies to tariffs long
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payments can be determined through the easy means of tallying total payments
by the state. Moreover, "with a subsidy, there is a state budget item that
precisely quantifies the amount paid to domestic producers," and "[tihat
information is simply and cheaply available.""'  In contrast, tax expenditures
are made "passively"-not through the outright expenditure of state funds, but
(at least usually) through claims made by taxpayers on their tax returns."9
While "tax expenditure budgets" are theoretically constructable, they seem not
to work well in practice. 12 ' As a consequence, discriminatory tax breaks pose
a heightened risk to Commerce Clause values because "their actual costs are
often unknown."'
121
before the theory of domestic distortions was deseloped The chances of sustained protection
are certainly less with subsidies.
W. MAX CORDEN. TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC WARFARE 56 (1974).
118. Drahozal, supra note 33. at 1153; see also LEONARD. supra note I11. at 121 (noting that. in
contrast to tax expenditures. "(n]o ... ambiguity arises in defining direct outlays: a dollar of spending is
relatively easy to define").
119. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664. 690 (1970) (Brennan. I . concurrng). ttOSSARD. supra
note 11l, at 16 ("[flax expenditures leave a fainter paper irad than comparable direct spending
programs; ... their low profile can be a decided advantage for the programs' ad%ocates "). Ladd. supra
note 111, at 52 ("[W]hen tax provisions lead to taxes not being collected, nothing is taken from indi iduals.
and therefore there is nothing to account for."): see also Wolkoff. supra note I ll. at 79 ("a, abatements
contain elements that make implementation easy. For example, benefits appear to be realized %ithout
cost."). Another commentator adds:
When a program is delivered through the tax system, however, unlike a direct spending
program, it cannot be monitored on an on-going basis. Even the most basic information about
tax expenditures must be obtained from tax returns and is normally not available until ocr a
year and a half after the program is first enacted.
Neil Brooks, Comment, ii TAX EXPENDITURES AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 324. 329 (Neil Bruce ed. 1988)
120. See SCHWEKE Er AL., supra note 24, at 21 (noting that very few states hase useful "tax
expenditure budgets"); Richard M. Bird. Comment. in TAX EXPENDITURES AND GovER.siENT" POLICY 123.
123 (Neil Bruce ed., 1988) ("[A]s many of the papers at this conference show, any particular set of
[tax expenditure budget] numbers is always open to attack and. even worse, misuse. In this respect at least.
tax expenditure analysis still remains in the 'twilight zone'. .. -": Thomas S Neubig, The Current Role
of the Tax Expenditures Budget in U.S. Polic'taking. in TAX EXPENDITURES AND GOVER',N r POLICY
239, 243 (Neil Bruce ed., 1988) ("IT]he current Ifederal) tax expenditure budget is siescd. correctly, as
having conceptual and measurement problems which render it both practically and politically difficult to
play a larger role in public policy debate."); Wildavsky. supru note I ll. at 420-.25 (detailing difficultics
of constructing useful tax expenditure budgets). One commentator concludes"
The tax expenditure budget (TEB) has figured in congressional debates about tax reform, and
it may have helped to limit expansion and reduce the scale of some tax expenditures But the
tax expenditure device has shown itself to be remarkably robust Most of the tax expenditures
listed in the original TEB are still in force. Revenue losses continue to increase
LEONARD, supra note Il l, at I10-1 I. He adds that "Ififty tax expenditure items %%ere listed in the first
TEB; there are now more than twice that many. The introduction of TEBs does not appear to have altered
the historical trajectory of tax expenditure spending." Id. at 117. see also infra note, 146-149 and
accompanying text.
121. Enrich, supra note 18, at 443; see also LEONARD. supra note I ll. at 107 ("Tax breaks do their
best work in the dark. When governments support activities by issuing checks,. it is usually easy to identify
the activity, the recipient, and the amount of support. All three are in doubt when the support comes
through tax breaks."); id. at 129 ("Because tax expenditure spending is intangible (hos much more revenue
would we have in the absence of subsidies?), it has an ethereal character .... You can't see or smell or
feel it the way you can real money, and so it remains easier to spend than real money "). SC)IWEKE El' AL.
supra note 24, at 67 ("Reductions in taxes or tax rates that are used to influence business decisions are
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Third, tax credits, exemptions, and the like are resistant to repeal because
legislatures typically enact them as presumptively permanent features of state
tax codes. 2 2 In contrast, because subsidies involve the direct expenditure of
funds, they routinely show up-and are subject to recurring reevaluation-as
expense items in perennially controversial state budget bills. 23 As a result,
in each legislative session, the subsidized industry must compete with every
other interest group in the state to retain its piece of the appropriations pie.
24
This continuing structural vulnerability to elimination distinguishes the
monetary subsidy from the ordinary tax break.' 25
analogous to spending programs or subsidies .... But, unlike direct expenditures, the value of tax
expenditures is not always compiled and disclosed to the public."); Enrich, supra note 18, at 395-96
("Forecasts both of the foregone revenues from business tax incentives and of their countervailing economic
benefits (with their derivative revenue gains) are notoriously open to debate; as a result, decisionmakers
can freely espouse estimates that minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of such incentives,").
122. See Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, 901 F. Supp. 1125,
1137 (M.D. La. 1995) (noting that "[t]ax laws are generally effective until repealed," whereas subsidies are
regularly reevaluated); Enrich, supra note 18, at 395 ("[Tax laws] are typically adopted through a process
independent of the appropriation machinery, and they ordinarily do not require annual re-authorization, as
direct budgetary outlays do."); id. at 443 (emphasizing that tax breaks typically become "a standing part
of the tax code"); Ladd, supra note I 11, at 55 (noting that "because they are still typically treated more
like provisions of the tax code than like direct expenditures, [tax breaks] continue to be harder to cut than
direct spending" and that experience at the federal level has shown that "most tax expenditures ... are here
to stay"); Schick, supra note Ill, at III (noting that "[m]any [tax breaks] are established in permanent
legislation and continue in effect without new budget decisions" and that therefore they "often do not
undergo regular budgetary or legislative review"); see also Gleason, supra note Ill, at 1703 n.98 (noting
that in California "fewer than 15% of all existing tax expenditures have 'sunset' provisions"); cf Guido
Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Foreword: Antidiscrimination and ConstitutionalAccountability
(What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 104 (1991) (discussing inertia that results
in legislatures' "often ... failing to repeal old laws").
123. See Coenen, supra note 22, at 481 (noting that "the annual revisitation of legislated subsidies
should assure that the state interest supporting the program remains a keen one," while exemptions lack
such visibility); Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1155-56 ("[A] subsidy is a less durable form of protection than
a tariff. Subsidies must be appropriated by the state legislature on an annual basis. Thus, subsidies require
ongoing lobbying by protected industries in order to assure that protection continues. Conversely, tariffs
are not automatically revisited on a year-to-year basis. Once a tariff is enacted, it continues to protect the
industry until affirmatively repealed .... ); Kline, supra note 22, at 374 ("State subsidies ... are
dependent upon the renewed grace of the local legislature, city, or town council for their continuance. As
such, they are visible, direct, and recurring costs to the state checked through both the political process and
the state budget." (footnotes omitted)); Pomp, supra note Ill, at 66 (discussing a 1969 New York
investment tax credit, which generated more than $660 million in credits before being restudied, and stating
that for 16 years the credit "received less review and analysis than did explicit spending programs that cost
a million dollars or less"); see also Surrey, supra note 38, at 725 (citing the "lack of an explicit accounting
in the federal budget for the tax expenditures involved in tax incentives"); id. at 730 ("[T]ax incentives are
not covered by the annual budgetary review process.").
124. See Enrich, supra note 18, at 395 ("Because tax breaks involve a reduction of public revenues,
rather than an expenditure of public funds, they do not directly compete with other programs demanding
scarce governmental resources."); id. at 395 n.91 ("These same considerations also enhance the appeal of
tax incentive methodologies for business advocates, because such measures simplify the legislative process
and obviate the need to fight the same battles each year.").
125. See LEONARD, supra note I11, at 108 ("[Tax expenditures are shielded from review. The tax
code is not revised every year, once a tax preference has been established, it does not require
reauthorization and new appropriations, as do direct expenditure programs."); SURREY & McDANIEL, supra
note 11l, at 107 (observing that "tax expenditures are more securely embedded than direct programs and
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Fourth, discriminatory tax breaks are more likely to damage our unitary
economy because they have an open-ended, unrestricted quality.'2 6 Subsidy
funds may simply run out, and subsidy programs at least will be scrutinized
with great care in the next budget cycle if cost overruns occur.'" In contrast,
discriminatory tax expenditures are not subject to any comparable empty
cookie jar effect.'28 Indeed, once in place, they may quickly grow through
incremental, and unnoticed, accretion.
1 29
thus will remain in effect considerably longer"): Bruce, supra note 116. at 45 (noting that "provisions in
the tax law are not subject to periodic review in the same way that expenditures are"); Ennch. supra note
18, at 443 ("[Tax breaks] do not have to compete with other demands on state resources in the
appropriation process."); Gleason, supra note 11, at 1703 ("(Tax expenditures] weaken the Legislature's
control over the budget because, once passed, they are no longer part of the normal annual appropnations
process."). Gleason observes:
Professor Bittker quotes Walter Heller in observing that tax subsidies might be politically more
palatable than direct expenditures and, moreover, that such subsidies, once granted, are difficult
to remove: ... "[H]ere is a whole catacombs of Government benefits which arc largely hidden
from public view, let alone, periodic review. Once imbedded in the tax structure, the preferential
provisions are treated as inalienable vested rights, impervious to changes in tax rates. economic
policy, and technology."
Gleason, supra note Il l, at 1703 n.98 (quoting Bons I. Bittker. Accouning for Federal "Tat Subsidies"
in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969)); cf Surrey. supra note 38. at 738 (arguing that. in
light of this traditional difference in treatment. "new tax incentive programs, if any arc to be adopted.
should have a time limit set on their operation to permit evaluation of ... effecti',eness"). As Ladd
points out:
State-specific rules may compound the inertia associated with tax-break appeals. For example-
Even greater barriers exist in some states, as is illustrated by California. In that state, tax
increases require a 2/3 favorable vote. Hence, because a reduction in tax expenditures is treated
as an increase in taxes rather than a cut in spending, it is harder to cut tax expenditures than
it is to cut direct spending. This 2/3 requirement plus other charactenstics of tax expenditures
have meant that during recessions and periods of budget deficits, the system is biased toward
cuts in direct spending and away from cuts in tax expenditures.
Ladd, supra note I 11, at 55.
126. See, e.g., LEONARD, supra note Il l, at 108 ("[T]ax expenditures arc entitlement programs, all
qualified applicants are granted benefits without reference to any ceiling."); SCWEKE Er AL. supra note
24, at 21 (noting that "tax incentives ... are not typical expenditures with a predetermined budget" and
that the "amount of these tax expenditures, then, cannot be predicted beforehand"); Surrey. supra note 38,
at 726 ("Tax incentives are usually open-ended: they place no limit on how much tax benefit a taxpayer
can earn. Hence it is difficult to foretell how much will be spent by the Government through a particular
incentive.").
127. See Bair, supra note 22, at 2422 (citing "built-in restraints" on resident contractual preference
laws).
128. See Enrich, supra note 18, at 443 ("[The] magnitude (of tax incentivesl is not typically fixed by
the legislature, like the cast of ordinary government programs. but rather is determined by the extent to
which taxpayers make use of them."); Surrey, supra note 38. at 730 ("[Wlhen overall expenditure limits
are directed by the Congress or when the President decides to cut expenditures it is essentially impossible
to apply the restrictions to tax incentives. So far none of the vanous expenditure control devices . have
in any way affected tax expenditures.").
129. See HOWARD, supra note I ll. at 183 ("As students of tax policy are well aware, tax expenditures
function like budgetary entitlements: once embedded in the tax code, these programs can grow without any
subsequent changes to eligibility criteria or benefit levels."); Gleason, supra note I ll. at 1704 ("[Tlhcre
is no cap on the amount of foregone revenue created by enactment or continuance of [a tax expenditurcl.-);
Ladd, supra note I ll, at 55 ("Like entitlement programs, growth in tax expenditures caused by increases
in the favored activity is not subject to pay-as-you-go provisions."); see also Schick. supra note Il1l. at I I
("[Tax expenditures are ... similar to entitlements. They ... tend to be open-ended. with costs nsing in
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Fifth, monetary subsidies differ from tax breaks because subsidy programs
are usually more costly for the state to administer. 30 From this perspective,
a major attraction of tax breaks is their method of operation: As a rule, persons
eligible for credits, exemptions, or deductions simply claim them on regularly
submitted returns, thereby reducing their own tax bills.'3' The establishment
of a subsidy program, in contrast, requires the creation of an administrative
machinery to handle funds and records and to make determinations as to
step with changes in exogenous conditions."). For an example of one tax expenditure that has experienced
invisible or unchecked growth, see HOWARD, supra note I ll, at 94. As Howard notes: "For most of its
history the home mortgage interest deduction experienced growth without advocacy. The program has
become somewhat more visible and politicized since then, but advocates still do not have to alter its
structure in order to produce growth." Id. Another commentator observes:
The volume of [business development tax] abatement activity has increased markedly. In New
York City, the amount of abated tax dollars now totals, after four years, over $4,000,000....
What is most interesting about this tremendous expansion of abatement awards is the apparent
ignorance with which they are made. It appears that once a locality decides to offer property
tax abatements, there are few conditions when awards are not made.
Wolkoff, supra note I ll, at 78 (citations omitted).
130. See JOINT ECON. COMM., 91ST CONG., 1969 JOINT ECONOMIC REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 91-142,
at 20 n.* (noting that "tax incentives ... can eliminate the need for additional bureaucratic apparatus");
see also LEONARD, supra note 11l, at 108 ("One view is that tax expenditures are used because they can
be precisely targeted and administered at low cost-that is, because they are efficient subsidies."); King,
supra note 11l, at 26 ("Administratively, such tax expenditures permit speedy implementation, with little
additional paperwork and without the expansion of what is often viewed as a prying bureaucracy."); Ladd.
supra note I 1l, at 54 ("[Ihe absence of red tape often gives tax expenditures administrative advantages
over direct subsidies, and the tax system provides a prompt and efficient mechanism for informing potential
applicants of relevant government programs, such as broad-based business incentive programs.").
131. For instance, one prominent legislator introduced a tax expenditure bill with the comments:
The advantages to a tax credit approach are numerous. The most important, however, is that the
program can go into effect immediately upon enactment.... This is an uncomplicated program
with the minimum of red tape .... This bill would require no Federal appropriations .... The
most convenient form for subsidizing a businessman is through his income tax.
115 CONG. REC. 12,876 (1969) (statement of Sen. Percy). Howard concurs:
By working through the tax code, the [tax expenditure) eliminates the need for large social
service bureaucracies. It requires seemingly small changes to established tax forms and existing
procedures of tax collection. The program is largely self-executing: individuals determine their
own eligibility and calculate their own benefits based on simple instructions accompanying the
annual tax return.
HOWARD, supra note I ll, at 140; see also LEONARD, supra note I ll, at 107-08 ("[Taxpayers ... claim
their subsidies through tax returns.... Tax-subsidized programs largely administer themselves."). Or as
another commentator puts it:
Most direct expenditure programs are administered so as to verify potential claimants' eligibility
for benefits before granting those benefits. Conversely, most tax expenditure programs check
for eligibility only on an expost basis, after the claimants have undertaken the specified activity
or expenditure and made their claim. For most tax expenditures these checks arise only where
documentary evidence is required with the tax return or where individuals are audited. The
majority of tax expenditure claimants are never checked at all.
Jonathan R. Kesselman, Direct Expenditures Versus Tax Expenditures for Economic and Social Policy, in
TAX EXPENDITURES AND GOVERNMENT POLICY, 283, 299 (Neil Bruce ed., 1988); see also Stanley L. Winer
& Walter Hettich, Tax Expenditures and the Democratic Process, in TAX EXPENDITURES AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY 379, 389 (Neil Bruce ed., 1988) ("The tax deduction or credit route may also save
on auditing costs by making use of existing auditing processes in the tax system.").
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eligibility and amounts.- 2 At first blush, this point may suggest that tax
expenditures are more efficient, and thus more defensible, than outright
monetary subsidies. The Constitution, however, is not a charter of economic
efficiency, particularly with respect to the intentionally checked and balanced
internal workings of government.'3 Moreover, insofar as the dormant
Commerce Clause restrains state power to interfere with private markets, its
purpose is not so much to advance economic efficiency per set as to
safeguard economic and political union. 3 ' From this vantage point, the
132. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna. Inc. % Town of Hamson. 117 S Ct 1590. 1605 n 23
(1997) (.'[A] direct money subsidy . . could encompass sustained and detailed administrati e
relationships .... .- (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n. 397 U.S 664. 675 (1970))). SL RREY & %ICDAIEL.
supra note III, at 108 ("Proponents of tax expenditures regard the Internal Revenue Servtce as an effecti e
administrative mechanism already in place to be utilized. Unlike the altemairie case inolving a direct
program, there is thus no need to establish a new process of administration. perhaps a new agency ").
Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1150 ("Tariffs and subsidies hase other costs as well For example, tariffs must
be collected and subsidies must be disbursed. These administrative costs are probably lower for a tariff
because tariffs have no disbursement costs ... "). Kesselman. sulwra note 131. at 315 ("The existing tax
systems offer a ready-made administrative and compliance inechasin for business incentives There is no
need to establish an entire parallel bureaucracy for promotion. claims processing, payment. auditing, and
enforcement, as would be required by a direct expenditure program of business incenti es "'). Neubig. suipra
note 120, at 249 ("The spector [sic] of the Department of Housing and Urban Deselopment administering
a mortgage interest subsidy program for the middle-class is not considered simpler than the current
mortgage interest deduction."). see also Turner Broad. SNs. Inc % FCC. 117 S Ci 1174. 1202 1997)
(rejecting the argument that subsidies for broadcast stations constitute a less restrctie altenatinc to must-
carry requirements imposed on cable systems and reasoning that a subsidN system "sould require the
Government ... to establish a potentially elaborate admmistratise structure to make subsidy
determinations"). Surrey, however, argues:
It is not the tax route that makes the program simple-it is a substantise decision to hase a
simple program. In many cases, it is true. direct expenditure programs are probabl)
overstructured and the urging of tax incentives is a reaction to. and a salid criticism of. badly
designed expenditure programs. The cure lies of course in better designed expenditure programs
Surrey, supra note 38, at 717.
133. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. 944 (1983) (stating that "'clonemence and efficiency
are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic goernmient"). Henry M. Hart. Jr. The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLt %i. L. REv 489. 490.91 (1954) (noting that the premise
of the federal system is that the complexity and inefficiency it produces are justified by countervailing
values).
134. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.. 481 U.S. 69.92 (1987) ("The Constitution does not
require the States to subscribe to any particular economic theor "). Anson & Schenkkan. supra note 22.
at 78 n.31 ("The assumption that the commerce clause embodies a free trade salue Is erroneous "1,
Kline, supra note 22, at 356 (rejecting "economic efficiency" as "'a 'core' constitutional % alue" underl, ing
the dormant Commerce Clause): Regan. supra note 4. at 1116 (asserting that "there is no constitutional
interest" in efficiency to the extent it is meant to describe "'lo prices or high production"). id at 1124
("The people who wrote our Constitution were by no means thoroughgoing free traders "). Id at 1180
("[S]tates are not required to legislate only in ways that swould be approved by a committee of theoretical
welfare economists .... *): Wells & Hellerstein. supra note 18. at 1126 ("lElconomic efficiency, hosscser
desirable, is not a criterion of constitutionality under the commerce clause.") c/f Regan, supra note 4. at
1234 (noting that in Exxon Corp. %: Governor of Mars.land. 437 U.S 117 (1978). the "Court upheld the
statute even though it may well have caused significant inefficienc) in gasoline distribution in return for
very slight benefits").
135. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond. 336 US 525. 533-35 (1949)1 stating that the Framers
designed the Commerce Clause to promote "solidanty" and "the peace and safety of the Union"). Kline.
supra note 22, at 356 (citing the "goal of national unmfication"l. Regan. upra note 4. at I115 n 55 (noting
that "the framers were worried about commercial nalry as a threat to the poltcal vability of the new
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greater administrative costs associated with subsidy programs should tend to
discourage their adoption and retention by the states in comparison to less
costly tax breaks. Given the goals of the dormant Commerce Clause, the
constitutional ban is thus logically targeted at the more politically appealing
discriminatory tax break, rather than at the less appealing monetary subsidy.
Sixth, cash subsidies are less likely than discriminatory tax breaks to take
hold and to persist because most people view tax structures (especially tax
structures applicable to corporations and other businesses) as an esoteric
specialty beyond their capability and willingness to understand.136 A failure
to understand breeds a failure to second-guess, and a failure to second-guess
implies that tax structures will, more readily than monetary subsidies, escape
political opposition.
Finally, a variety of psychological reasons-rooted in the general desire
for tax relief and a heightened attentiveness to how one's "own" money is
spent-suggest that citizens may well be more inclined to look the other way
when legislators enact a tax break than when they adopt an affirmative
monetary subsidy with comparable economic effects. 37 In particular, tax
breaks are more likely to gain acceptance because citizens do not perceive
them as taking away that which those citizens see as already being their
own 138 or as channeling scarce state funds to competing (but no more
union" (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6, 7 (Alexander Hamilton))).
136. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 267 (1997) (noting "how distant and alienating
the facts of tax seem to most people" and observing that "Americans have trouble filling out their own tax
forms"); SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note I ll, at 70 (noting "the complexity of the tax system as a
whole"); Winer & Hettich, supra note 131, at 395 ("['fax structures are inherently complex and thus
difficult to understand."). As Professor Surrey observes: "[Tihe tax system is complex enough as it is, and
to have a large number of tax incentives side by side with the provisions making up the structure of the
tax itself can only cause confusion and a blurring of concepts and objectives." Surrey, supra note 38, at
731. Surrey continues:
It may be that legislators and the beneficiaries of tax incentive programs-businesses receiving
accelerated depreciation or percentage depletion, state and local governments receiving tax
exemption on their bonds-fear that once the public is fully aware of the amounts involved and
can weigh expenditure costs against benefits received by the nation, the tax incentives will be
found wanting in many respects. In this view, the deeper the incentive is buried in tax
technicalities and tax terminology, the more it looks like any other technical tax provision, the
more it partakes of the protective coloration of the tax law that can be obtained by such outward
similarity to ordinary tax provisions, then the more desirable the tax incentive becomes.
Id. at 733-34.
137. See Surrey, supra note 38, at 715 ("It is often said that a tax incentive is more useful than a
direct expenditure because people do not like ... 'subsidies."'). One commentator reflects that
it can be expected that free individuals who form a compact to create a government with the
power to command resources from them will, in turn, demand accountability as to how those
resources are used. It is less obvious, to me at least, that they will demand the same sort of
accounting for resources that are not taken from them due to tax expenditures.
Bruce, supra note 116, at 46.
138. As Schick notes:
Although progress has been made in measuring tax expenditures, generally they arc not
perceived by the public or government as equivalents of direct spending. Insofar as they are
regarded as the retained earnings or wealth of taxpayers, it is understandable that tax
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deserving) claimants. 39 In addition, tax breaks may present a greater danger
to the goal of discrimination-free interstate trade because many people view the
proper "baseline" as a world in which governments engage in the most
minimal level of taxation. 40 On this view, tax breaks, more than subsidies,
accord with the perceived and preferred norm; indeed, subsidies become
suspect precisely because taxes are required to fund them."" In a similar
vein, subsidies may be looked upon unfavorably because they are symptomatic
of large and meddlesome government, while tax exemptions seem to comport
with limited government and the value of private initiative.'42 Non-
expenditures have not been subjected to the same measure of control as is commonly applied
to direct spending.
Schick, supra note I 11, at 12. Or as Wolkoff argues:
Since property tax abatements involve no budget allocation, local officials can support these
programs without visibly diverting funds from any group currently being supported. Tax
expenditures shield local officials from the political conflict that would be generated if
abatement awards were made at the expense of currently funded groups. This gives tax
abatements a distinct advantage over other economic development in:entives that involve direct
transfer of funds to investing firms.
Wolkoff, supra note 11l, at 79 (footnote omitted).
139. See ALAN STONE. REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 12 (1982) (noting that a common
response to subsidy proposals is for other groups to demand subsidies).
140. See, e.g., Self-Governing Americans, ECONOMIST, De. 21. 1996. at 29 30-31 (describing the
historical American antipathy to taxation).
141. As a recent commentary on proposed federal tax reforms stated:
If Washington wants to subsidize higher education, let it set up a program of grants and
scholarships. If it wants to reward capital gains, let it send checks to sellers of stocks.
Neither proposal would ever fly, of course. Each would be attacked as a new government
program in a downsizing era. Politically, it is safer to torture the tax code to accomplish the
same things and label the result a tax cut.
Avrum D. Lank, Tax Masters Find More lVays To Make Things Complicated. MILWAUKEE J. SE ,nNEL
July 1, 1997, at ID; see also LEONARD, supra note Ill. at 147 ("[D~ollars flowing through the
appropriations process feel expensive.").
142. Consider in this regard the observation of Alexis de Tocqueille: "The inhabitant of the United
States learns from birth that he must rely on himself to combat the ills and rials of life; he is restless and
defiant in his outlook toward the authority of society and appeals to its power only when he cannot do
without it." ALExIS DE TOCQUEViLLE. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer & Max Lemer cds. & George
Lawrence trans., 1966) (1835); see also SURREY & MCDANIEL supra note I ll, at 107 ("Business generally
dislikes the idea of government subsidies, with its implication that the private sector is incapable of
performing on its own. Tax expenditures, which business does not view as subsidies. carry no such negative
psychological effect."); id. at 104 (noting that "tax expenditure provisions [appeal to] public perceptions
of tax spending; legislators or presidents who do not want to appear to be 'big spenders' can comfortably
approve tax expenditures without damaging their image of fiscal conservatism.*" (footnote omitted)); Brooks.
supra note 119, at 328 ("[N]o moral opprobrium attaches in most social circles to tax avoidance ."); King.
supra note 11l, at 16 ("In those cases where the federal government wants to subsidize a seemingly good
thing but is uneasy about the entailed interference with the private sector, it consistently turns to the
taxation mechanism, resolving its ideological dilemma through reliance on a means that appears least
intrusive because it is based upon reduced public extractions from pnvate earnings."). King adds,
[W]hen the perceived need for public support conflicts with the belief in private initiative.
government regularly turns to indirect vehicles which cloak its interventionism and make its
dominion less obvious. Conceptually, tax expenditures can be portrayed as returning funds to
the private sector, making reduced government extractions appear as reduced government
intrusion.
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beneficiaries of tax breaks may even tend to accept them on the view that, in
the longer term, they might get tax relief too. In short, for a variety of
psychological reasons, there is generally less risk of political opposition to
discriminatory tax breaks than there is risk of opposition to discriminatory
subsidies.43
It is impossible to offer strict empirical proof that the differences between
tax breaks and subsidies catalogued here have significant real world effects.
There are, however, several good reasons to believe that such effects exist. For
example, since the mid-1970s, the federal government and a growing number
of states have chosen to produce tax expenditure budgets. 44 A number of
factors may have inspired this movement, but the most significant factor seems
obvious: Responsible officials, well-informed about how government
decisionmaking works, saw a need to put "underhanded" tax-based spending
on more of a level playing field with outright cash appropriations. 45 It also
is telling that once tax expenditure budgets were put in place, they appeared
to have little effect. 146 Again, various explanations for this outcome are
Id. at 26; cf. Heinzerling, supra note 18, at 271 n.258 (noting that some "defend free trade generally on
the ground that it limits governmental power").
143. For some additional observations along these lines, see Ladd, supra note I ll, at 54, which states
that "tax expenditures are often popular because they resolve the conflict between the liberals' desire to
have the government do something and conservatives' inherent belief in the market mechanism." Howard
similarly notes:
Perhaps the more important attribute of tax expenditures is their ambiguity. Tax expenditures
can be defended politically on at least four distinct grounds: as aid to some needy category of
citizens; as a subsidy to third-party providers in the private sector, who furnish most of the
goods and services underwritten by the tax code; as tax reductions; and as alternatives to
traditional government programs (i.e., direct expenditures and regulation). These various
objectives are not mutually exclusive. Policy makers can and do support tax expenditures for
more than one reason. Such ambiguity helps proponents of new tax expenditures forge broader
coalitions of support than proponents of direct expenditures are typically able to do. In
particular, such ambiguity helps conservative Democrats and moderate Republicans to support
tax expenditures more strongly than they do direct expenditures.
HOWARD, supra note 11l, at II (footnote omitted).
144. See Ladd, supra note 11l, at 50-51 ("[Stanley] Surrey, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury, produced the first tax expenditure 'budget' or listing of [tax expenditure] provisions in 1968.
The requirement that federal tax expenditures be lifted and published annually was subsequently enshrined
in the Budget Control and Improvement Act of 1974."); id. at 52 (noting that "17 states have relatively
comprehensive tax expenditure reports ... [and] 13 states have reports that are partial or are produced
intermittently"); Harris & Hicks, supra note Il l, at 33 ("Wisconsin and California issued the first tax
expenditure reports in 1975 and 1976, respectively. The periodic issuance of tax expenditure reports by
twenty-one states demonstrates a steady trend toward the production of this type of cost information."
(footnote omitted)).
145. See, e.g., Wildavsky, supra note 11, at 415 ("Opponents of tax expenditures are not opposed
to subsidies per se. Many are proponents of increased spending on social welfare programs and would be
delighted to see such subsidies grow. It is just that these expenditures should be above-board (i.e.,
manifest), not underhanded (i.e., latent).").
146. See, e.g., Harris & Hicks, supra note I 1l, at 36 ("George Deukemejian, formerly the governor
of California, recommended the termination of [tax expenditure] reporting because, 'the report seems to
have little impact .... '); Pomp, supra note I 1l, at 67 ("What evidence exists, albeit tentative, suggests
that state tax expenditure budgets have not yet had any serious impact on the legislative process. A report
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available. 147 One likely explanation, however, is that the same political
dynamics that produced a perceived need for tax expenditure budgets in the
first place (e.g., reduced visibility, heightened entrenchment, and psychological
attractiveness) continued to push policymakers to favor tax breaks over outright
spending even after those budgets were adopted.'48 There is, however, an
even more significant piece of evidence that political realities cause lawmakers
to favor business-benefitting tax breaks over outright cash subsidization
programs: In the real world, state tax-based business incentives are pervasive,
while outright cash subsidies are uncommon. 14 9 To put the matter bluntly, the
prepared by the National Conference of State Legislatures concluded that 'tax expenditure budgcts are
unlikely to produce any meaningful policy changes except under special circumstances.' (quoting STEVEN
GOLD & DALE NESBARY, STATE TAX EXPENDITURE REVIEW MECHANISMS 16 (National Conference of
State Legislatures Legislative Finance Paper No. 47. 1985)); Schick. supra note I11. at 12 ("'The U.S.
budget classifies tax expenditures into the same functional categones that are used for direct spending. Thus
far, however, few explicit tradeoffs have been made between the two types of expenditures."). Another
commentator observes:
A review of the evidence suggests that Surrey's aspirations for tax expenditure analysis as a tool
of tax reform have not been met. One circumstantial piece of evidence is the growth in U S. tax
expenditures [notwithstanding implementation of a tax expenditure budget] and. in particular.
the new tax expenditures that were included in the 1981 Tax Act.
Ladd, supra note Il1l, at 53. She continues:
In its 1983-84 report, the California Department of Finance recommended eliminating the 10-
year-old requirement to report tax expenditures. The first reason they cited was that the
legislature had ignored over 90 percent of the recommendations for repeal of specific tax
expenditures made by the Department over the previous 10 years and that special interest groups
had continued to be effective in securing the enactment of new tax expenditures... The report
cited nearly one hundred new tax expenditures and extensions of existing tax expenditures since
1972. Although the legislature responded by setting up legislative structures and procedures for
regular review of tax expenditures, it still remains difficult in California to reduce or eliminate
them.
Id. at 54; see also HOWARD, supra note I ll. at 6 (noting "the impressive growth of tax expenditures over
the past quarter of a century"); Benker, supra note I1. at 405 ("The dollar amount of revenue foregone
due to tax expenditures has dramatically increased in recent years.").
147. See, e.g., LEONARD, supra note Ill, at 121 ("Ambiguous-or at least debatable-conceptual
underpinnings are not the only weakness of the [tax expenditure budget] device. It is also technically
difficult to estimate the required figures and even to determine which figures to estimate."): Benker. supra
note Ill, at 413 (discussing problems with gathenng information for tax expenditure reports); Hams &
Hicks, supra note 11l, at 35 ("The weakness of source data is a persistent problem in estimating certain
tax expenditure costs. It is seldom possible to compare estimated cost to actual cost because no actual cost
referent may exist.").
148. See HOWARD, supra note Ill, at 189 ("[T]ax expenditures are segregated from direct
expenditures in the budget process and budget documents, making informed trade-offs among spending
priorities harder to achieve."); LEONARD. supra note Il 1. at 126 ("Tax expenditures do not require
appropriations and do not have to fit under expenditure ceilings set early in the budget process. Whatever
the [tax expenditure budget]'s virtues as an informational device, this reality virtually guarantees that tax
expenditures will not be scrutinized as meticulously as direct expenditures."); see also Hams & Hicks.
supra note I ll, at 45 ("[T]ax expenditure report information appears to be least accepted for the purpose
for which it is most commonly advocated-consideration of the resource allocation effect of budget
policy."); Neubig, supra note 120, at 249 ("The tax expenditure budget has become a revenue estimators'
exercise and issue, rather than an economic, legal, budget, or policy issue. Until the political leadership in
the Executive and Legislative branches see the tax expenditure budget as a useful policy tool for their goals.
it will not be used.").
149. See LEONARD, supra note I 11, at 142-43 ("In spite of repeated analyses showing little impact
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proof is in the pudding. And the proof suggests that the array of political
considerations detailed above render tax breaks that favor local businesses far
more attractive to state policymakers than economically equivalent cash
awards.
This lengthy listing of political process distinctions points to a single
overarching conclusion: Outright monetary subsidies are less likely than
discriminatory tax breaks to take hold, to persevere, and thus to distort the
geography of production in favor of local operators.'50 That conclusion,
moreover, suggests that there exists a sturdy basis for the traditional distinction
between subsidies and tax expenditures in dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
This is so because, in cases such as Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v.
Rice,'5' the Supreme Court endorsed a reduced judicial activism when a
"State's own political processes will act as a check on local regulations that
unduly burden interstate commerce." '15
2
The critic may well observe, however, that Raymond and kindred cases use
the "political processes" principle in a way that is different from the way it is
used here. When the Court applies this principle in the usual case, it asks
whether there are state residents who can and will provide "surrogate
representation' for nonresidents disadvantaged by the challenged state law. 53
Here, however, no argument has been offered that the interests of favored
residents and disfavored nonresidents are more closely aligned when a state
grants a subsidy than when a state grants tax relief. (In fact, as we shall soon
see, the alignment between in-state and out-of-state interests in both settings
on investment levels or location decisions, [tax incentives for economic development] continue to be widely
endorsed by state legislatures.... By contrast with tax-side subsidy programs, direct state aid to businesses
appears to be relatively scarce."); id. at 147 ("[S]tate and local economic development programs give us
a rare glimpse of the impacts of differing mechanisms of accountability. Appropriated spending in these
programs is relatively restrained .... Programs operating outside the appropriations process seem to be
larger and to grow faster."); NORTHEAST MIDWEST INST., supra note I 1l, at 233 (noting that "[flax breaks
are among the oldest and most prevalent type of economic development inducement"); SCtHWEKE ET AL.,
supra note 24, at 17 ("Tax incentives, the traditional tool of industrial recruitment, are still the most
commonly used development incentive."). See generally Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 27, at 816.34
(detailing numerous tax-based business development incentives). Though enacted much less frequently than
tax breaks, direct cash subsidy programs do exist. See, e.g., MOSES, supra note I 1l, at 7 ("Some states give
direct grants to industry, particularly for projects which, in the state government's view serve the public
interest. Indiana's Rural Development Fund, for example, has issued grants covering up to 50 percent of
a minor project's cost."); NORTHEAST MIDWEST INST., supra note I ll, at 48-52 (describing various state
business development incentive programs, including those of Arkansas, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, each
of which includes some cash grant program).
150. For a judicial endorsement of this concept, see Pelican Chapter Associated Builders &
Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, 901 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (M.D. La. 1995), in which the court reasoned that
"tax exemptions are inherently different from subsidies ... [in part] because of the inherent safeguards
involved."
151. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
152. Id. at 447.
153. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 107: 965
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is the same.)'- Instead, the reasons that discriminatory subsidies are less
likely to proliferate than discriminatory tax breaks concern the internal
dynamics of state lawmaking processes.'55 It may be, according to the critic,
that local voters and their representatives will more readily focus on, question,
and impede efforts to put in place outright subsidy awards. But that fact, the
critic will say, simply does not trigger the surrogate-representation principle
that the Court drew upon in Raymond and endorsed in other cases.
The proper response to this critique is: So what? If the underlying policy
of the dormant Commerce Clause is to avoid distortion of the geography of
production within our national market, and state subsidization poses less risk
of distortion than do tax credits, exemptions, and deductions, that should be
good enough.1 56 No further explanation for reliance on our long list of
political process distinctions seems necessary, whether or not the traditional
surrogate-representation principle is implicated. 5 7  Nonetheless, if some
further justification is required, it can be supplied. That additional justification
derives from broadly ascendant themes in modern constitutional theory.
3. Constitutional Theory
The factors articulated above suggest that judicially unchecked political
processes are less likely to produce monetary subsidy programs than
154. See infra notes 214-215 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 109-150 and accompanying text.
156. Put somewhat differently, the surrogate-representation principle is merely (or at least essentially)
a means to an end: namely, the end of maximizing the operation of an open. discnnunation-free national
common market. The critical point is that a variety of policies may jeopardize or promote this end. whether
or not surrogate representation is present. In particular, because discriminatory tax relief measures threaten
the national market more than outright monetary subsidies (because of the operation of the seven political
process considerations described above), it makes sense to distinguish between these two forms of state
action in developing dormant Commerce Clause rules. Cf. Heinzerling. supra note 18. at 252 (suggesting
that surrogate-representation analysis reflects the value of "'forcing those who enjoy benefits [by way of
state action] to think hard about whether they're worth their costs-).
Yet another way of looking at the matter is that reliance on these seven factors to support the
distinction between subsidies and tax breaks comports with the surrogate-representation principle itself. This
is so because ordinary in-state taxpayers are always potential surrogate representatives of out-of-state
business interests who are threatened with disadvantage by either subsidies or tax breaks amed at local
businesses. In essence, however, the functional considerations collected above suggest that local taxpayers
are far more likely to be effective or real surrogates in the subsidy context than in the tax break one. If this
is true, it seems sensible to say that the distinction between subsidies and tax breaks comports with the
surrogate-representation principle itself. Cf. infra note 213 (noting that the operation of the surrogate-
representation principle depends on the nature-and not just the presence-of the surrogate representation
involved in the case).
157. Cf., e.g., United States v. Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2365. 2378 n.12 (1997) (favoring a principle that
rejects congressionally mandated state administration of federal programs in favor of conditional spending
and other programs that encourage and induce state administration because "the condition of voluntary state
participation significantly reduces the ability of Congress to use this device as a means of reducing the
power of the Presidency"); City of Boeme v. Flores. 117 S. Ct. 2157. 2169 (1997) (-Strong measures
appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.").
1998]
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economically comparable discriminatory tax relief. This fact, as we have seen,
is relevant under existing Commerce Clause case law, as exemplified by the
principle of the Raymond case. Wholly apart from the Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, however, the political process considerations identified
above have constitutional significance. Indeed, distinguishing between subsidies
and tax breaks resonates with a trilogy of themes that run through much of
modern constitutional thought: the themes of ensuring accountability, of
facilitating deliberative decisionmaking, and of recognizing the collaborative,
multibranch nature of much constitutional lawmaking.
a. Accountability
In recent years, the Court has emphasized in a variety of settings the
importance of ensuring the accountability to the electorate of government
decisionmakers. In New York v. United States,58 for example, Justice
O'Connor rejected a claimed congressional authority to force states to adopt
regulatory programs because, without a constitutional restriction on this form of
congressional action, "the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished."' 159 Likewise, in United States v. Lopez,16° the Justices who
supplied the pivotal votes observed: "Were the Federal Government to take over
the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern .... [t]he resultant
inability to hold either branch of the government answerable to the citizens
[would be] dangerous .... 't6t This norm of accountability-which the Court
has invoked in other contexts as well' 62-is advanced by the distinction
between subsidies and tax breaks precisely because of the heightened visibility
158. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
159. Id. at 168.
160. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
161. Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1743 (1996) ("The... clear assignment of
power to a branch ... allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer for making, or not making,
those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance."); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116
S. Ct. 1495, 1511 (1996) (questioning the Court's earlier validation of a prohibition on casino advertising
because it "served to shield the State's antigambling policy from the public scrutiny that more direct,
nonspeech regulation would draw" and noting its "longstanding hostility to commercial speech regulation
of this type"); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)
(expressing concern about the government's choice of regulatory means that "could screen from public view
the underlying governmental policy"); id. at 575 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (attacking, in
the commercial speech context, government means that cause "the State's policy choices (to be] insulated
from the visibility and scrutiny that direct regulation would entail"); see also Penell v. San Jose, 485 U.S.
I, 22-23 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing de facto subsidization of
poor tenants by landlords through rent-control regulation because it can "be achieved 'off budget' with
relative invisibility and thus relative immunity from the democratic process" and noting that "voters might
well see other, more pressing social priorities" if funds for this purpose were to come directly from "the
municipal treasury" because "both economic effects and competing priorities [would be] more evident").
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and periodic reviewability of subsidy grants.'63 In essence, if government is
going to channel benefits selectively to favored groups, there is reason to say it
must do so in the fashion that local residents most readily can see, understand,
and question.' 6 Recognizing a dormant Commerce Clause distinction between
subsidies and tax breaks comports with this constitutional goal.
b. Deliberative Decisionmaking
In addition, the distinction between subsidies and tax breaks corresponds
with the growing emphasis in constitutional thought on the facilitation of
"deliberative democracy."' 165 From this point of reference-drawn from the
writings of the Framers'6--value lies in "widespread discussion among
representatives and the citizenry at large" about important government
decisions.1 67 A commitment to this value, like a commitment to government
accountability, suggests there is good reason to steer state decisionmaking with
respect to financial aid for local business into the field of affirmative
subsidization. Why? Because, as we have seen, government decisions about
subsidies are more likely to provoke public critique and to generate periodic
reevaluation than economically comparable decisions about tax policy.' 6
Deliberative constitutionalism also puts a premium on justifying government
programs with "public-regarding reasons"'169 that transcend private "self-
interest" and "raw political power."'"7 Because of their lower visibility, tax
breaks seem more susceptible to interest group abuses in this regard. For this
reason, too, the notion of deliberative democracy supports the traditional
distinction between discriminatory tax breaks and discriminatory subsidies.
163. See supra notes 112-125 and accompanying text.
164. See SCHWEKE Er AL., supra note 24, at 49 ("ITIhe best way forward would be to make incentives
more accountable to the general public interest .... ").
165. CASs R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITrrmON 10 (1993); see also ELY. supra note 105. at
102-03 (noting that the judiciary must guarantee open access to the political process to prevent the process
from serving only the interests of an elite few).
166. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 165. at 9, 20-24.
167. Id. at 10; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law. 38 STAN L. REV
29 (1985) (favoring a more active judicial role in policing legislatures to ensure genuinely deliberative,
public-interest-based choices free from factional influences). For a general treatment of legislative patterns,
see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurispndence of Public Choice. 65 TEX. L REv. 873. 874
(1987), which seeks to answer the "fundamental" question "'whether legislatures can claim to formulate
public policy legitimately."
168. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Emerging Reconnection of lndividual Rights and Institutonal Design.
Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Due Process of Lawmaking, 10 CREIGHTON L REV 433. 44146 (1977)
(claiming that court decisions should be determined in part by the manner in which legislation was passed).
169. SUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 19.
170. Id. at 25.
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c. Collaborative Lawmaking
Finally, the distinction between subsidies and tax breaks squares with the
Court's recent inclination to view the making of constitutional law as a
cooperative venture in which the judicial branch is only one participant.'
The Court has moved toward this joint-undertaking conception of constitutional
law in a variety of contexts. Even while signaling, for example, that no
significant state regulatory immunity limits congressional powers, 72 the
Court has held that Congress may interfere with traditional state activities only
when it legislates in clear terms. 173 Similarly, Congress must make its wishes
apparent when it seeks to supplant such core state choices as who is eligible
to hold state office' 74 and whether the state is subject to a monetary
judgment. 75 In the dormant Commerce Clause sphere itself, the Court has
reaffirmed traditional nexus rules 76 but it has indicated that those rules are
subject to revision by Congress, 177  at least if it makes its choices
"unmistakably clear."' 178 Behind all of these rulings lies the notion that the
171. For scholarly discussion of this trend, see, for example, William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Friekey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593
(1992); and Calvin R. Massey, Etiquette Tips: Some Implications of "Process Federalism," 18 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 175 (1994). Cf. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 4-14, at 273 (suggesting that the presidential damages
immunity rule of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), is congressionally reversible).
172. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
173. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) ("Federal statutes impinging upon
important state interests 'cannot ... be construed without regard to the implications of our dual system of
government ....' (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 540 (1947))); see also TRIBE, supra note 4, § 5-8, at 316 ("The Supreme Court has invoked
the clear statement requirement most notably where a judgment that a federal statute reached to the outer
limits of the commerce power would be obviously inconsistent with state institutional interests."); id. § 6-
25, at 480 ("By declining to infer preemption in the face of congressional ambiguity, the Court ... [is]
furthering the spirit of Garcia by requiring that decisions restricting state sovereignty be made in a
deliberate manner by Congress .... ); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The
Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. Cr. REV. 341 (discussing Garcia's effect on the
balance of power between the federal and state systems).
174. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) ("This plain statement rule is nothing more
than an acknowledgement that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional
scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.").
175. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 285 (1973) (articulating a "clear language" requirement for congressional negation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
176. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309-18 (1992). The nexus test is the first part
of the four-pronged analysis described in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), used
to determine whether a state tax can withstand a Commerce Clause challenge. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S.
at 311. The Court had earlier held, and confirmed in Quill Corp., that "a vendor whose only contacts with
the taxing state are by mail or common carrier lacks the 'substantial nexus' required by the Commerce
Clause [to uphold the tax]." Id. The Court emphasized that this "substantial nexus" test is not the equivalent
of the "minimum contacts" test that must be met before a person can be forced to defend a suit in state
court. Id. at 311-13.
177. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318-19.
178. E.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (citing South-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984)). More specifically, the Court in Quill Corp. carried forward the tax
1000
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judicial and popular branches are involved in a collaborative implementation
of constitutional values. 7 9  Thus, Congress may override important
constitutional norms that the Court has recognized and protected, but to do so
it must-at the Court's insistence-make a clear and conscious choice to that
effect to ensure that competing interests have been fully and fairly
weighed.'
Much the same logic supports the Commerce Clause distinction between
state tax breaks and state subsidies. Invalidation of a state tax break does not
strip state legislators of all authority to advantage a local producer. To take
such action, however, those legislators must resort to the more straightforward,
politically visible, and periodically reviewable mechanism of outright
subsidization. The constitutional principle at work in this area thus operates
much like process-centered "second look" doctrines used to police state action
in a variety of settings. 18' In effect, through the use of such doctrines, the
judiciary may "remand" constitutionally suspect political decisions back to
state legislatures for consideration of whether to reinstate the earlier decision
in a more cautious, studied, and procedurally untainted manner."'2 One way
of viewing many dormant Commerce Clause rulings is that they have this
effect.'83 Against this backdrop, it seems sensible to say-just as the cases
nexus rule of National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue. 386 U.S. 753 (1967) In so doing.
however, the Court held that the rule flowed only from the dormant Commerce Clause (%%hich produces
results that are congressionally reversible) and not from the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
(which produces results that only constitutional amendments can alter). The Court. moreover. left no doubt
about what it saw as a principal advantage of this approach:
[I]n recent years Congress has considered legislation that would 'overrule' the Bellas Hess rule.
Its decision ... may, of course, have been dictated by respect for our holding in Bellas Hess
that the Due Process Clause prohibits States from imposing such taxes. but today wc hase put
that problem to rest. Accordingly, Congress is now free to decide whether. when. and to what
extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.
Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318.
179. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 171. at 177 (reporting "the emergence of a hybrid form of
federalism, neither completely political nor wholly legal" and stating that "the emerging 'process
federalism' is one characterized by a willingness to let Congress impose its will upon the states so long
as that imposition is performed in a procedurally restrained fashion").
180. See TRIBE, supra note 4. § 5-8, at 316.
181. Second look "jurisprudence requires that when the legislature has acted with haste or hiding in
a way that arguably infringes even upon the penumbra of fundamental rights. courts should invalidate the
possibly offending law and force the legislature to take a 'second look' with the eyes of the people on it"
Calabresi, supra note 122, at 104. Thus, for the challenged legislation to survive. "new politicians in a new
set of circumstances, and with a new set of people looking at them. must reaffirm the possibly offending
law." Id. at 105; see also ELY, supra note 105, at 169; Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H_ Welington.
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case. 71 HARV L REv 1. 16-35 (1957)
182. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stnking
down a set-aside for minority contractors in substantial part because of a lack of sufficient legislative
findings to justify race-conscious remediation); see also Calabresi. supra note 122. at 145 ("[Slecond-look
doctrines are designed to make legislatures and executives accountable, to make them responsive to the
people.").
183. Two illustrative cases are Southern Pacific Co. %. Arizona. 325 U.S. 761 (1945). and Kassel v
Consolidated Freightays Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (plurality opinion) In the Southern Pacific case. the
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that propound the distinction between subsidies and tax breaks effectively
do-that lawmakers inclined to benefit local industry must employ the
legislative mechanism that minimizes risks of shortsightedness, one-
dimensionalism, and abuse.
4. A Recapitulation
Notwithstanding West Lynn Creamery, the traditional distinction between
monetary subsidies and discriminatory tax breaks can lay claim to roots that
sink deeply into Commerce Clause case law. This fact is not surprising given
that-as we now have seen-four separate justifications support the traditional
subsidy-protective rule. First, considerations of constitutional history provide
a firm "formal" basis for distinguishing cash grants from discriminatory
taxation.' 8' Second, a broad state power to subsidize rests on the fairness-
based notion that state residents should be able to reap where they have
sown.8 5 Third, the traditional distinction vindicates values of federalism, by
granting heightened authority to state governments to direct to the benefit of
the state's citizenry those tangible assets that the state itself owns.'86 Finally,
for many reasons-focusing on visibility, intelligibility, self-limitation, and
impermanence-subsidies pose less of a threat to dormant Commerce Clause
values than do discriminatory tax breaks. 8 7 In sum, the long-recognized
distinction between subsidies and tax breaks reflects far more than "magic
words and labels."'' 8 8 It reflects instead, as many cases suggest it should,
"economic realities" 89 and "'practical effect."'' 190
Court confronted a train length law that was more than 30 years old and stricter than the length laws in
place in all other states. Relying on the district court's finding that the law had no reasonable relation to
safety in light of then-current train technology, the Court struck down the law because of its significantly
adverse effects on interstate commerce. Given the Court's reliance on the "unchallenged findings" of the
lower court, Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 773, there is every reason to believe that the Court would have
upheld the law upon reenactment if the reenactment had been accompanied by a serious legislative
investigation that resulted in findings that the length limit created genuine safety advantages despite
technological improvements. Likewise, in Kassel, the Court struck down a truck-length law, emphasizing
the existence of troublesome exemptions created by the state legislature and the failure of the state "to
present any persuasive evidence that 65-foot doubles are less safe than 55-foot singles." Kassel, 450 U.S.
at 671 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 671 n.12, 676-77. Again, there is every reason to believe that the
Court would have upheld a reenacted truck-length law that lacked resident-favoring exemptions and was
supported by defensible legislative findings on the safety benefits of the 55-foot restriction.
184. See supra Subsection II.B. I
185. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 112-150 and accompanying text.
188. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992).
189. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
190. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 183 (1995) (quoting Complete
Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 41-42 (1937)
(stating that "interstate commerce ... is a practical conception" and that "interferences with that commerce
must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore actual experience").
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Ill. THE WEST LYNN CREAMERY APPROACHES TO DISTINGUISHING
PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE SUBSIDIES
The preceding discussion teaches that the traditional distinction between
tax breaks and subsidies "makes good sense and sound law."'' Reaching
that conclusion, however, gives rise to another large and complex question:
How does one distinguish the ordinary subsidy that comports with the
Commerce Clause from the exceptional subsidy that does not? 92 The proper
starting point for approaching this issue lies in West Lynn Creamery itself, for
each of the three opinions in that case seeks to cast light on this problem.
Unfortunately, as the ensuing discussion shows, none of these efforts meets
with much success.
A. Justice Stevens's Approach
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found the Massachusetts program
unconstitutional because it operated as the "'equivalent to a rampart of customs
duties."" 93 Because the effect of the tax on Massachusetts milk was "entirely
(indeed more than) offset by the subsidy" to in-state milk producers, the
program threatened to shift business from out-of-state to in-state dairy
farmers.' 94 As Justice Stevens concluded: "This effect renders the program
unconstitutional, because it, like a tariff, neutralizes advantages belonging to
the place of origin."'95
Justice Scalia quickly spotted the central problem with this analysis. Taken
to its logical end, the majority's approach would invalidate almost all business
subsidies because every subsidy in purpose and effect "neutralizes advantages"
of unsubsidized interstate competitors.' 96 In other words, the majority's
neutralized advantages reasoning, without more, would undermine the Court's
longstanding endorsement of ordinary subsidies.
The majority, however, did offer more: Justice Stevens devoted five full
paragraphs to distinguishing West Lynn Creamer' from the typical subsidy
case. 197 This effort, as we have seen, focused on Massachusetts's linkage of
its milk subsidy and its milk tax.' 98 But why did this feature of the
191. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980).
192. Cf. Maltz, supra note 106, at 69-70 ("Defining the precise scope of the subsidy exception Is
a complex task.").
193. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994) (quoting Baldwin v G AF Seelig.
Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
194. Id. at 194-95.
195. Id. at 196 (citation omitted).
196. See id. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring).
197. See id. at 199-203 (majority opinion).
198. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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Massachusetts program make a difference? According to Justice Stevens, the
"conjoining"' 99 of the tax and the subsidy triggered two special concerns.
First, it had a problematic impact on state "political processes" because the
subsidy "mollified" in-state dairy farmers who otherwise would have opposed
the tax.200 Second, the "entire program" not only benefited in-state milk (as
would an ordinary subsidy), but also burdened out-of-state milk (as an ordinary
subsidy would not).20' Justice Stevens's focus on these facts suggests that,
in his view, they should guide future efforts to distinguish permissible and
impermissible subsidy programs. The difficulty with this position is that neither
explanation for the result in West Lynn Creamery (at least without substantial
refinement) holds much persuasive force.
1. The Surrogate-Representation Distinction
Assessments of political dynamics have long played a role in judicial
application of the dormant Commerce Clause. In West Lynn Creamery, Justice
Stevens drew upon this analytical tradition in framing his first distinction
between ordinary subsidies and the Massachusetts program. As he explained:
[W]hen a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of
the groups hurt by the tax, a state's political processes can no longer
be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one of the in-state
interests which would otherwise lobby against the tax has been
mollified by the subsidy. So, in this case, one would ordinarily have
expected at least three groups to lobby against the order premium,
which, as a tax, raises the price (and hence lowers demand) for milk:
dairy farmers, milk dealers, and consumers. But because the tax was
coupled with a subsidy, one of the most powerful of these groups,
Massachusetts dairy farmers, instead of exerting their influence
against the tax, were in fact its primary supporters."
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist came down hard on this line of
reasoning by claiming that "[a]nalysis of interest group participation in the
political process may serve many useful purposes, but serving as a basis for
interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause is not one of them."2 3 This
criticism seems misguided, however, because for decades the Court has
consulted interest group participation in the political process when applying the
199. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199.
200. Id. at 200.
201. Id. at 201.
202. Id. at 200-01.
203. Id. at 215 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
[Vol. 107: 9651004
HeinOnline  -- 107 Yale L.J. 1004 1997-1998
Business Subsidies
dormant Commerce Clause.2 0' Thus, nearly sixty years ago, the Court upheld
South Carolina regulations that limited truck weight in part because "they
affect alike shippers in interstate and intrastate commerce in large
number. '20 5 This fact mattered, the Court explained, because the predictable
opposition to the law by "some interests within the state" ensured that there
were "political restraints" on its ill-advised enactment.20 In a long list of
later cases, the Court has continued to consider the impact of "interest group
participation" in assessing legislation under the dormant Commerce
Clause.0 7 Given this consistent practice, the Chief Justice's critique of
Justice Stevens's "political processes" distinction has a hollow ring.
"1
To say that the Chief Justice missed the boat in his critique, however, is
not to say that Justice Stevens's political process analysis provided a steady
anchor for the result in West Lynn Creamery. Indeed, that analysis is subject
to a powerful criticism not mentioned by the dissenters at all. According to
Justice Stevens, a political process problem infected the Massachusetts tax
because one group "ordinarily ... expected" to oppose the tax (namely,
Massachusetts dairy farmers) would and did favor the tax because of the
204. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 18, at 251-52 ("The political process leading to the enactment
of laws that discriminate against outside commerce is an important theme of the Court's decisions ")
205. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros.. 303 U.S 177. 187 (1938).
206. Id. at 184-85 n.2.
207. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown. 511 U.S 383. 404 (1994) (O'Connor.
J., concurring) (noting that the Court has "consistently recognized" that the presence of interests within the
regulating jurisdiction that are as equally affected as interests outside of the jurisdiction "counsels against
a finding of discrimination"); Goldberg v, Sweet. 488 U.S. 252. 266 (1989) (noting that "the insider who
is able to complain about and change the tax through the [state] political process" deserves less judicial
protection than burdened outsiders "who would have difficulty effecting legislative change")- Kassel v
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675-76 (1981) (plurality opinion) (refusing to give deference to
a legislative determination of safety needs where "the local regulation bears disproportionately on out-of-
state residents and businesses"); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.. 449 U.S. 456. 473 n. 17 (1981)
(noting that "[t]he existence of major in-state interests adversely affected by the Act is a powserful safeguard
against legislative abuse"); Nipper v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416. 434 (1946) (sinking down a
"drummer" tax in part because "(pirovincial interests and local political power are at their maximum %%eight
in bringing about acceptance of this type of legislation"): McGoldnck v Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.
309 U.S. 33, 45-46 n.2 (1940) (noting that "to the extent that the burden falls on economic interests without
the state, it is not likely to be alleviated by those political restraints which arc normally exerted on
legislation where it affects adversely interests within the state"). See generally TRIBE. supra note 4. § 6-5.
at 408-13 (citing numerous authorities); Collins. supra note 27. at 67 (noting that "many opinions since
Barnwell have mentioned local political restraint as a factor in dormant commerce power analysis"),
208. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist himself has invoked this analytical tradition in arguing that the
operation of in-state "political processes" counseled the constitutionality of a state law that "workledl to
the substantial disadvantage of ... segments of the State's population." Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill. Inc.
v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353. 370 (1992) (Rehnquist. CJ.. dissenting). Similarly.
Justice Blackmun-who joined the Chief Justice's West Lynn Creamery dissenting opinion-freely
consulted interest group dynamics in other cases that called for application of the dormant Commerce
Clause principle. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana. 453 U.S. 609. 649 (1981) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); see also Dan T. Coenen. Justice Blackiun. Federalism and Separation of Powers. 97 DICK
L. REv. 541, 560 n.115 (1993). Indeed, just a month before joining the Chief Justice's opinion in Wev
Lynn Creamery, Justice Blackmun joined Justice Souter in invoking Barnw elt's "political restraints"
analysis. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 426 (Souter. J.. dissenting).
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accompanying subsidy.20 9 That is true, but irrelevant in isolation. States often
pass tax laws that grant more favorable treatment to some taxpayers than
others, be they low-wage earners, parents of young children, or companies that
invest in pollution abatement equipment. That one group of citizens may be
"'mollified''210 when a tax law is enacted does not, in itself, render the law
suspect under the dormant Commerce Clause.2 n
The proper inquiry in Commerce Clause cases thus is not whether some
in-state group has been protected from the impact of the challenged statute.
Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the impact of the challenged law falls
on "other States' economic interests," without significantly disadvantaging
"local economic interests" as well.2t2 It is, after all, economic activity in and
with other states that the dormant Commerce Clause seeks to safeguard. "Thus,
the presence of an in-state surrogate who may assert the claims of burdened
out-of-state interests serves to lower the level of commerce clause
scrutiny.
2t 3
Justice Stevens was right to conclude that the Massachusetts milk program
was constitutionally suspect under this form of analysis. Why? Because the law
disadvantaged out-of-state dairy farmers without disadvantaging politically
potent in-state dairy farmers at all. There is, however, a basic difficulty with
Justice Stevens's analysis: It does not, as it was supposed to do, logically
209. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 200.
210. Id.
211. Put somewhat differently, legislative mollification of one or more groups in enacting legislation
cannot alone be a litmus of constitutionality "because all legislation is by its nature redistributive." Steven
G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 81 (1994); see
also Collins, supra note 27, at 69 ("[E]very law adversely affects some market actors in the state.").
212. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 675 (plurality opinion); accord, e.g., Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
at 473 & n.17 (noting, in finding a state milk container law constitutional, that most challengers of the law
were in-state firms).
213. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 6-5, at 411-12. Moreover, in making this assessment, courts will consider
the nature of the disadvantaged in-staters because some groups are far more effective political surrogates
than others. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 105, at 525 ("[C]onsumers fare badly in the legislative process:
They are too numerous to organize an effective 'cartel' in support of or in opposition to existing or
proposed legislation."); Collins, supra note 27, at 69 ("Political allocation of goods chronically
disadvantages small consumers."); id. ("When internal costs are large, and those bearing them are
practically able to influence the political process ... there is less justification for judicial intervention.");
Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV.
L. REv. 1328, 1342 (1994) ("From Madison's time to ours, students of politics have recognized that
producers are concentrated relative to consumers and so more readily can overcome the free riding problem
that obstructs collective action."); Barbara J. Redman, The Market Regulator-Market Participant Distinction
and Supreme Court Vigilance over Discriminatory State Programs: Does Economic Theory Justify the
Judicial Effort?, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 585, 598 (1988) (noting that governments do not always serve "to
maximize the welfare of the citizens of the state as a whole" because policymakers tend to respond
disproportionately to "strongly felt preferences," including those of certain minorities, like "a coalition of
producers within a major industry"); Regan, supra note 4, at 1141 (noting that "consumers as a group are
less likely to be organized politically than farmers, manufacturers, or workers").
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distinguish West Lynn Creamern' from the ordinary subsidy case.21-" If
lawmakers had proposed a simple in-state dairy farmer subsidy program, after
all, the benefited farmers would have supported that program as surely as they
supported the program actually put in place. Indeed, in terms of representation
reinforcement analysis, the actual Massachusetts program was less problematic
than a straightforward subsidy program because the tax imposed by the actual
Massachusetts program was payable by in-state milk dealers. It is improbable
that dealers would have opposed a simple subsidy paid to Massachusetts
farmers; in fact, dealers might well have supported such a subsidy as a
probable catalyst of lower producer prices. Because the actual Massachusetts
program laid a tax on dealers, however, it threatened their own pocketbooks
in such a way that they could be expected to serve as "surrogates" for out-of-
state dairy farmers in opposing the law.
21
In short, Justice Stevens's attempt to use representation reinforcement
analysis to place the Massachusetts milk program in the impermissible tax
break category-rather than the permissible subsidy category-lacks persuasive
force.216 On this score, there simply was no basis for a heightened suspicion
that "Massachusetts ... created a program more dangerous to interstate
commerce" than a subsidy program standing alone.' 7
2. The Burden-and-Benefit Rationale
Justice Stevens took a second crack at distinguishing Massachusetts's milk
producer payments from the ordinary subsidy when he observed:
214. As Professor Drahozal comments.
The majority in West Lynn CreamerY argued that "'lbcause the tax was coupled with a subsidy.
one of the most powerful of these groups [that would otherwise lobby against the taxl.
Massachusetts dairy farmers, instead of exerting their influence against the tax. % ere in fact its
primary supporters." ... The majority's analysis has the tail wagging the cow. The pricing
order was not structured as it was to buy off opponents of a general milk tax. It was structured
as it was to transfer wealth to milk producers with the least political opposition by others
Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1163 n.185 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
215. Indeed, the plaintiff who challenged the Massachusetts program in West Li-nn Creamerv was a
substantial in-state milk dealer. See West L ynn Creamer%,. 512 U.S at 186. For an explanation of the effects
of the Massachusetts plan on in-state milk dealers, see Heinzcrlng. supra note 18. at 246 Hemzcrhng
notes:
All milk dealers-whether they purchased rasw milk from rn-state or out-of-state
producers-were required to make the same payment to the state In effect, for Massachusetts
milk dealers, the Massachusetts pricing order merely raised the price they were required to pay
in order to transact in a given quantity of milk.
Id.
216. Cf Heinzerling, supra note 18, at 24647 (noting that the West L)an Creamer- Court's 'sole
focus was on the pricing order's potential impact on out-of-state producers. whose injury. if any. would
result from the subsidy to in-state producers" (footnote omitted))
217. West Lynn Creamer-, 512 U.S. at 200.
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A pure subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no
burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local business. The
pricing order in this case, however, is funded principally from taxes
on the sale of milk produced in other States. By so funding the
subsidy, [the State] not only assists local farmers, but burdens
interstate commerce.1
This mode of differentiating the Massachusetts subsidy program and the
ordinary subsidy is suspect on its face, for courts and commentators have often
noted the dubious character of claimed distinctions between beneficial and
burdensome laws.2t9 Moreover, reliance on this distinction seems especially
218. Id. at 199 (footnote omitted).
219. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) ("[T]he
distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the
beholder."); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985) (declaring that whether a state
law is "benefiting one group or... harming another" is a "distinction without a difference"); Hcinzcrling,
supra note 18, at 262 (noting that the distinction between burdens and benefits has been "elsewhere
ridiculed by the Court" and "merely states rather than explains the Court's conclusion"). Lower courts have
noted the evanescence of this distinction in applying the dormant Commerce Clause. See Alliance for Clean
Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1995) (striking down an Illinois law that required a utility's
installation of scrubbers that permitted burning of high-sulphur Illinois coal, and rejecting the state's
argument that the law "merely 'encourages' the local coal industry and does not in fact discriminate"); id.
("By 'encouraging' the use of Illinois coal, the Act discriminates against western coal by making it a less
viable compliance option." (citation omitted)); Fireside Nissan, Inc. v. Fanning, 30 F.3d 206, 216 (1st Cir.
1994) (finding a "blurring" in "the imaginary line between discriminatory privileges that burden interstate
commerce and those that do not"); see also Smith Setzer & Sons v. South Carolina Procurement Review
Panel, 20 F.3d 1311, 1321 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[A]II, or almost all, state action results in some persons being
benefitted while others are burdened .... ); J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl.
Protection, 857 F.2d 913, 919 (3d Cir. 1988) ("The essential question is whether the challenged regulation
confers an advantage upon in-state economic interests-either directly or through imposition of a burden
upon out-of-state interests-vis-a-vis out-of-state competitors." (citation omitted)).
Moreover, contrary to what seems to be the premise of Justice Stevens, much rhetoric in the Supreme
Court cases suggests that state laws that discriminatorily "benefit" local businesses are as problematic as
those that "burden" out-of-staters. For example, the Court has said that states "may not 'impose a tax which
discriminates against interstate commerce ... by providing a direct commercial advantage to local
business."' Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 197 (1995) (quoting
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959) (emphasis added)); see
also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) ("It is well settled that actions
are within the domain of the Commerce Clause if they burden interstate commerce or impede its free
flow.") (emphasis added); id. at 393 ("The Commerce Clause presumes a national market free from local
legislation that discriminates in favor of local interests." (emphasis added)); id. at 417 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "laws 'adopted for the purpose of improving the competitive position of local
economic actors, just because they are local, vis-at-vis their foreign competitors' ... offend the Commerce
Clause" (citation omitted) (emphasis added)); id. (expressing concern about state laws that have "advanced
the economic interests of its own business classes at the expense of its neighbors" (emphasis added));
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 106 (1994) ("[Rlegulating interstate
commerce in such a way as to give those who handle domestic articles of commerce a cost advantage over
their competitors handling similar items produced elsewhere constitutes [prohibited] protectionism."
(emphasis added)); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) ("A state is ... precluded from taking
any action which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between
States." (emphasis added)). For an illustrative discussion of the problems inherent in the benefit-burden
distinction, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 209-13, which criticizes the distinction between benefits and
penalties in the First Amendment context. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochners Legacy, 87 COLJM. L.
REv. 873, 876 (1987) ('The notion of subsidy is of course incoherent without a baseline from which to
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strained in the dormant Commerce Clause context because of the Court's
recurring insistence that attention should focus on the challenged statute's
"practical effect. ' 22 Assume, for example, that the Massachusetts tax-and-
subsidy program had two principal effects. First, it put the average nonresident
producer "out" $1.00 per hundredweight of milk sold (based on taxes paid by
the dealer, but "passed back" to the producer through an insisted-upon
equivalent price reduction). Second, it put the average in-state producer "in"
$.50 for each hundredweight sold (based on an average of $1.50 per
hundredweight in subsidies minus the passed-back $1.00 per hundredweight in
dealer-paid taxes). The combined operation of these effects would give the in-
state producer an unearned advantage of $1.50 per hundredweight as it fixed
its prices in competition with out-of-state producers. 2
Assume next that, instead of adopting a tax-and-subsidy program, the state
had simply given in-state producers a subsidy of $2.50 per hundredweight,
with the consequence that in-state producers received an unearned advantage
of $2.50 per hundredweight over out-of-state competitors. One need not consult
Albert Einstein to see that the pure subsidy grant would have more "distorting
effects on the geography of production '222 than the actual Massachusetts
program. Put differently, if the $1.50 per unit price advantage creates a danger
of distortion, a $2.50 price advantage "exacerbates the danger by giving
domestic producers an additional tool" (in the form of one additional dollar per
hundredweight of milk sold) "with which to shore up their competitive
position. ' -
If that is the case, however, how can it be that the actual program-but not
the hypothesized program-violates the Commerce Clause? Justice Stevens's
answer seems to be that, while the hypothesized program "benefits" local
producers, it does not "burden" out-of-state producers. This assertion, once
again, ignores real world practicalities. Out-of-state sellers, after all, surely will
view themselves as burdened when they are unable to sell their product in a
state because subsidized competitors are able to slash prices.2- 4 In any event,
make a measurement.").
220. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274. 279 (1977).
221. This is not to suggest, of course, that this was the actual effect of the Massachusetts program.
Indeed, the existence of federal price controls may have limited the dealer's ability to "pass back" the full
tax amount. There is little reason to doubt, however, that any "pass-backs" that did occur were directed in
equal amounts to in-state and out-of-state producers. That is the critical point for purposes of this
illustration.
222. West Lynn Creamers, 512 U.S. at 193.
223. Id. at 197 (emphasis added): see also Enrich. supra note 18. at 446 ('Indced. once a differential
impact on in-state and out-of-state activities has been established, it is unclear %%hat work the distinction
between benefits and burdens is to do.").
224. See Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1159 (-Subsidies in large states do not merely assist local
business; they benefit it by burdening out-of-state competitors."); Gergen. supra note 22. at 1135 ("When
a subsidy encourages local firms to increase production or new firms to enter a trade, the subsidy injures
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while there is rhetoric in the case law suggesting that a state must be
"burdening out-of-state competitors" for Commerce Clause protections to
attach, 22 there also is language that points the other way.2 26 Perhaps most
significantly, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,227 the Court seemed to reject
just such verbal legerdemain. As the Court stated:
Virtually every discriminatory statute allocates benefits or burdens
unequally; each can be viewed as conferring a benefit on one party
and a detriment on the other, in either an absolute or relative sense.
The determination of constitutionality does not depend on whether one
focuses on the benefited or burdened party.
228
In sum, Justice Stevens's dual reasons for distinguishing the Massachusetts
program from the ordinary subsidy stand on shaky ground. Accordingly, they
will be of limited usefulness as courts in the future seek to draw a principled
line between constitutional and unconstitutional subsidy programs.
B. Justice Scalia ' Approach
For the reasons just mentioned, Justice Scalia was right to find fault with
the majority opinion in West Lynn Creamery.229 His own attempt to
distinguish the Massachusetts program from the ordinary subsidy, however,
turns out to be no more satisfying than the majority's effort.
In a salutary effort to bring focus to the case, Justice Scalia began his
analysis by explaining:
foreign producers through both a decline in the price of affected goods and a loss of market share. Indeed,
the effects of subsidies are generally the same as those of tariffs."); Heinzerling, supra note 18, at 262
(arguing that subsidies impose a "burden" because they "may drive outside competitors out of business");
Kline, supra note 22, at 354, 378 (asserting that the market participant doctrine "condones state-sponsored
discrimination 'burdening' the interstate market" because "foreign business concerns must meet the
augmented efficiencies of local firms"); Note, supra note 31, at 1542 (stating that "subsidies ... benefit
the local producer while burdening interstate commerce"); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Leading Cases,
supra note 39, at 61 (arguing that subsidies burden out-of-state competitors). As Professor Drahozal
observes: "Mhe Court's treatment of subsidies looks a lot like a return to the discredited distinction
between direct and indirect burdens on interstate commerce." Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1142.
225. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988); see Enrich, supra note 18, at 444
("The Court has frequently articulated its antidiscrimination principle in terms of the improper burdens
placed on out-of-state businesses, products, or activities.").
226. See supra note 219; cf, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 586 (1937) (rejecting
the use of "[c]atch words and labels" in applying the dormant Commerce Clause); Gregg Dyeing Co. v.
Query, 286 U.S. 472, 481 (1932) ("Discrimination, like interstate commerce itself, is a practical conception.
We must deal in this matter, as in others, with substantial distinctions.").
227. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
228. Id. at 273.
229. Notably, however, the criticisms outlined in the preceding section are not the criticisms that
Justice Scalia advanced. Moreover, Justice Scalia's criticisms are themselves-as we already have
seen-subject to serious criticism. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
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There are at least four possible devices that would enable a State to
produce the economic effect that Massachusetts has produced here: (1)
a discriminatory tax upon the industry, imposing a higher liability on
out-of-state members than on their in-state competitors; (2) a tax upon
the industry that is nondiscriminatory in its assessment, but that has
an "exemption" or "credit" for in-state members; (3) a
nondiscriminatory tax upon the industry, the revenues from which are
placed into a segregated fund, which fund is disbursed as "rebates" or
"subsidies" to in-state members of the industry (the situation at issue
in this case); and (4) with or without nondiscriminatory taxation of the
industry, a subsidy for the in-state members of the industry, funded
from the State's general revenues. 30
According to Justice Scalia, while the taxes in categories one and two would
be unconstitutional, the subsidy in category four would survive Commerce
Clause attack.23' As for the question presented in West Lynn Creamery itself
(i.e., the legality of the category three device), Justice Scalia explained:
The issue before us in the present case is whether the third of these
methodologies must fall. Although the question is close, I conclude
it would not be a principled point at which to disembark from the
negative-Commerce-Clause train. The only difference between
methodology (2) (discriminatory 'exemption' from nondiscriminatory
tax) and methodology (3) (discriminatory refund of nondiscriminatory
tax) is that the money is taken and returned rather than simply left
with the favored in-state taxpayer in the first place. The difference
between (3) and (4), on the other hand, is the difference between
assisting in-state industry through discriminatory taxation, and
assisting in-state industry by other means ....
I draw the line where I do because it is a clear, rational line at the
limits of our extant negative-Commerce-Clause jurisprudence. ' 2
The difficulty with this reasoning is that it begs most critical questions. In
essence, Justice Scalia declared that methodology three involves
"discriminatory taxation." 23 3 The Massachusetts tax, however, was not
discriminatory at all. 2  Justice Scalia implied that the Massachusetts program
could fairly be viewed as involving a tax "rebate" or "refund."135 But so can
230. West Lynn Creamerv, 512 U.S. at 210 (Scalia. J.. concumng)
231. See id. at 210-11.
232. Id. at 211-12.
233. Id. at 211.
234. See Heinzerling, supra note 18. at 270 ("[Tjhe premium imposed on Massachuscts milk dealers
appears to be the legislative abuse the Court was seeking to prevent. But this premium did not discriminate
against anyone.").
235. West Lynn Creanerv. 512 U.S. at 210. 211 (Scalia. J.. concumng)
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any monetary subsidy paid back to firms that are subjected to state taxation (as
most subsidized firms certainly are), particularly when the subsidy is
specifically coupled with targeted "taxation of the industry., 236 Justice Scalia
correctly noted that the line between methodologies two and three is thin.237
But the line between methodologies three and four seems no less shadowy.
Indeed, on Justice Scalia's reasoning, Massachusetts could have collected
exactly the same taxes, calculated in exactly the same manner, from exactly the
same milk dealers, and then paid out exactly the same amount of monies, to
exactly the same producers, if only it had placed the collected taxes in "the
general revenues" rather than "a segregated fund. 238
On what "clear, rational" theory would the payments in these
circumstances have ceased to be "refunds" or "rebates"? After all, in the usual
case, tax refunds and rebates are paid from the general treasury. On what
"clear, rational" theory could it be said that the actual case, but not the
hypothetical case, involved "discriminatory taxation"? After all, in each case,
the tax imposed would have been exactly the same. And on what "clear,
rational" theory could Justice Scalia conclude that the general fund case, but
not the segregated fund case, was "far removed from what we have hitherto
held to be unconstitutional"? 239 After all, for the reasons just given, the
general fund case is plainly not "far removed"-if removed at all-from the
case involving the segregated fund. Justice Scalia left these questions
unanswered.
There is an additional and more basic difficulty with Justice Scalia's
analysis: It hinges on his underlying, but unexplained, acceptance of the
foundational distinction between state tax breaks and state subsidies.24 Apart
from citing the "limits of our extant negative-Commerce-Clause
jurisprudence, ' 24' however, Justice Scalia offered no reason in West Lynn
236. Id. at 210; see Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1161-63 (noting the problem presented by "a subsidy
funded by a tax on the good being subsidized"); Patterson, supra note 18, at 1025 ("States receive the
majority of their revenue from sales taxes .... It is impractical and probably impossible for a state tax
system to not impact out-of-state producers. If the general funds subsidize in-state producers, it is likely
that out-of-state interests would provide some of the funds.").
237. See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 211 (Scalia, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 210, 211. A student note also rejects Justice Scalia's segregated fund distinction:
A firm is indifferent as to whether its subsidy comes from a segregated fund or from the general
treasury. A dollar is worth a dollar regardless of its source: in either case, its effect is to lower
a firm's marginal cost, and hence the price at which the firm can sell its goods without suffering
a marginal loss.
Note, supra note 31, at 1541-42. Conceivably, Justice Scalia would reject the effort to distinguish the
hypothesized case from West Lynn Creamery by characterizing it as involving a de facto "segregated fund."
But such a position would only reveal more clearly the thinness of the claimed distinction between Justice
Scalia's categories three and four.
239. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
240. See id. at 211-12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 212.
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Creamery for deeming this distinction "clear," "rational," or otherwise sound.
To be sure, Justice Scalia hinted at two possible justifications for
distinguishing tax breaks from subsidies in his earlier opinion in the New
Energy case. 42 But, again, a close look at these putative justifications shows
that they lack sufficient explanatory power to guide courts called on in the
future to decide whether particular subsidy programs are unconstitutional.
First, in distinguishing the Ohio ethanol tax credit struck down in New
Energy from an ethanol subsidy adopted in Indiana, Justice Scalia had noted
that the "assessment and computation of taxes" constitutes "a primeval
governmental activity. '243  One wonders, however, in what way this
observation advanced informed analysis. To begin with, even if state taxation
is a "primeval governmental activity," state spending is as well. 2'" In
addition, even assuming that state taxation is distinctively "primeval," it is
doubtful that this fact should subject discriminatory tax breaks, but not
discriminatory subsidies, to dormant Commerce Clause attack. If
"primevalness" cuts in any direction, it would seem to favor the broadest
legislative discretion in exercising state taxing powers.2'4  Finally, it is
doubtful that "primevalness" could supply a useful litmus for distinguishing the
constitutional from the unconstitutional state subsidy. To take the most
immediate example, if primevalness provides the analytic key, why should the
Court have invalidated the newfangled linked-tax-and-subsidy program at issue
in West Lynn Creamery itself?
Justice Scalia's second attempt to distinguish impermissible tax breaks
from permissible subsidies was based on the text of the Commerce Clause. As
he explained the distinction:
242. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1988).
243. Id. at 277; see also Bair, supra note 22, at 2415 (noting that the Court in New Energy
distinguished earlier resource distribution decisions on the ground that "taxation is a *pnmeval
governmental activity"'); Enrich, supra note 18, at 442 ("In particular, although it may be plausible to
characterize governmental cash subsidies as a form of participation in the market for the subsidized goods.
services, or activities that is akin to what private entities do in bidding up the pnces for destred purchases.
taxation is, as the Court has emphasized, 'a primeval governmental activity.'").
244. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I. 40 (1973) ("*Tlhe way in which [a
state] has chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues .... [is) an area in which [the Court)
has traditionally deferred to state legislatures." (emphasis added)).
245. The Court has shown solicitude in a variety of contexts to claims of state autonomy in areas
"historically" or "traditionally" subject to state control. See United States v. Lopez. 514 U S. 549. 563
(1995) (invalidating congressional regulation of firearms in school zones): Gregory v. Ashcroft. 501 US
452,460 (1991) (narrowly interpreting a congressional override of state-established electoral qualifications)
The Court has also recognized, time and again, that "[s]tates have broad discretion to configure their
systems of taxation as they deem appropriate." Oregon Waste Sys.. Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality.
511 U.S. 93, 106-07 (1994); accord. e.g.. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton. 462 U.S. 176. 196 (1983)
("'Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.'-
(quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983))): Austin v Ne, Hampshire.
420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975) ("'[I]n taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest
freedom in classification."' (quoting Madden v. Kentucky. 309 U.S. 83. 88 (1940)))
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The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to
give its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of
that description in connection with the State's regulation of interstate
commerce. Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-
of-state manufacturers does.246
Again, one wonders why. It is not self-evident that the award of subsidies to
in-state producers fails to qualify as a "regulation" of interstate commerce.247
Many economists and lawyers would say just the opposite 24  because the
very purpose of subsidization is to regulate the flow of business by promoting
in-state production. 249 Indeed, at one juncture in New Energy itself, Justice
Scalia observed that ordinary "subsidy programs.., might ... be
characterized" as "regulatory activity.
''
25
In sum, Justice Scalia's writings offer little or no real explanation for why
tax breaks differ from subsidies for dormant Commerce Clause purposes; why
"primevalness" or "regulatoriness" has justificatory power in this context; or
why the segregated fund principle he advanced in West Lynn Creamery
sensibly reflects "primevalness," "regulatoriness," or any other underlying
constitutional concern. In addition, while Justice Scalia's approach might bring
a greater level of determinacy to this area of law, it carries with it the twin
246. New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278; see also Mark V. Tushnet, Scalia and the Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Foolish Formalism?, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 1717, 1727 (1991) ("The courts' authority to
invalidate state legislation is ... limited to consideration of state laws that regulate interstate commerce,
not those that discriminate against out-of-state commercial activity in some other way, for example, by a
direct cash subsidy.").
247. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTiONAL LAW 176 (12th ed. 1991) (noting that "the way
in which revenues are spent [has] significant regulatory impacts" and that governmental "spending powers
have been invoked to regulate ... economic problems"); Regan, supra note 4, at 1112 ('Regulation' [may
be] used in a broad sense [so that it] includes taxing and spending programs.").
248. See. e.g., Polelle, supra note 39, at 684 (asserting that "competition is nullified" and
"protectionism is at work" as a result of subsidies, no less than with other forms of regulation).
249. Cf Fireside Nissan, Inc. v. Fanning, 30 F.3d 206, 216 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that a "diversionary
effect is present in all subsidy cases"); Enrich, supra note 18, at 459 ("[A]lthough the market participant
doctrine may provide a basis for distinction, cash subsidies to relocating businesses surely distort economic
decisions in precisely the same way as tax benefits.").
250. New Energy, 486 U.S. at 269; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992)
(holding that a "congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments" amounts to federal action that
"would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes" (emphasis added)):
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 n.14 (1980) (noting that some subsidy programs might be
characterized as regulatory activity for purposes of the market participant exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause). Of course, the Court has said that tax laws are "plainly connected to the regulation of
interstate commerce." Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 107 n.9; accord Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446,
455 (1886) (stating that a "discriminatory tax ... operating to the disadvantage of products of other
states ... is, in effect, a regulation"). In this regard, are subsidies really any different? See, e.g..
Heinzerling, supra note 18, at 260 n.210 ("The language of the Commerce Clause does not answer this
question. To be sure, the Clause applies only to the 'regulation' of interstate commerce, but it does not
define this term."); Polelle, supra note 39, at 658 (equating a state's behavior when it "uses subsidies" to
its behavior "when it uses its normal regulatory powers to manipulate an existing market").
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risks of drawing an essentially arbitrary liner' and of threatening to render
West Lynn Creamery an all but empty gesture.2 2
In the end, Justice Scalia's West Lynn Creamery concurrence rests upon
two distinctively personal viewpoints. First, it reflects Justice Scalia's strong,
but probably quixotic, drive to discover and draw "clear" constitutional
lines.53 Second, and more important, it derives from Justice Scalia's
distinctive view that, because the Commerce Clause contains no "negative"
component at all, he should honor only the strict letter of the Court's past
decisions in this field.2 4 Lower courts, however, do not have the same
251. See infra Subsection V.B.2 (critiquing in detail the proposed segregated fund distinction).
252. See Note, supra note 31, at 1554 (attacking the segregated fund pnnciple on the ground that.
under it, "[a]n otherwise unconstitutional tax becomes constitutional if the tax revenue simply makes a
monetary pit stop in the general treasury"); see also Winkfield F. Twyman. Jr.. BeYond Purpose:
Addressing State Discrimination in Interstate Commerce. 46 S.C. L. REV. 381. 425 (1995) ("Artful drafting
of neutral regulations should not be rewarded with more protection from the Court if these regulations
result in discrimination that proves disruptive in effect."); Varat. supra note 22. at 542 (concluding. without
mention of fund segregation, that "the same impermissible result would be produced if resident and
nonresident businesses were equally taxed but only resident businesses received cash subsidy rebates").
253. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia. J.. dissenting); Sisson v Ruby. 497
U.S. 358, 371 n.2 (1990) (Scalia J., concurring): Burnham v. Superior Court. 495 U.S 604. 621 (1990)
(plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.); Morrison v. Olson. 487 U.S. 654. 711-12 (1988) (Scalia. J . dissenting):
Antonin B. Scalia, The Rule of Lwass a Law of Rules. 56 U. Citl. L. REV. 1175. 1178 (1989) (arguing for
clear rules because "the discretion-conferring approach ... does not satisfy [thcl sense of justice very
well"). On Justice Scalia's effort to formulate a "clear" rule in West Lynn Creamer)y. see Patterson. supra
note 18, at 1005, which states that "[iln an effort to shape the Court's expansive reasoning. Justice Scalia
advocated a bright line between constitutionally permissible and impermissible subsidies " On Justice
Scalia's gravitation to purportedly "'clear" rules in general, see Nicholas S. Zcppos. Justice Scalia's
Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597. 1619 (1991). which observes that
Justice Scalia's insistence on following clear statutory strctures denvs from "concern about judicial
activism" and represents one "of his repeated calls for clear. bnght-linc rules to cabin judicial discretion"
Cf. Walter Hellerstein, Justice Scalia and the Commerce Clause: Reflections of a State Tt Lawyer. 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1763, 1787 (1991) (noting that Justice Scalia has "taken formalistic and rcstnctic
positions" on state tax issues such as apportionment and discnmination)
Of course, volumes could be written on the advantages and disadvantages-and the disco crability
and nondiscoverability-of clear constitutional rules. Even with respect to Justice Scaha's own segregated
fund test, for example, a number of questions come quickly to mind: What if the proceeds of multiple taxes
are "segregated"? Is de facto segregation a possibility') What if subsidy funds come from a segregated fund
generated by taxes imposed on another industry? A related industry? What if subsidies come from a
segregated fund paid out to both in-state members of a taxed industry and to others (e.g.. local dairy
farmers and local charities)? What if most of the segregated fund's proceeds are paid to others) In short.
even in applying Justice Scalia's test it remains true that "[tihe boundary at which the conflicting interests
balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance. but points in the lIne. or helping to
establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side - Hudson
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.): see also Tushnet. supra note 246. at 1734-
39 (discussing the practical difficulties of applying "formal" as well as "balancing" rules)
254. See, e.g., Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v Huddleston. 507 U.S 60. 78-79 (1993) (Scalia. J.
concurring) (refusing to go further than invalidating "a state law that facially diseminates against interstate
commerce" or "that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this Court")
Justice Thomas has joined Justice Scalia's articulation of this case-on-point style of dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. See West Lynn Creamery. Inc. v Healy. 512 U.S. 186. 210 (1994) (Scalia.
concurring, joined by Thomas, J.). The view is nonetheless -'distinctive" in the crtical sense that no other
Justice has expounded it, or anything like it, at least since Chief Justice Taney left the Court. See TRIBE.
supra note 4. § 6-3, at 405 (noting Taney's rejection of the dormant Commerce Clause pnnciple)
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options as a free-minded Supreme Court Justice. They must accept the settled
proposition that there is a dormant Commerce Clause, abide by the logic and
spirit of the Court's past Commerce Clause decisions, and seek principles that
have a reasoned basis in light of those decisions for distinguishing permissible
and impermissible state subsidies.
C. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Parting ways with Justices Stevens and Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist
defended the constitutionality of the Massachusetts program. Declaring the
Court's earlier tax break cases inapposite, the Chief Justice found it "'not only
a distinction, but a significant difference"' that the payment "in this case goes
not to the entity which pays the tax (milk dealers) but to the dairy farmers
themselves." 5 The Chief Justice thus suggested that the critical criterion in
assessing the constitutionality of state subsidy programs should be whether
they direct payments on a discriminatory basis to the same persons whose tax
payments create the subsidy fund. 56 The difficulty with the Chief Justice's
opinion is that it offered no reason why courts should draw this particular
distinction between permissible and impermissible subsidy programs. This
omission was especially surprising because the Chief Justice's approach
(strange as it may seem) arguably fits best with the overarching principle that
drove both the majority and concurring opinions in the West Lynn Creamery
case. Both the majority and concurring Justices, after all, found a dormant
Commerce Clause violation in West Lynn Creamery only after characterizing
the subsidy payment as a tax "rebate" or "refund. ' z 7 In ordinary parlance,
however, a rebate or refund involves a return of money to the same person
who paid it out.258 Moreover, the state's separation of its tax and grant
targets had economic consequences that provided a basis for deeming the
"rebate" or "refund" labels inapplicable to the Massachusetts milk payments.
When a dealer buys milk, that dealer will take account of all transaction-
related costs as it chooses among competing suppliers. Thus, if the dealer's tax
costs for in-state milk are negated due to a tax exemption or rebate afforded
to the dealer itself, the dealer unquestionably will buy from in-state suppliers,
all other things being equal. Given the structure of the Massachusetts scheme,
however, the dealer did not receive this sort of purchasing incentive; instead,
255. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 216 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 197 n.14
(majority opinion)).
256. See id. at 216.
257. See supra notes 48, 235 and accompanying text.
258. See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1266 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "rebate" as "an amount
handed back to the payer").
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from the dealer's perspective, transaction-related tax costs for in-state and out-
of-state milk were identical. To be sure, the subsidy afforded to in-state
producers would make in-state milk more attractive to the dealer if the in-state
producer chose to pass all or part of that subsidy through to the dealer by way
of price reductions2 9 But there is only a possibility that the subsidy would
be passed through and thus only a possibility that in-state milk would be more
attractive to dealers. Thus, the subsidy would not-like a true tax exemption
or rebate-necessarily make in-state milk more attractive to dealers with the
direct consequence that less out-of-state milk would move in interstate
commerce. Moreover, the economic argument for the Chief Justice's position
draws strength from a body of precedent the Chief Justice neglected to
mention-namely a series of Commerce Clause cases in which the Court has
refused to assume that pass-throughs occur. 6°
Justice Stevens was unmoved by the Chief Justice's dissent. In his view:
Rebating the taxes directly to producers rather than to the
dealers .. merely reinforces the conclusion that the pricing order
will favor local producers. If the taxes were refunded only to the
dealers, there might be no impact on interstate commerce, because the
dealers might not use the funds to increase the price or quantity of
milk purchased from Massachusetts dairy farmers. The refund to the
dealers might, therefore, result in no advantage to in-state producers.
On the other hand, by refunding monies directly to the dairy farmers,
the pricing order ensures that Massachusetts producers will
benefit. 26
1
This reasoning is faulty because how milk dealers "use" any payments they
receive is beside the point. What is critical is that conditioning the availability
of rebates on a dealer's purchase and resale of in-state milk inexorably will
induce the dealer to shift its purchases away from out-of-state suppliers. For
this reason, it is simply erroneous to say that "if taxes were refunded only to
the dealers, there might be no impact on interstate commerce. -6 " On the
259. See infra text accompanying notes 267-268.
260. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U S 18. 46-47 (1990)
("We repeatedly have recognized that determining whether a particular business cost has in fact been passed
on to customers or suppliers entails a highly sophisticated theoretical and factual inquiry (and cannot be
based] on sheer speculation that a 'pass-on' occurred."); cf Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner. 116 S Ct 848. 859
(1996) (citing "the frequently extreme complexity of economic incidence analysts"). Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175. 196 n.7 (1995) (noting that '[tlhc significance of the
taxpayer's identity is ... central to" dormant Commerce Clause tax cases). But cf Evansv ille-Vandcrburgh
Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707. 714 (1972) ("1W]e do not think it particularly
important whether the charge is imposed on the passenger himself, to be collected by the airline, or on the
airline, to be passed on to the passenger if it chooses.**).
261. West Lynn Creamery. 512 U.S. at 197 n.14.
262. Id.
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other hand, if Massachusetts dairy farmers did not pass back the subsidy
payments paid out to them (because, for example, each of them immediately
made a gift of all such payments to the Vesuvian Cosmetology College), then
dealer purchasing patterns would not change at all, and there would in fact be
"no impact on interstate commerce" in milk. It is true that if "rebates" were
to go to dealers, a dealer might, no less than a producer, use the extra cash to
philanthropize purveyors of cosmetology skills. But the dealer would
nonetheless certainly switch its purchasing to in-state milk-and thereby alter
interstate movement of this product-so as to maximize the resources it could
use to make its salutary donations.
Responding in another way to the argument that "dealers who pay . . . the
tax ... are not competitors of the farmers who receive disbursements,
263
Justice Stevens observed that "[f]or over 150 years, our cases have rightly
concluded that the imposition of a differential burden on any part of the stream
of commerce ... is invalid. ' '264 This observation is question-begging,
however, because the central issue in West Lynn Creamery was whether the
Massachusetts program should be characterized as imposing a "differential
burden" in the first place. To be sure, "a higher sales tax on milk produced in
Maine than milk produced in Massachusetts ... would be struck down., 265
But that assertion does not answer the question whether a neutral tax on
dealers should be characterized as discriminatory because of a supposed
"rebate" given, not to dealers, but to local milk producers who only might pass
through to dealers the benefit of that subsidy.
Despite these problems, there is much to be said for the majority's
rejection of the Chief Justice's wooden refusal to apply the rebate label to a
subsidy paid to a dairy farmer, rather than the taxed wholesaler of that dairy
farmer's product. To begin with, whatever else the Massachusetts milk subsidy
was, it was uniquely tax-related-and thus particularly susceptible to
characterization as a tax rebate-because it was funded solely with the
proceeds of the simultaneously enacted milk-dealer tax. In addition, to the
extent any pass-back of the tax to producers occurred at all, the program
operated almost exactly like the patently unlawful protective tariff.266 Finally,
263. Id. at 198.
264. Id. at 202.
265. Id.
266. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. This is the case because, if a tax burden were thus
imposed indirectly on milk producers through lower milk prices, only in-state producers would receive a
rebate payment of the "tax" thus paid. In fact, the respondent in West Lynn Creamery claimed that no such
taxes were "passed back" through producer price reductions. See Respondent's Brief at 17, West Lynn
Creamery (No. 93-141). It seems likely, however, that some pass-backs occurred. See Collins, supra note
27, at 70 (noting that government charges can be "pass[ed]-on" either to "suppliers or customers"); Regan,
supra note 4, at 1120 n.59 (noting "that in the final analysis the burden is almost certainly shared by all
parties, including producers"). Even if there seemed to be no pass-backs, however, it would be wrong not
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if any subsidy benefits were passed forward by in-state dairy farmers to local
dealers in the form of voluntary producer price reductions (and there is every
reason-given the purpose of the program-to conclude that this form of pass-
through occurred 267), the program very closely tracked the tax exemption
scheme invalidated without difficulty in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v Dias. 26 In
both cases, after all, a wholesaler received a government-generated benefit
solely because it chose to deal with the local supplier of a government-favored
product.
In the end, Justice Rehnquist's "it's-not-a-rebate" argument failed because
it was perceived to hinge on the sort of "nice distinction" the Court's
Commerce Clause cases eschew. 269  Perhaps the best way to view the
Massachusetts program is that it set up the most tariff-like tax-and-subsidy
structure possible without obviously violating the Commerce Clause. In
particular, Massachusetts could not have imposed its tax directly on producers
because an attempt to tax directly out-of-state producer sales would have
violated (at least in most cases) the nexus prong of the Court's Complete Auto
Transit test.270 Similarly, Massachusetts could not have directed its subsidy
to taxpaying dealers on the basis of their Massachusetts milk sales because,
after Bacchus Imports, that would have constituted patently discriminatory
relief afforded to taxpayers themselves. -  It might be said that, by dodging
these pitfalls, Massachusetts escaped all constitutional difficulties. It is
certainly as sensible to say, however, that Massachusetts resorted to
impermissible "subterfuge ' 272 to circumvent the strictures of the Commerce
Clause. "The Constitution 'nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded
to apply the anti-tariff rule logically applicable to this class of cases merely because this extraordinary
circumstance appeared to pertain in this particular case. This conclusion is reinforced by an inability to say
with any confidence that pass-backs did not occur. As Patter-son notes"
The incidence of a tax on a dealer may be partially or fully shifted backwards to the produccr,
or forward to the consumers. In fact. whether a tax was collected from milk consumens or from
milk dealers, the impact of the tax theoretically would not change. with the exception of
controlled economic experiments, however. it is very difficult to measure the effects of taxes
as they pass through the economy.
Patterson, supra note 18, at 1010-1I; see also Suellen M. Wolfe. Municipal Finance card the Commerce
Clause: Are User Fees the Next Target of the "Silver Bullet "'. 26 STE'Iso% L RE', 727, 799 (1997)
("Requiring a specific and detailed economic analysis of a tax burden is not possible or justified "
267. See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 196 n.10.
268. 468 U.S. 263 (1984). For a discussion of Bacchus Imports. see utfra notes 365-369 and
accompanying text.
269. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511. 522 (1935): see also POS\,ER. supra note 105. at 642
(rejecting the relevance of whom the tax is "on" and "%where the nominal subject of the tax is physically
located").
270. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 430 U.S. 274. 277-79 (1977). id at 279 (requinng a
"substantial nexus with the taxing state"); see also. e.g.. Quill Corp v. North Dakota. 504 U S 298. 311-19
(1992) (applying the nexus principle to strike down a state tax law as applied to sellers sho lacked a
physical presence in the state).
271. See infra notes 365-370 and accompanying text.
272. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577. 587 (1937)
1998] 1019
HeinOnline  -- 107 Yale L.J. 1019 1997-1998
The Yale Law Journal
modes' of infringing on Constitutional protections. 273 For this reason, the
majority had good cause to reject the claim that channeling in-state milk
payments to local producers, rather than to local dealers, ipso facto removed
any constitutional infirmity from the Massachusetts milk program.
IV. TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR TAX-LINKAGE ANALYSIS
In both New Energy and West Lynn Creamery, members of the Court
explicitly or implicitly advanced a variety of possible approaches for drawing
the constitutional line between permissible and impermissible subsidy
programs. Yet, as we saw in Part III, each of these approaches-whether based
on surrogate representation, the benefit-burden dichotomy, "primevalness,"
"regulatoriness," use of a segregated fund, or differentiation of taxpayer and
subsidy recipient-seems demonstrably misguided, or at least incomplete.274
The challenge thus remains to craft a more sensible set of organizing principles
for distinguishing between constitutional and unconstitutional state subsidies.
In Section IV.A, I consider a number of principles proposed by other legal
commentators. Finding each of these approaches unsatisfactory, I advance my
own proposed methodology in Section IV.B.
A. Other Commentators' Approaches
Several scholars have offered suggestions for marking the distinction
between constitutional and unconstitutional state subsidies. These efforts,
however, are sparse in detail and, in most cases, tentative and preliminary in
nature. More important, each effort is open to serious criticism on doctrinal
and policy grounds. I turn now to an examination of these proposals, which
focus on maximization of efficiency, creation of commerce, and sheltering
subsidies that accompany a general (rather than an industry-specific) tax.
1. The Low-Cost-Subsidy and Efficient-Subsidy Principles
Professor Regan has floated the idea that courts should target for
invalidation monetary subsidies that "achieve a substantial redirection of
273. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995) (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268, 275 (1939)).
274. Cf. Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1131 ("State tariffs certainly are unconstitutional under
the ... dormant Commerce Clause; state subsidies, funded from the general revenues of the state, appear
to be entirely constitutional. The Supreme Court has given no persuasive justification for this differing
treatment.").
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business to local producers at very little cost."2'3 To his credit, Professor
Regan has tried to build this organizing principle on a policy said to
distinguish subsidies from other forms of impermissible state
discrimination-namely, the policy that subsidies pose a reduced risk to our
national market because of their inherent costliness.276 As I have already
noted, however, the "expensiveness" policy on which Professor Regan relies
is of dubious legitimacy because tax expenditures, no less than cash
expenditures, are inherently costly.277 In addition, as I have observed
elsewhere: "[T]here will be great difficulties both in creating and in sorting out
the type of 'carefully calibrated' subsidies Professor Regan identifies. Lack of
necessity and problems of judicial manageability thus converge to favor
restraint in invalidating [these] subsidy programs.2 78 Perhaps the best
evidence that this criticism has merit comes from Professor Regan himself. As
he has written: "[T]he informational demands for designing the dangerously
cost-effective subsidy are just too great. 2 79
Taking a related approach, some observers have suggested that courts
should sustain or strike down a subsidy depending on whether it contributes
to "utility maximization. 2 " The approach of these observers reminds us of
a key background proposition: Many monetary subsidies serve useful purposes,
so that barring them all (or even barring them as a general rule) risks serious
harm. 281 Yet, any test that calls on judges to sort between the efficient and
inefficient subsidy on a case-by-case basis would-as Professor Gergen has
argued-"strain their capacity and vest in them undue discretion to decide
close questions of value. 282 A major problem is that there is no readily
available standard for deciding whether a particular subsidy is efficient, or
even for deciding what efficiency means in this context. A subsidy might be
deemed economically defensible, for example, if it pays a firm for the
275. Regan, supra note 4, at 1196 (deeming it "important that the benefits that are limited to locals
be expensive for the state").
276. See id.
277. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
278. Coenen, supra note 22, at 479.
279. Regan, supra note 4. at 1196.
280. See. e.g., Bair, supra note 22, at 2423 ("[C]ourts should stoke down those contractual preferences
that create large inefficiencies ...."); see also Gergen. supra note 22. at 1107 (noting that "[sleveral
scholars have explicitly taken an economic perspective on these issues").
281. See Regan. supra note 4, at 1194 ("Many spending programs are positively beneficial from the
point of view of the nation as a whole .... ); Note. supra note 3 1. at 1547 (noting that "'subsidies can be
a socially beneficial means of encouraging an optimal level of production"); Patterson. supra note 18. at
982 ("A state may address market failures with subsidies that conform production to its true costs."); id.
at 983 ("Traditionally, courts tolerate subsidies because subsidies often can produce beneficial social as well
as economic consequences, and regulating them would be administratively difficult.").
282. Gergen, supra note 22. at 1I10.
1998] 1021
HeinOnline  -- 107 Yale L.J. 1021 1997-1998
The Yale Law Journal
generation of positive externalities." 3 But what counts as a positive
externality? If the amount of the subsidy must approximate the value of the
positive externality, how are we to measure that value? Apart from valuing the
positive externality, must that value be offset by the costs imposed by negative
externalities generated by the firm? And when (if ever) should an in-state
firm's generation of positive externalities entitle it to a subsidy not paid to
competing out-of-state firms that generate positive externalities of their own
(either in the state, outside the state, or both)? These sorts of judgments are not
likely to be welcomed by a Court that recently declared itself "institutionally
unsuited to gather the facts upon which economic predictions can be made, and
professionally untrained to make them.
' 284
Responding to such concerns, Professor Gergen has taken a different
approach, drawing on both the value of efficiency maximization and "concerns
that a rule be administrable"285 to propose categories of permissible and
impermissible resource-distribution preferences. 286  Like a case-by-case
approach, however, this methodology is distinctively wedded to neoclassical
wealth maximization; it thus seems to clash with the Court's prior counsel that
the "Constitution does not require the states to subscribe to any particularly
economic theory., 287 In addition, as I have observed elsewhere, Professor
Gergen's own carefully developed efficiency-related categories are open to
question on efficiency grounds. 88 In short, the problem remains that any
efficiency-driven analysis (whether undertaken on a case-by-case basis or in
a more categorical way) is likely to prove deeply problematic in application,
particularly for busy judges who are not professional economists.2 89
283. See Note, supra note 31, at 1548 n.64 (citing articles in the economics literature for the
proposition that "the government should impose subsidies" when "there is a positive externality").
284. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811, 829 (1997).
285. Gergen, supra note 22, at 1107.
286. See id. at 1132-52.
287. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987); see also supra notes 133-134 and
accompanying text.
288. See Coenen, supra note 22, at 416-17 (questioning, for example, the proposed distinction between
medical services and cement sales).
289. See, e.g., CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF FEDERAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATE
BUSINESS INCENTIVES 26 (University of Va. Working Paper Series No. 97-1, 1997) (questioning the
competence of courts to distinguish socially beneficial and nonbeneficial business development incentives);
Michael E. Smith, State Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1211 (1986)
("[Tihe courts might undertake to determine whether the overall economic benefits and burdens of a
regulation favor local inhabitants against outsiders. Even expert economists might find themselves hard put
to make this determination."); cf Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 619 n.8 (1981)
(noting "the formidable evidentiary difficulties" in resolving such issues as elasticity of demand for the
product and alternative sources of supply (citing Developments in the Law: Federal Limitations on State
Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, 970 (1962))).
Professor Gergen himself recognizes that "formulating a simple rule that can distinguish wealth-
creating subsidies from those that are inefficient is virtually impossible." Gergen, supra note 22, at 1137,
To this thought the following might be added: A central purpose of federalism is to facilitate
experimentation, and experimentation necessarily envisions state forays into programs that might not be--or
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2. The Commerce-Creation Principle
Professor Tribe,29 with some support from an early opinion by Justice
Stevens, 291  has advocated a different principle. In Tribe's view, state
programs are open to attack if they distort existing markets, but are
unobjectionable if they create new market activity and then channel it into the
state. 92 I have suggested elsewhere that, contrary to Professor Tribe's claim,
this principle lacks support in the Supreme Court's existing decisions.2"' The
Tribe approach also seems misdirected because it is difficult to conceive of any
subsidy designed to stimulate additional economic activity within the state that
has no adverse impact at all on interstate markets. If this is so, the real
question raised by the Tribe test cannot be whether a particular state subsidy
has no effect on interstate commerce; instead, the judicial inquiry must focus
on whether that effect is de minimis or whether the essential thrust of the state
program is to stimulate new commercial activity of potential benefit to the
nation as a whole. These judgments, however, involve just the sort of
evidentiary problems and inevitable speculations that the Court historically has
eschewed.29
at least might not seem at first blush to be--economically efficient To put the point differently, an
important goal of federal experimentation is to provide a testing ground for determining whether state
programs that do not seem efficient really are efficient in the sense that the benefits they produce outseigh
the costs they impose. There is a danger that any up-front efficiency-ccntered standard for evaluating state
subsidy programs will conflict with this basic purpose of federalism
290. See TRIBE, supra note 106, at 144-46.
291. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.. 426 U S. 794. 816 (1976) (Steens. I . concurrmng)
292. See TRIBE, supra note 106, at 146. Professor Regan also seems sympathetic to this views See
Regan, supra note 4, at 1196 n.203 (endorsing constitutional immunity -on the ground that the bounty
scheme did create the relevant commerce").
293. See Coenen. supra note 22, at 410-14. In particular. Professor Tribe has asserted that this
commerce-creation principle explains the outcome in Alexandrta Scrap In that case. the Court upheld
subsidies paid by Maryland for the destruction of inoperable cars with a discnminatory preference for in-
state processors. Professor Tribe has claimed that this discriminatory subsidy was permissible only because
it created a new market in junk car processing. The record in the case. hosseser, suggested that a
preexisting market existed and that cars otherwise destined to be crushed outside Maryland s cre diserted
to in-state processors due to the availability of subsidy funds See Alexandria Scrap. 426 U S at 412-13.
see also Regan, supra note 4, at 1196 n.202 (noting that the Court in Alerandra Scrap did not rely on the
claim that the state created the commerce its bounty scheme affected).
294. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848. 855 n.3 (1996) (rejecting a "-de minimis' defense
to a charge of discriminatory taxation under the Commerce Clause"). id. at 859 (noting that courts "are
poorly equipped to evaluate with precision the relative burdens of various methods of taxation" and that
".[t]he complexities of factual economic proof always present a certain potential for error- (quoting
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue. 460 U.S. 575. 589-90 (1983))).
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263. 269 (1984) ("INleither the small %olume of sales of exempted
liquor nor the fact that the exempted liquors do not constitute a present "compeItie threat' to other liquors
is dispositive .... ); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake. 447 U S. 429. 445 (1980) (rejecting an attempt to
escape the market participant rule on the ground that the state's construction of a cement plant undermined
the operation of a preexisting private market in cement because the argument's factual premise was unduly
"speculative"); cf. Collins, supra note 27, at 102 C"Ih would .. be difficult to separate subsidies that
burden preexisting trade from those that stimulate new trade ") Indeed. even protectue tanffs (as %c ll as
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Professor Tribe's notion, however, may lay the groundwork for a more
measured and manageable subsidy-sorting principle. On this view, a strong line
marks the boundary between protectionist devices (designed, at least in part,
to safeguard existing industry from competitive pressures) and development
incentives (designed solely to expand economic activity within the subsidy-
granting state in an objectifiable way). 295 In particular, the pro-development
principle would shelter those subsidies (but only those subsidies) made
specifically contingent on the generation of new and greater economic activity
in the state-for example, the building of a new facility, the purchase of
additional equipment, or the hiring of more workers." From this
perspective, for example, it would be fine for South Carolina to pay cash to
BMW to build a new manufacturing plant within the state's borders. But it
would not be all right for South Carolina to share subsidy payments with
preexisting in-state auto manufacturers or (presumably) to make payments to
an existing in-state firm that is threatening to relocate to Minnesota. 97
Embracing this sort of distinction, however, falls far short of removing all
analytical difficulties.29 1 One problem is that so-called "business
innumerable discriminatory taxing schemes) could be defended on the ground that they promote the
establishment and growth of local business activity without unduly hampering the activities of out-of-state
firms. The Court, however, has never engaged in this sort of calculus when confronting programs of this
kind. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
295. This distinction is hinted at (with respect to both outright subsidies and tax credits) in Justice
Stevens's concurrence in Alexandria Scrap. As Justice Stevens stated:
Nor, in my judgment, does that Clause inhibit a State's power to experiment with different
methods of encouraging local industry. Whether the encouragement takes the form of a cash
subsidy, a tax credit, or a special privilege intended to attract investment capital, it should not
be characterized as a 'burden' on commerce.
426 U.S. at 816 (Stevens, J., concurring).
296. For two lines of possible defense for this type of incentive, see Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1129
n.9, which states that "[i]nstead of discriminating against out-of-state producers and protecting local
businesses, relocation subsidies discriminate against in-state producers and, thus, generally have avoided
constitutional challenge under the dormant Commerce Clause"; and Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra
note 35, at 933 n.261, which argues:
[T]he typical investment credit, jobs credit, or research credit may not have been enacted with
the primary intent of diverting activity from other states. Instead, many tax incentives appear
to have been enacted to encourage a higher level of the desired activity (investment or jobs or
research) within the state through the creation of more of the activity. There may be no (or
little) diversion of the activity from other states and hence no negative effects on interstate
commerce.
Of course, to the extent that tax breaks of this nature are constitutional (as some have argued they should
be, at least as applied to certain forms of taxes, see supra note 81), it should follow a fortiori that
economically equivalent outright subsidies are unobjectionable. Cf Regan, supra note 4, at 1193 ("The state
can waive property taxes on new manufacturing plants, thereby securing jobs for local workers at the
expense of foreign.").
297. See generally Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 27, at 849-53 (considering the constitutionality
of subsidies of this nature).
298. See id. at 849-55; see also Varat, supra note 22, at 545 (suggesting the propriety of similar
treatment of "expenditure ... to attract industry, employment, and commercial prosperity to, or to keep
it in, the subsidizing state").
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development" incentives often come with strings attached. If, for example, a
subsidy is awarded to the owner of a newly built plant-but only on an annual
basis for so long as the plant generates a specified output in the state-is the
subsidy properly viewed as a business development incentive, a stay-at-home
subsidy, or a "protectionist" measure that props up an already established in-
state business? In addition, the drawing of a line between expanding businesses
and businesses unwilling or unable to grow rests uncomfortably beside the
Court's longstanding insistence that "no principle of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence support[s] a distinction between thriving and struggling
enterprises.
299
Most important, any rule that singularly safeguards new business
development subsidies seems both over and underinclusive from the standpoint
of traditional Commerce Clause policy. The rule is underinclusive because
some desirable subsidies do not involve business expansion.3" The rule also
seems overinclusive, however, if one is prepared to draw on the Commerce
Clause to outlaw some business subsidies. This is the case because, in
Commerce Clause tax and regulatory cases, the Court often has condemned
state actions that induce "business operations to be performed in the home state
that would more efficiently be performed elsewhere."3'0
In the BMW hypothetical, for example, it is probable that South Carolina's
actions would not contribute to expansion of the national economy; instead,
because BMW was going to build its plant somewhere in the United States,
South Carolina's action would merely induce BMW to locate its plant in a
state where it otherwise might not have gone .3 2 It is for this reason that the
use of business development incentives creates the risk of an ill-advised "race
299. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 272; see also West Lynn Creamery. Inc. v Healy. 512 U S. 186.
205 (1994) ("Whether a State is attempting to 'enhance thriving and substantial business enterprises' or to
'subsidize ... financially troubled' ones is irrelevant to Commerce Clause analysis " (quoting Bacchus
Imports, 468 U.S. at 272)).
300. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. By way of example. it may sometimes be advisable
to "bail out" a critical local business threatened by insolvency. This should be true. for example, where the
cost of a subsidy needed to get a business back on its feet is less than the cost of its liquidation Cf
Gergen, supra note 22, at 1141 (arguing that a "measure may be of net benefit to society if by a small
expenditure the city can encourage local employment and accrue substantial savings in public support from
those escaping the dole, provided that the disappointed outsiders can find work at only lightly less return
elsewhere").
301. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970). quoted in Westinghouse Elec Corp. v Tully.
466 U.S. 388, 406 (1984); accord. e.g., Toomer v. Witsell. 334 U S 385. 403-04. 406 (1948); Foster-
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13 (1928); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna. Inc v Town
of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1604 (1997) (reiterating that under well-establishd Court jurisprudence
"discriminatory tax exemptions" used "as a means of encouraging the growth of local trade" are
"impermissible").
302. Cf. Gergen. supra note 22, at 1135 ("(A subsidy may not stimulate increased production if. for
example, a state causes an industry to relocate to a place where its marginal costs are higher, but where
that increase is offset by aid from the state.").
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to the bottom" among the states,0 3 a race that seems at odds with the
Commerce Clause vision of a "federal free trade unit''3 4 in which business
location occurs in response to market forces rather than state
manipulations.30 5 In light of these concerns-as well as the advisability of
avoiding a rule that might generate a pointless cycle of never-ending business
relocations-there is no good reason to single out "business development"
subsidies for special and preferred treatment.
3. The Industry-Specific-Tax Distinction
Another approach-trumpeted by a student note in the Harvard Law
Review30 7  and perhaps lent support by Professor Drahozal's recent
article 308 -would invalidate subsidies paid to in-state firms subjected to an
"industry-specific tax" (such as the milk tax in West Lynn Creamery),309 but
uphold subsidies accompanied by only a "general tax, imposed on multiple
industries, such as a sales tax or general corporate income tax."3 0 The key
idea behind this proposed distinction is that the subsidy plus industry-specific
303. See Enrich, supra note 18, at 401. For a critique of this race-to-the-bottom theory, see Gillette,
supra note 289, at 16-24.
304. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949).
305. See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963) (rejecting the
creation of an "incentive to locate within Louisiana" as a legitimate justification for a higher use tax on
certain out-of-state goods because "[d]isapproval of such a result is implicit in all cases dealing with tax
discrimination" since every discriminatory tax "encourages an out-of-state operator to become a resident");
see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880 (1985) (stating, in applying the Equal
Protection Clause, that "promotion of domestic business within a State, by discriminating against foreign
corporations that wish to compete by doing business there, is not a legitimate state purpose").
306. Cf. Coenen, supra note 22, at 475 ("If states constitutionally may use state resources to woo new
businesses, then why should states not be able to use their resources to keep old businesses where they
are?"); Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 27, at 854 (arguing that the distinction between new business and
stay-at-home subsidies would create undesirable incentives). Of course, it would be possible to reformulate
any business development limitation on a general prohibition on state subsidies, including business
retention, as well as business creation, incentives. But such an adjustment would complicate an already
complex principle and put serious pressure on the underlying distinction between "protectionist" and
"nonprotectionist" subsidies.
307. See Note, supra note 31.
308. See Drahozal, supra note 33.
309. Note, supra note 31, at 1552.
310. Id. at 1549; cf. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 196 (1994) (noting that the
Massachusetts program, like that in Bacchus Imports, involved a "tax on a single kind of good and special
provisions for in-state producers"). In a lengthy article, Professor Drahozal advocates a similar approach
for evaluating the constitutionality of tax credits and exemptions favoring local industry. See Drahozal,
supra note 33, at 1165-67. Presumably, Professor Drahozal would gravitate toward the industry-specific-tax
test in subsidy cases too, at least outside the business development context. See id. at 1129 n.9 (reserving
judgment on the applicability of an industry-specific-tax tariff-likeness principle to business development
incentives). For the reasons set forth in this section, however, the industry-specific-tax principle should not
govern subsidy cases, and a fortiori it should not govern true tax break cases either. See also Coenen &
Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 2203-06 (discussing the critical role in tax-discrimination analysis of
internalization of state "spending" within the tax system through explicit grant of credits, exemptions, or
deductions).
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tax bears a close resemblance to the classic (and unconstitutional) tariff
because in both cases states will find themselves unable to counter the effects
of neighboring states' actions with retaliatory subsidies of their own.31 1 In
particular, the argument goes, if State B retaliates against State A's true tariff
or subsidy plus industry-specific tax by enacting a subsidy designed to protect
State B industries' competitive position in State A, State A can counter by
raising its tariff or industry-specific tax to the point at which State B no longer
can afford such subsidies because of "budgetary restraints."3 - If, however,
State A initiates this cycle with a subsidy accompanied by a general tax, State
A will not be able to respond to a State B retaliatory subsidy because local
targets of the general tax, apart from subsidized industry members, will oppose
any further increase in the State A tax. 31' As the note author states: "The
general tax cannot convert the subsidy into a threatening functional tariff,
because other in-state industries would preclude the state from increasing the
tax rate, a step necessary for winning the tariff-versus-subsidy game.'"334
This line of analysis-while innovative and partially rooted in policy
concerns emphasized in this Article 3 -ultimately fails to provide a
satisfactory approach for distinguishing permissible and impermissible subsidy
programs. To begin with, the proposed distinction is not well-developed. For
example, how does it operate when the challenged subsidy is enacted at
another time than the industry-specific tax? The majority in West Lynn
Creamery lent this "simultaneity" factor much significance.3 ' 6 Yet a principle
built solely on the distinction between "industry-specific" and "general" tax
cases would seem to take no account of this factor or of a number of other
factors that courts are likely to find important. 7
311. See Note, supra note 31, at 1544-48 (discussing tariffs); id at 1552-53 (discussing a subsidy
coupled with an industry-specific tax).
312. Id. at 1551.
313. See id. at 1550-52.
314. Id. at 1550.
315. See infra text accompanying notes 327-328.
316. See West Lynn Creamery. Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186. 199-201 (1994); see also supra notes 59-
61 and accompanying text. For an explanation of why the Court properly considered this factor significant.
see infra notes 410-411 and accompanying text.
317. See Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90. at 2195-227 (discussing and defending various linkage
criteria). The Harvard note author also posits that the majority in West Lynn Creamery at least might have
been prepared to decide the case differently if the Massachusetts milk taxes had gone into the general
treasury, rather than a segregated fund. See Note, supra note 31. at 1538. This possibility seems farfetched.
however, particularly since the majority's analysis-in pointed contrast to that of Justice Scalia. who (in
vigorously criticizing the majority) specifically endorsed this distinction. see West L)nn Creamery. 512 U.S.
at 210-11 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra note 238 and accompanying text-did not focus on the
presence of a segregated fund at all. At the least, the note author missteps to the extent he suggests that
Professor Hellerstein and I "argued unambiguously" for the segregated fund principle embraced by Justice
Scalia. Note, supra note 31, at 1539 (citing Hellerstein & Coenen. supra note 27. at 837-45). In our Cornell
Law Review article, we concurred with the lVest Lyin Creamery majority's view that "courts should strike
down only those subsidies that operate ... as discriminatory de facto rebates of an identifiable state tax."
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More basically, it is wrong to equate with tariffs only those subsidies
linked to industry-specific taxes. Indeed, we have already seen that some
combinations of a subsidy and a general tax will very closely approximate true
protective tariffs.3t 8 On the other hand, many subsidies that accompany
industry-specific taxes-namely, all those subsidies that go to only some in-
state members of the taxed industry-present political dynamics unlike those
that surround the use of tariffs. In particular, it is wrong to suppose, as the
note author apparently would,3 t9 that our hypothetical State A will simply
raise its industry-specific tax (just as it would raise a tariff) if neighboring
State B responds to the State A subsidy and industry-specific tax with a
retaliatory subsidy for its own industry members. If there are taxed industry
members within State A that do not receive the subsidy, they are certain to
oppose any such tax increase. 32 In these circumstances, it is questionable to
assert that "the state can raise an industry-specific tax rate more freely than a
general one." 32' Indeed, just the opposite may be the case if the principle
holds true that "the political process responds much better to concentrated
interests than to dispersed ones. 322
Finally, the distinction between a "specific tax" and a "general tax" is
subject to criticism on doctrinal grounds. In Westinghouse,323 for example,
the Court struck down a business development incentive, in the form of tax
relief, that accompanied a general corporate income tax. In addition, although
the Court in both Bacchus Imports324 and New Energy325 invalidated tax
relief that accompanied industry-specific taxes, analysis of those opinions
suggests that this fact was irrelevant to the Court. There is simply no reason
to believe that the Court in Bacchus Imports would have reached a different
result had the same facially discriminatory tax exemption for local fruit wine
id. at 838, and specifically identified one category of potentially invalid and tax-tied subsidy paid from the
general fund, see id. at 863-65. We did not endorse as analytically significant in any context the bright line
segregated fund principle advocated by Justice Scalia.
318. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
319. See Note, supra note 31, at 1552.
320. See Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 2199-200, 2202, 2209-10.
321. Note, supra note 31, at 1552.
322. Collins, supra note 27, at 68-69. In addition, the Harvard note author's approach is built on the
expectation that states engaged in protectionism and retaliation will act with a high level of subtlety and
refinement. Suffice it to say that the author's "game-theoretical analysis," Note, supra note 31, at 1544, is
not likely to be replicated in the rough and tumble world of raw trade-warfare politics. This is all the more
true because questions about whom to tax and subsidize-and about how to anticipate and respond to the
moves of neighboring states-invariably arise against a complex backdrop of competing claims made by
various industry members, producers of substitutes, suppliers of raw materials, local consumers, taxpayers,
and competing would-be beneficiaries of state spending programs.
323. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984). Notably, in Camps
NewfoundlOwaronna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997), the Court again invalidated
discriminatory tax relief, even though afforded against a general property tax.
324. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
325. New Energy v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
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sales operated to reduce a "general" corporate income tax instead of an
"industry-specific" liquor wholesaling tax.326 And if that is so, the argument
for recognizing the distinction between a specific tax and a general tax seems
in tension with established doctrine.
Despite these criticisms, the proposed specific-tax principle probably
reflects a valid underlying concern. In particular, the more industry-specific a
tax is the more likely it may be that a related subsidy will have the linking
characteristic (elsewhere called "universality of scope"' 27) that is present
when a subsidy favors all in-state members of a taxed group.32 But
universality of scope is not always present in industry-specific-tax cases, and
it is not, in any event, the only relevant indicator of tax-subsidy linkage. In
short, a prohibitory rule that focuses exclusively on a subsidy's relation to an
industry-specific tax is, in the end, oversimplified and misconceived.
B. Toward a Policy-Driven Principle for Distinguishing Permissible and
Impermissible Subsidies
This review of possible strategies for distinguishing constitutional from
unconstitutional subsidies reminds us of an important proposition. Most serious
theorists who have looked at the question have rejected the view that the Court
should invalidate monetary subsidies in wholesale fashion. There appears
instead to be a felt need to sustain many state subsidy programs, while
nonetheless imposing some limiting principle upon them. Where should this
326. See infra notes 365-370 and accompanying text. After all. the basic principle that controlled the
case had nothing to do with the industry-specific character of the state exaction. Instead. the dispositivc rule
was that "[n]o state, consistent with the Commerce Clause. may impose a tax which disenminates against
interstate commerce." Bacchus Imports. 468 U.S. at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted). That principle
has always been applied to both general and industry-specific taxes. See. e.g.. Associated Indus. v. Lohman,
511 U.S. 641 (1994) (sales and use tax); Halliburton Oil well Cementing Co. v. Reily. 373 U S 64 (1963)
(sales and use tax); I.M. Darnell & Son v. City of Memphis. 208 U S. 113 (1908) (sales tax) Moreover.
in applying this principle, the Court has never focused on the number of in-state firms that are subject to
the challenged tax. Instead, the Court has consistently proclaimed that. if a tax favors some in-state
activities, goods, or entities, "'Iwle need not know how unequal the [tlax is before concluding that it
unconstitutionally discriminates."' Bacchus Imports. 468 U.S. at 269 (quoting Maryland v Louisiana. 451
U.S. 725, 760 (1981)); see also Wolfe, siupra note 266. at 764 ("Taxes and exactions that discriminate
against interstate commerce, even when composed in part of taxes on intrastate commerce, are
unconstitutional.").
For these reasons, it is hardly surprising that the Court in Camps Nlenfound/Owatonna cited Bacchu
Imports for the broad proposition that "discriminatory tax exemptions [designed tol encouraglel the growth
of local trade... are impermissible." Camps Nefound/Owatonna. 117 S. Ct. at 1604 (citing Bacchus
Imports, 468 U.S. at 273). Indeed, Camps NesfoaundlOwatonna involved a challenge to discriminatory tax
exemption (afforded only to nonprofit corporations that dealt primarily with local residents) from a
generally applicable property tax. The Court, relying on Bacchus and other cases. had no difficulty stiking
this tax exemption down and clearly perceived no distinction at all between an exemption from a general
tax and an exemption from an industry-specific tax.
327. Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 2202.
328. See id. at 2199-200.
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limiting principle come from? The answer to this question, it turns out, flows
from the basic thesis of Parts I and II of this Article.
In those parts, after all, we saw that both Supreme Court precedent and a
raft of functional considerations support the general proposition that
discriminatory subsidies are lawful even though discriminatory tax breaks are
not. This overarching conclusion suggests the essential issue posed in any
Commerce Clause subsidy case: Is the challenged state payment more properly
characterized as a subsidy or as tax relief? Perhaps the most telling feature of
the West Lynn Creamery case is that all nine Justices proceeded from the
premise that this question was the right one to ask. Thus, according to the
majority and concurring opinions, the problem at hand was whether the milk
payments should be characterized as a tax "rebate. ' '329 Even the dissenters
voiced no disagreement with the view that a discriminatory tax rebate would
violate the dormant Commerce Clause; instead, they disagreed-because the
payers of the tax were not the recipients of the subsidy-with the majority's
conclusion that the rebate label applied.330
In short, there was unanimity in West Lynn Creamery that, in cases of this
kind, courts should focus on whether there exists a strong enough link between
the challenged subsidy and some related tax to treat the subsidy as a de facto
tax break.33' What split the Court apart was how to decide whether such a
linkage was present. The challenge left behind by West Lynn Creamery is
therefore clear: to determine how courts should go about deciding whether any
particular state subsidy is sufficiently interconnected with a particular state tax
to trigger application of the dormant Commerce Clause prohibition on
discriminatory taxation.
As courts consider subsidy-tax linkage problems in Commerce Clause
cases, they should recognize that comparable questions have arisen, and will
continue to arise, in a variety of constitutional settings. Professor Hellerstein
and I have developed this point elsewhere by showing that courts confront
linkage issues in applying, not only the dormant Commerce Clause, but also
the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, and the uniformity and equality provisions of state constitutions.332
In all of these contexts, certain factors suggest illicit linkage. These factors
include simultaneity of enactment of the tax and payment programs,333
329. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 197 (1994); id. at 210 (Scalia, J., concurring);
see supra text accompanying notes 235 and 257.
330. See supra text accompanying note 255.
331. See Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 2172-73 (analyzing the Justices' different approaches
to this issue).
332. See id. at 2176-84 (intergovernmental tax immunity); id. at 2196-97 (Privileges and Immunities
Clause); id. at 2184-89 (uniformity and equality provisions).
333. See id. at 2198-99.
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computational connectedness, 33 and a correspondence between the
constitutionally protected class of taxpayers and those groups excluded from
the tax-relieving benefits of the payment program. 335 The most difficult and
interesting linkage cases, however, require courts to draw on the distinctive
policies that surround the particular constitutional provision at issue.
What underlying policies should courts consult in applying the "law of
linkage" in the dormant Commerce Clause setting? Upon reflection, the answer
to this question is apparent. I have already devoted much energy to identifying
the cluster of justifications that underpin the basic Commerce Clause
distinction between subsidies and tax breaks.337 These considerations, as we
have seen, center on: (1) conventional notions of fairness that support a broad
state power to channel a state's own property to a state's own residents; (2) the
special force of federalism arguments in the subsidy context; (3) the reduced
risk to free interstate trade presented by subsidies (because of their distinctive
visibility, susceptibility to periodic review, intelligibility and the like); and (4)
the historical focus of the Constitution's Framers not on state subsidies, but on
commerce-threatening state tax schemes. Courts should consult these same
factors as they grapple with whether particular payment programs fall on the
ordinary subsidy or the discriminatory tax break side of the constitutional
line.338
These four factors have not been made from whole cloth. Instead, the
Supreme Court itself has drawn on these considerations, or considerations very
much like them, in the parallel set of cases involving the so-called "market
participant exception" to the dormant Commerce Clause rule.339 A common
thread ties the market participant and subsidy cases together; at bottom, each
type of case concerns choices about how a state will distribute its own
resources. 34° As a result, it is sensible and unsurprising that, in both contexts,
a like set of referents should guide judicial decisionmaking.
334. See id. at 2200.
335. See id. at 2199-200.
336. See id. at 2201-02, 2218, 2223-27.
337, See supra Section II.B.
338. Cf Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1144 ("The problem then becomes one of characterization is a
challenged state law more like a lawful subsidy or more like an unlawful tanff,).
339. See sources cited supra note 22.
340. See. e.g., Kline, supra note 22. at 390-91 (reasoning that state sales, purchases, or subsidies
should be treated in like fashion because they all involve "spending or ... property. goods. or services
owned by the state"); see also Smith, supra note 289, at 1222 (noting "that w'hat the Court may truly have
in mind [in its market participant cases] is the special character of state programs for distributing its own
money or resources"); Varat, supra note 22, at 493. 552 (advocating a broader state-proprty-distnbution
principle that includes, but also reaches beyond, the market participant role and that covers subsidy
programs).
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V. APPLYING THE POLICY-BASED LINKAGE METHODOLOGY
The policy-centered approach to linkage problems proposed in Part IV can
provide a tool for evaluating future cases only if it squares with the result in
West Lynn Creamery itself. A necessary starting point for assessing this
approach thus involves its application to the facts of that case. In Section V.A,
I show that application of a policy-guided linkage analysis fully comports with
the ruling in West Lynn Creamery. Then, in Section V.B, I analyze under this
policy-centered linkage structure a variety of subsidy programs that have been,
or may soon be, litigated in the lower courts.
A. A Better Analysis for West Lynn Creamery
As we have seen, both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia properly focused
in West Lynn Creamery on whether a fatal linkage existed between the
Massachusetts milk subsidy and the Massachusetts milk tax. 4 1 As we also
have seen, in finding a fatal linkage both Justices offered question-begging or
342Th Jutcsddntofraayeotherwise assailable lines of reasoning. The Justices did not offer analyses
based on the four concerns that, as a general matter, distinguish subsidies from
tax breaks. Such a systematic, policy-driven analysis reveals why the
Massachusetts milk program was invalid and helps show how courts should
approach future cases.
1. Fairness
A state's residents generally should be free to channel state subsidies to
themselves. Why? Because, as a rule, it is fair to "limit[] benefits generated by
a state program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the State was
created to serve.' 343 This sow-and-reap rationale applied only tenuously in
341. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
342. See supra Sections III.A-B.
343. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980); see also, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council
of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983) (allowing a hiring preference for local workers
and stating that "[insofar as the city expended only its own funds in entering into construction contracts
for public projects, it was a market participant"); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1877) (finding
that the state's citizens, "and they alone, owned the property to be sold or used, and they alone had the
power to dispose of it as they saw fit"); Kline, supra note 22, at 350 ("Central [to Reeves] was a belief that
the states have a heightened sovereign claim when redistributing to their residents benefits made available
through the local fisk [sic]."); Regan, supra note 4, at I113 ("A state does have a special relationship to
its own citizens. Alaska may provide that only Alaskans ... share in the distribution of the state's oil
royalties. Such legislation is not hostile to non-Alaskans in the way protectionism is hostile. It takes nothing
away from non-Alaskans that we would normally think they have as much right to as Alaskans have.").
See generally Coenen, supra note 22, at 421-26 (describing the Court's and commentators' recognition of
a faimess-based rationale). Of course, there is often a measure of crudeness to the sow-and-reap principle,
since many nonresidents pay state taxes. Professor Varat argues at length that the sow-and-reap principle
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West Lynn Creamery because, in substance, Massachusetts residents had not
"combined to produce" the fund out of which the challenged subsidies were
paid.' Instead, the state nominally imposed a tax on both in-state and out-
of-state milk and created a "wash" with respect to the in-state milk tax
payments by returning them to in-state milk producers, and thus in effect
captured only the tax on out-of-state milk sales for redistribution to in-state
producers. 4 5 It is one thing to distribute to state residents monies that reflect
"a return of capital" 3 6 that "a state's citizens ... created or preserved."' 7
It is quite another thing, however, for the state to redirect to favored in-staters
a specified pool of monies extracted, for that very purpose, from the sale of
out-of-state goods.348 In such circumstances, Massachusetts residents were
not reaping where they had sown; they were robbing the out-of-state Peter to
pay the in-state Paul.' 9
2. Federalism
The Court's general discomfort with invalidating state subsidies also stems
from concerns about safeguarding "our Federalism. ' '35 As a leading scholar
of the dormant Commerce Clause has explained, "[T]o bar the states from
making any distinctions between in-state and out-of-state interests in
distributing state resources [would threaten] the essential fabric of our
constitutional plan."35' That observation is true in part because foreclosing
resident preferences in the grant of state monies would contravene principles
of federalism by impeding state-by-state development of specialized programs
is nonetheless legitimate in light of the special tax-paying responsibilities that come %,ith state residency
See Varat, supra note 22, at 528-30 (noting the "general validity of using residence to approximate the
group responsible for creating the state's benefits"); cf. Enrtch. supra note 18. at 452 ("Yet in the context
of state taxation, in-state and out-of-state businesses simply are not similarly situated Indeed, the
Commerce Clause itself dictates that they cannot be. because it requires that state taxes apply only to
activities having a substantial nexus with the taxing state.*).
344. Varat, supra note 22, at 523.
345. See supra text accompanying note 194; see also ERWIN CiEMERINSKY. COSTr'n.'ONAL LAW
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.4.4, at 347 (1997) ("In essence, the state was taxing both in-staters and out-
of-staters, but in effect refunding the taxes paid by in-staters through the subsidy system")
346. Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 22. at 89.
347. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 6-35, at 539.
348. Cf. Varat, supra note 22, at 545 n.205 (noting that a program "purporting to tax in-state and out-
of-state businesses equally and then subsidizing the in-state businesses .... clearly would amount to
discriminatory taxation").
349. Cf. Bair, supra note 22, at 2422-23 (noting that the sow-and-reap rationale is inappltcable when
state monies that are paid out "come from ... taxes or licensing fees paid by nonresidents")
350. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37. 44 (1971). For some of the many vindications of federalism
interests in recent years, see United States v Prit., 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). United States s. LopeZ. 514
U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); and Gregory % Ashcroft. 501 U S 452
(1991).
351. Walter Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma. The Court. the Commerce Clause. and State Control
of Natural Resources, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 51, 75; see also sources cited supra note 107
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to address "diverse local needs. 352 If farmers in Nebraska need financial
help, for example, it seems sensible that Nebraskans, through their government,
should be free to supply it. The Nebraska legislature, however, will hesitate to
offer such aid if the only way it can do so is by subsidizing large numbers of
out-of-state farmers as well. 353
These sorts of concerns about impeding local fiscal autonomy, however,
offered limited help to the defenders of the program struck down in West Lynn
Creamery. That program, after all, reflected a desire to aid the state's ailing
dairy industry through cash subsidization. If this were a genuinely deserving
need, however, Massachusetts could have addressed it-and still can address
it-with funds paid by all taxpayers by way of ordinary exactions unlinked to
subsidy payments.354 Given this ready and equally efficacious alternative, it
is hard to say that invalidation of Massachusetts's peculiar mode of
subsidization disabled the state from fashioning "effective ... programs for
solving local problems. 355
3. Political Processes
As we have seen, for a host of reasons state subsidies in general are less
likely to threaten Commerce Clause values than discriminatory tax credits,
exemptions, or deductions. In particular, a built-in brake on the undue
proliferation of subsidies exists because they inflict on state residents highly
visible costs that are easy to understand, carry with them potentially prohibitive
administrative burdens, and are regularly subject to reappraisal in the annual
budgeting process.3 56 For all these reasons, "[w]here the funds for a subsidy
or preference benefitting some state residents come out of the state treasury,
352. GUNTHER, supra note 247, at 67; see also TRIBE, supra note 4, § 6-1I, at 434 (explaining that
the market participant rule "allows state and local governments the freedom to experiment with different
packages of benefits for their citizens without fear that they will have to share the contents with everyone
else"); Collins, supra note 27, at 79 (noting that "[plolicy reasons in favor of ... protectionist subsidies"
include the desire not to "curtail useful state undertakings"); Regan, supra note 4, at 1194 ("many (useful)
programs would not exist if the state could not channel the primary benefits to locals"); Varat, stupra note
22, at 522 ("When the Framers provided for concurrent federal and state taxing, spending, and regulatory
powers, they sanctioned a diversity of policies among the states.").
353. As Maltz notes:
[A]ssume that a state considered its cantaloupe industry critical to the economic health of the
state, and thus chose to subsidize domestic cantaloupe production. Few would deny that the
state could do so without also subsidizing out-of-state cantaloupe producers who wished to sell
cantaloupes in the state, even though the subsidy for domestic producers would give them a
competitive advantage in the marketplace.
Maltz, supra note 106, at 68.
354. See Patterson, supra note 18, at 1024 n.3 10 ("The states may reach the desired ends of the pricing
scheme by subsidizing the dairy farmers from the state's general fund.").
355. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980).
356. See supra notes 112-150 and accompanying text.
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reviewing courts might assume that the state legislature has considered [the
program's] burdens and benefits" more carefully than when it enacts a tax law
that favors local businesses.357
Massachusetts's milk payments, however, did not come out of "the state
treasury"; instead, they were drawn from the pooled proceeds of a specific tax
established as an inseparable part of the subsidy program. While the ordinary
subsidy is subject to heightened visibility because it is paid by way of
"budgeted spending"' 8 out of "public funds, 359 Massachusetts set up a
self-funding tax-and-spending program as a unitary package, solely to channel
earmarked tax revenues to local dairy farmers. Thus, as far as built-in political
checks on protectionism go, the payments at issue in West Lynn Creamery
operated much more like tax breaks than typical monetary subsidies.
4. Considerations of Form
Given the original tax-related purposes of the Commerce Clause, the case
for finding a fatal linkage is strong if a subsidy provides in substance for relief
from a particular identifiable tax. In West Lynn Creamern', Justice Stevens
focused on this point when he described the state's subsidy payments as a
"rebate" of the Massachusetts milk levy.36 Likewise, Justice Scalia reasoned
that it was Massachusetts's award of a tax "refund" that placed its program in
the endangered tariff-and-tax-break category, rather than on the unendangered
ordinary subsidy list.361
Both Justices were right in their underlying assumption that a
discriminatory tax rebate offends the dormant Commerce Clause principle. A
tax rebate, after all, is a tax break: It provides relief from a tax to in-staters,
but not to out-of-staters, and by reason of that disparate treatment, it offends
the ban on discriminatory taxation. 62
357. Levmore, supra note 39, at 585. The greater vulnerability of subsidies in the political process is
suggested by a recent decision by budget-balancers in Congress to focus attention on cash grants rather than
tax breaks. See Tumulty, supra note 26, at 47 ("[House Budget Committee Chair John) Kastch has
already given up at least half the battle. This year the Budget Committee will focus its effort enitirely on
direct payments the government makes to business, ignonng the estimated S50 billion a year Washington
grants in tax breaks.").
358. Spending by Not Taxing, ECONOMiST, Jan. 23. 1988. at 51. 51.
359. Gergen, supra note 22, at 1135; see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 US 664. 690 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that subsidies come from "resources exacted from taxpayers as a % hole").
quoted in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock. 489 U.S. 1. 35 (1989) (Scalia. J.. dissenting)- and Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756. 807 (1973) (Rehnquist. J . dissenming in part)
360. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186. 197 (1994)L see supra text accompanying note
48.
361. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 210 (Scalia. J.. concurrmng); see supra text accompanying note
235.
362. See Coenen & Helerstein, supra note 90. at 2204
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Although there was room to argue about whether the Massachusetts milk
payments operated just like typical tax rebates, 363 a seven-member majority
of the Court concluded that they came close enough to justify application of
the "rebate" label. In other words, seven Justices viewed the case as no
different from one in which dealers paid taxes on all sold milk and then
themselves received rebates from the state only for those taxes paid on
Massachusetts products. On this view, the Massachusetts program bore an
unmistakable resemblance to a true tariff.
364
Indeed, for two separate reasons, the anti-tariff principle applied to the
program at issue in West Lynn Creamery with distinctive force. First, like a
tariff, the Massachusetts program in effect put no tax burden on anything
produced by any in-stater. A useful point of comparison is Bacchus
Imports,65 which concerned an exemption for sales of fruit wine and
okolehao produced in Hawaii from the state's generally applicable excise tax
on wholesale transfers of alcohol. In West Lynn Creamery, the Court explained
its earlier invalidation of this Hawaii tax scheme in the following words: "By
granting a tax exemption for local products, Hawaii in effect created a
protective tariff. Goods produced out of State were taxed, but those produced
in-state were subject to no net tax.''366 It was only half true, however, to say
that goods "produced in-state were subject to no net tax"; after all, every
alcoholic beverage produced in Hawaii was fully taxable unless it was fruit
wine or okolehao.367
In West Lynn Creamery, by contrast, the tax was levied on milk but not
on any other beverages produced in Massachusetts, so that the rebate served
to protect, at least indirectly, all of the domestic product otherwise subject to
the tax. The case, in other words, would have been different had the subsidy
gone only to Massachusetts producers of Holstein milk, but not to
Massachusetts producers of Jersey or Guernsey milk. In fact, however,
Massachusetts producers of any type of milk were eligible to receive the state's
"rebate."3 68 Bacchus Imports was thus not only "most similar ' 369 to West
363. See supra text accompanying notes 255-265.
364. Cf Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1148 ("Because the tax necessary to finance the subsidy will
increase the price of widgets and reduce widget consumption, the subsidy will now have the same
consumption loss-as well as the same production loss-as a tariff.").
365. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
366. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 197.
367. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 265 (noting that "[I]ocally produced sake and fruit liqueurs are
not exempted from the tax"); id. at 271 (finding the exemption discriminatory "in that it applies only to
locally produced beverages, even though it does not apply to all such products").
368. See West Lynn Creamery, 572 U.S. at 188 (describing the pricing order as applying to "all fluid
milk").
369. Id. at 196.
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Lynn Creamery; it supplied an a fortiori argument for invalidating the
Massachusetts program.370
Second, the tariff-like character of the Massachusetts program was
magnified by the state's dispersal of all funds collected through the milk tax
back to in-state milk producers.37' In fact, as a result of this wrinkle in the
Massachusetts program, in-state producers did even better than they would
have done under a true tariff program: They not only got back all tax payments
made on their own milk, but received in addition all tax payments attributable
to out-of-state milk. The Massachusetts program thus hit out-of-state milk
producers with a double-whammy worse than a tariff. In practical effect, the
program placed a tariff on the imports of out-of-state producers and then
turned every tariff penny paid directly over to their in-state competitors.'"
The majority in West Lynn Creamery never mentioned the first of these
features of the Massachusetts program and did not focus on the second. 75
These distinctive characteristics, however, provided especially potent reasons
for subjecting the Massachusetts program to the anti-tariff principle at the core
of the dormant Commerce Clause.
B. Deciding Other Subsidy Cases
The foregoing discussion confirms two key points. First, the ordinary
subsidy payable from the general treasury remains constitutional.7 Second,
370. Indeed, this argument may have been strengthened by the fact that West Lynn Creamer)'. unlike
Bacchus Imports, involved milk. Okolehao is probably tasty, but there are many substitutes for it. So too
with ethanol, most foodstuffs, and other household goods. Milk, however, has a distinctive appeal linked
to its perceived contributions to good health (as well as its usefulness as a complement to breakfast cereal).
It thus may lack strong competitive substitutes, so that subsidizing milk hurts out-of-state milk producers.
while affecting in-state makers of other products little, if at all. See Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502.
516 (1934) ("Milk is an essential item of diet."); id. at 557 (McReynolds. J.. dissenting) (describing milk
as "a necessity of life"); Patterson, supra note 18, at 1012 ("Milk. for instance, is likely to have a fairly
inelastic demand because it has no close substitutes."). If these assumptions are true, a milk subsidy-esen
standing alone-would "behave" much like a tariff (particularly from a political process angle) for the same
reason that a tax exemption behaves most like a tariff when no substitutes for the exempted product are
made in the state. See supra note 99. In particular, because such a subsidy would significantly harm only
out-of-state milk producers and not significantly affect in-state producers of substitute products, there would
be no "major in-state interest adversely affected" to provide "a powerful safeguard against legislative
abuse." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456. 473 n.17 (1981). Of course. I make no
claim that the critical assumptions made here about the availability of substitutes for milk are accurate; I
leave that matter for investigation by economists and nutritionists. The key legal point is that some forms
of tax-related subsidies for local industry will operate more like tariffs than others.
371. See supra text accompanying note 47.
372. See Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1162 ("Effectively. the pricing order was a tariff in which the
tariff revenue was paid to in-state producers-hardly a saving feature.").
373. See West Lynn Creamery', 512 U.S. at 194-95.
374. See also Drahozal. supra note 33. at 1138 ("Although the Court made clear that it was not
deciding whether a subsidy funded from a state's general revenues would be lawful, such a conclusion
seems to follow from its analysis."), Walter Hellerstem. \vest Lynn Creamery Inc. v. Healy and the
Constitutionality of State Tax Incentives: A Prelininar' Analysis. 7 STATE TAX NOTES 1182. 1186 (1994)
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the Court reached the right result in deeming unconstitutional the closely
connected tax-and-subsidy package at issue in West Lynn Creamery. But what
about subsidy programs that fall between these poles?375
In this final section, I consider whether actual or predictable adaptations
of the program at issue in West Lynn Creamery should survive dormant
Commerce Clause attack. Subjecting such subsidies to the policy-centered
scrutiny proposed here reveals how this approach can produce consistent and
sensible results. I look at four separate variations of the West Lynn Creamery
scheme: (1) the program in which most subsidy-funding taxes are paid on in-
state, as opposed to out-of-state, products; (2) the program in which tax
payments are not put in a segregated fund, but instead go into and back out of
the state's general treasury; (3) the program that involves a tax and a subsidy
that are not simultaneously enacted; and (4) the program upheld in Cumberland
Farms, Inc. v. Mahany (Cumberland Farms i/),376 which was designed
specifically to escape the clutches of the West Lynn Creamery ruling.
377
1. The Source of Subsidy Money
In Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. LaFaver (Cumberland Farms /),378 the
First Circuit confronted a Maine tax-and-subsidy program nearly identical to
the program invalidated in West Lynn Creamery. There was, however, one key
difference. Because Maine-unlike Massachusetts-is not a heavy milk
(noting that states apparently can avoid West Lynn Creamery by funding subsidies out of general revenues).
375. Two recent cases out of Minnesota, for example, involved unusual applications of the West Lynn
Creamery principle. In Zenith/Kremer Waste Systems, Inc. v. Western Lake Superior Sanitary District, 558
N.W.2d 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), the court invalidated a generally applicable waste management fee
imposed on all waste handled within the district, regardless of where the waste was hauled because the fee
was imposed to offset a recent tipping-charge reduction at the local waste-processing facility. Following
West Lynn Creamery, the court deemed the tipping-charge reduction a rebate of the waste management fee
that was discriminatorily denied to those who dealt with out-of-state landfills. Likewise, the court in
Sanifill, Inc. v. Kandiyohi County, 559 N.W.2d I I (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), invalidated a similar program
in which the reduction of the tipping charge and the imposition of a waste management fee were put in
place simultaneously.
376. 943 F. Supp. 83 (D. Me. 1996).
377. Any rule that sorts between good and bad subsidies will raise a preliminary characterization
question about whether the case involves a "subsidy" at all. For example, in Alliance for Clean Coal v.
Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995), Illinois forced coal-burning power plants to install "scrubbers" needed
to burn high-sulfur Illinois coal in an effort to support local coal producers. The state, however,
simultaneously permitted the utility to pass along the cost of adding scrubbers to ratepayers through fee
increases. Judge Cudahy, in a concurring opinion, wrote: "The ratepayers are substantially coterminous with
the taxpayers and a mandate to place a charge on the ratepayers is in economic effect functionally
equivalent to a subsidy financed from general revenues." Id. at 597 (Cudahy, J., concurring). Not so.
Utilities, after all, had to install scrubbers; thus the state program involved far more than awarding
"subsidies" as we normally think of them. In other respects, too, the challenged program departed markedly
from a subsidy. In particular, no budgeted spending was necessary to effectuate the program. Indeed, the
state itself turned over no money at all to anyone.
378. 33 F.3d I (lst Cir. 1994).
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importer, most of the tax proceeds used to subsidize Maine dairy farmers had
been generated by dealer sales of in-state milk. In Cumberland Farms 1, the
court found this fact inconsequential,179 and it was right to do so under the
policy-centered analysis offered here. Indeed, each of our four policy-based
linkage factors supports the conclusion that this feature of the Maine program
did not serve to distinguish Cumberland Farms I from the West Lynn
Creamery case.
First, in Cumberland Farms I, the return of in-state milk taxes to in-state
milk producers created exactly the same sort of financial "wash" that was
present in West Lynn Creamery. As a result, in both cases, it was the diversion
of monies from sales of out-of-state milk to the benefit of in-staters that was
constitutionally significant. And, with respect to those funds, Maine-like
Massachusetts-was not reaping where it had sown.3w
Second, in the Maine case, just as in the Massachusetts case, federalism
interests were muted because the same opportunity existed to address local
needs with a subsidy funded with dollars genuinely drawn from the general
treasury. In other words, in Cumberland Farms I, no less than in West Lynn
Creamery, a "less restrictive alternative"-in the form of subsidies funded with
truly public revenues, rather than revenues essentially captured from sales of
out-of-state milk-was available to aid local milk producers if in fact they
needed government support."'
Third, in both cases, the ordinary brakes on excessive subsidization could
not and did not take hold. In particular, in each state, simultaneous enactment
of the local dairy farmer subsidy and the closely related across-the-board milk
tax removed the built-in checks that impede the enactment of stand-alone
subsidies.382 Also, in each case, the unitary, self-funding character of the
program made legislative redirection of tax proceeds to any use other than
local dairy farmer subsidization improbable.8
Fourth, in both cases, the resemblance of the overall program to a
prohibited protective tariff was strong. Indeed, the Cunberland Farms I
program was marked by exactly the same tariff-exacerbating problems present
in West Lynn Creamery: (I) The milk support program adversely affected no
other in-state product; 384 and (2) the state not only extracted de facto tariffs
from out-of-state milk, but it also turned those funds over to in-state
competitors of the tariff-paying out-of-staters. 8 5 To be sure, Maine extracted
379. See id. at 1-2.
380. See supra Subsection V.A.].
381. See supra text accompanying notes 354-355.
382. See Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 2198.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 358-359.
384. See supra notes 365-370 and accompanying text.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 371-372.
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fewer duties than Massachusetts from milk produced on out-of-state farms. But
a tariff is no less a tariff because it operates on only a limited number of out-
of-state producers or products. The "size and number of in-state and out-of-
state firms" does not matter,386 because "[w]e need not know how unequal
the [t]ax is before concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates.""3 7
2. The Segregated Fund
Assume that Massachusetts adopted exactly the same program at issue in
West Lynn Creamery, but without a "segregated fund." The program would
thus place payments directly into (and take subsidy payments directly out of)
the state's general treasury.388 For Justice Scalia, this change in facts
apparently would have produced a change in result.389 For Justice Stevens,
however, the state's use of a segregated fund did not play a critical role. So
whose lead should lower courts follow, Justice Stevens's or Justice Scalia's?
The proper answer, of course, is that they should follow Justice Stevens, for
he had five votes, while Justice Scalia had only two. No less important,
however, a policy-centered analysis confirms that Justice Stevens was right to
conclude that the use of a segregated fund should not be an indispensable
condition for striking down the sort of program involved in West Lynn
Creamery.
a. Fairness and Federalism
Is a segregated fund program distinguishable from a nonsegregated fund
program on the basis of reap-and-sow or federalism concerns? Perhaps it
would be cleaner to say the following: There can never be such a thing as a
de facto segregated fund; general fund payments-whatever their connection
to even the most focused, single-industry tax-must be deemed to come from
the public as a whole; and commingling the proceeds of a special tax in the
general fund necessarily uncouples the tax from even a simultaneously enacted
subsidy. But can it be that a lack of fund segregation always disassociates a
subsidy and a tax? What if, for example, Massachusetts's subsidy payments
386. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276-77 (1988); accord, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
502 U.S. 437, 455-56 (1992); cf Regan, supra note 4, at 1258 (asserting that the Court did "not seem to
care in Baldwin how much of New York's milk comes from out of state" and that "later cases suggest that
such percentages are not determinative" (discussing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935))).
387. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981).
388. Cf Patterson, supra note 18, at 1024 ("The Court [in West Lynn Creamery] did not address
whether the tax and subsidy program would have been legal if the tax first had been placed in the state
general fund.").
389. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring);
see also supra text accompanying note 230. But see supra note 238.
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had been paid from the general treasury to the taxpaying dealers themselves
(based on their use of in-state milk), instead of to local producers? 3" More
to the point, it seems farfetched to suggest that West Lynn Creamery would
have come out the other way if Massachusetts had only avoided the use of a
segregated fund. After all, as we already have noted, both West Lynn Creamery
and our posited case involve precisely the same amounts of money paid to and
from precisely the same people at precisely the same time. To say in these
circumstances that the two programs are distinguishable on fairness and
federalism grounds subordinates, in the strongest fashion, substance to form.
b. Political Processes
A more plausible basis for distinguishing the segregated fund program
from the general fund program arises out of the political dynamics justification
for distinguishing subsidies from tax breaks as a general rule. As Justice Scalia
could have noted, use of a segregated fund may diminish political checks on
legislative retention of a subsidy by exempting the subsidy from annual
appropriations review.3 9' Professor Drahozal put the point this way: "The
money raised by the milk tax never made it to the general revenues .... Thus,
the pricing order ... allow[ed] beneficiaries to avoid the political restraints
posed by well-organized competitors for government funds. ' 92
One difficulty with such a political-process-based distinction of general
fund and segregated fund cases is that it may overstate the significance of fund
segregation. The creation of a segregated fund does not foreclose periodic
review of the fund's existence, structure, and use; the state is still writing
checks readily noticeable by other constituents who would like a piece of the
action. Creation of a segregated fund thus does not immunize the subsidy
portion of the program entirely from repeal, redirection, or reduction.
More importantly, it was not the establishment of a segregated fund that
produced the basic political process difficulty that underlay invalidation of the
Massachusetts milk scheme. The main problem resulted instead from the self-
funding character of a tax-and-subsidy package, enacted as one measure, that
offered (or at least appeared to offer) a way of exporting to out-of-state dairy
390. Probably, even the dissenters in West Lynn Creatnerv vould have found a constitutional violation
in these circumstances, given that their opinion focused not at all on fund segregation, but instead on the
shared identity of the taxpayer and subsidy recipient. See supra text accompanying note 255
391. The effects of such exemptions are discussed supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text-
392. Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1163. Indeed, perhaps foolishly. Massachusetts sought to defend its
use of the segregated fund with just this line of reasoning. See Respondent's Brief at 31. West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (No. 93-141) ("Eliminating the segregated fund and
depositing payments into the general fund would increase the political risk that the money whould be used
not only for the subsidy program, but also to defray 'the cost of providing all governmental
services .... '").
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farmers the full cost of in-state dairy farmer support.39 3 In such
circumstances, regardless of fund segregation, political disincentives were weak
with respect to putting the tax-and-subsidy program in place. At the least, the
political dynamics at work when a state adopts such a unitary program differ
radically from those at work when it enacts a monetary subsidy "standing
alone. 394
The self-funding nature of the program also created a problematic political
check on any legislative revision of the program to redirect milk taxes away
from local dairy farmer subsidies to less protectionist uses. Again, however,
this problem did not arise primarily because of the existence of a segregated
fund. It arose instead from the inherently industry-specific character of the tax-
and-spending program, which provided dairy farmers with the ability to protest
vehemently if state policymakers ever sought to end the subsidy without
simultaneously ending the tax.
c. Considerations of Form
Justice Scalia was willing to characterize the Massachusetts subsidy as a
tax "rebate" only because it was paid from a segregated fund. This fixation on
Massachusetts's use of a segregated fund, however, does not square with
Justice Scalia's own proper focus on whether the state's program should have
been deemed too tariff-like because it embodied a discriminatory tax
rebate.395 One simply cannot say it is more likely or more logical for rebates
to come from a segregated fund than the general treasury.396 In addition, it
is difficult to see why the Massachusetts program would have become less
"tariff-like" in appearance if the only change made to it was to mix program
funds with the state's general revenues. After all, as surely as the general
treasury may provide the source of rebate payments, it also is the ordinary
destination of typical tariff exactions.397
In short, courts should not limit the West Lynn Creamery principle to cases
that involve segregated funds. Such a result would square with neither the
majority's obvious disinclination to embrace this proposed distinction nor a
393. See supra text accompanying notes 358-359; see also Heinzerling, supra note 18, at 264 (arguing
that the key to West Lynn Creamery was not the segregated fund, but that Massachusetts "funded the
subsidy by taxing out-of-state firms in the same industry as the recipients of the subsidy").
394. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199.
395. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
396. Cf supra text accompanying note 258.
397. Cf supra text accompanying note 258; see also Drahozal, supra note 33, at 1148 ("In the extreme
case of State S funding the subsidy by a tax on widgets, the good being subsidized, the welfare
consequences of the subsidy will be indistinguishable from those of a tariff.").
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functional focus on whether the tax-and-subsidy program is too tariff-like in
effect.398
3. Simultaneity of Enactment
What if a state enacts a milk program identical to the one at issue in West
Lynn Creamery, but does so in two separate stages? In Year 1, the state
imposes its milk-dealer tax. Then, in separate legislation in Year 2, it
establishes the program's subsidy feature. Would this lack of contemporaneous
enactment cause our hypothetical case to come out differently from West Lynn
Creamery itself?
Justice Stevens's opinion suggests it might. In particular, his analysis
focused on the propriety of the Massachusetts tax,'" and he found that tax
objectionable because "Massachusetts dairy farmers, instead of exerting their
influence against the tax, were in fact its primary supporters." More
specifically, in-state dairy farmers supported the new tax because they were
"mollified by the subsidy," with which the tax was "coupled" when it was
adopted.40
In our hypothetical two-step-enactment case, these dynamics are absent
because in-state producers would obviously not be "mollified" when the state,
in Year 1, enacts a genuinely across-the-board tax. Indeed, in-state dairy
farmers would lead the charge against such a tax because its unmitigated
burden falls on sales of their product. To be sure, in our hypothetical, these
same in-state dairy farmers in Year 2 are able to out-muscle unrepresented out-
of-state competitors by securing a milk subsidy from a friendly legislature. But
that does not bring our case within Justice Stevens's political process rationale
because (to repeat the key point) his rationale focused on the legislative
dynamics at work in enacting the tax.'02 Indeed, if we were to use Justice
Stevens's political process argument to condemn our hypothetical in-staters'
successful muscle-flexing in Year 2, that argument would prove too much
because (contrary to Stevens's essential purpose in constructing that argument)
it would logically require the invalidation of any discriminatory subsidy
398. Cf. Patterson, supra note 18. at 1027 n.330 (citing -simtlar protectionist effects of subsidies paid
to in-state dairy farmers from the state's general fund. and subsidies paid from segregated funds-). Bui cf.
Sanifill, Inc. v. Kandiyohi County, 559 N.W.2d Il1. 116 n.4 (Mtnn. Ct. App. 1997) (invalidating a scheme
that involved a "'service fee" placed on all local waste generators used in part to fund tipping-fee reductions
for waste haulers that use the local facility, and noting that the *'service fee is not . analogous to a
general revenue tax because it ... does not go to the general fund").
399. See Heinzerling, supra note 18. at 263.
400. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy. 512 U.S. 186. 200-01 (1994).
401. Id.
402. See id.; see also supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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"standing alone. '4 °3 In short, the key to Justice Stevens's political process
distinction between the ordinary subsidy and the Massachusetts program was
the simultaneous enactment of the subsidy and the tax. It follows that Justice
Stevens-and a majority of the Court-might well decline to apply West Lynn
Creamery to our hypothetical "two step" case4
Justice Stevens's opinion, however, does not require this result, and courts
should eschew it in light of considerations of symmetry and the effects-
centered focus of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause authorities. 40 5 After
all, the milk program in our hypothetical case does not have just the same
"practical effect ' 406 as the actual Massachusetts program; it has exactly the
same effect because it is exactly the same program. Lack of simultaneous
enactment, moreover, does not rob the program of its most problematic
features. First, once the subsidy is in effect, the overall program cannot be said
simply to permit state residents to reap where they have sown. Instead, no less
than in West Lynn Creamery itself, the program works, in self-funding fashion,
to redirect money raised from sales of an out-of-state product to in-state
producers. Second, our two-step case is indistinguishable from West Lynn
Creamery with regard to facilitating federal experimentation; in both cases,
subsidization of local dairy farmers-if truly necessary-could be paid for out
of the state's general revenues. Third, while the political dynamics surrounding
initial adoption of the two programs plainly differ, the two-step program-once
in place-gives rise to the same political process problems present in West
Lynn Creamery itself. In particular, regardless of simultaneity of enactment,
built-in political pressures will impede efforts to strip in-state farmers' benefits
away as soon as the unitary tax-and-subsidy program takes hold. This is so
because the unitariness of the scheme, once in place, puts local milk producers
in a strong position to insist that there should be no alteration of the subsidies
they receive unless the tax on their own product also is withdrawn.
403. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199.
404. Cf. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing
"four distinct statutes enacted at different times" from the "single integrated scheme consisting of two
parts" involved in West Lynn Creamery), aff'g 861 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (W.D. Va. 1994) (stating that West
Lynn Creamery "involved two statutes that the legislature intentionally joined together to create an
integrated program," and noting that "[e]xtending West Lynn Creamery to non-integrated statutes not
intentionally joined together ... would create enormous difficulties"); Enrich, supra note 18, at 465
("Contemporaneous enactment of the two would ordinarily favor [unitary] treatment.").
405. See, e.g., Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 655 (1994) (stating that to save one tax
from discriminatory effect, another "need not be promulgated in the same provision of state law, or even
through the same governmental entity" and indicating that these "matters of form do not determine in
substance whether the tax ... discriminates against interstate trade"); Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders
& Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, 901 F. Supp. 1125, 1138 n.45 (M.D. La. 1995) ("The fact that both West
Lynn Creamery and Bacchus dealt with a new tax directed toward a particular policy as opposed to a pre-
existing, neutral tax is ultimately irrelevant.").
406. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
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Finally, whether enacted in one or two steps, the unitary tax-and-subsidy
program "smells" no less like a tariff than the program deemed too tariff-like
in West Lynn Creamer), itself. The key in this regard is that once the state
enacts the subsidy, its program is exactly the same as the one involved in West
Lynn Creamery. When two programs are exactly the same, they look exactly
the same. And when two programs look exactly the same, neither looks more
like a tariff than the other.
407
Viewed from another angle, the nonsimultaneous enactment of the tax and
the subsidy may affect our ability to castigate the purpose of the state tax law
because that law, on our assumed set of facts, was put in place for entirely
evenhanded and nonprotectionist reasons. In fact, when the tax was enacted,
it burdened in-state dairy farmers no less than out-of-staters. But state laws can
offend the dormant Commerce Clause based on "either discriminatory
purpose ... or discriminatory effect."O'  After Year 2, our hypothetical milk
program is no less discriminatory in effect than the program struck down in
West Lynn Creamery. As a result, a court should probably strike it down.' 9
407. What if the subsidy had been put in place in Year I and the tax in Year 2" Perhaps the -subsidy
first" situation differs from the "tax first" case because it is hard to say that the proceeds of the new tax
are the source of a subsidy that predated the tax's very existence. (And if the particular tax is not the
subsidy's source, then the source is the state's general revenues, so that the argument is stronger that
subsidy recipients are reaping where the state's own citizens ha%e sown.) On our assumed facts, however.
the two-step enactment produces exactly the same result as in West Lynn Crann'r-that is. the total
volume of subsidy monies is determined directly by the total volume of tax collections. In these
circumstances (whether the tax or subsidy was enacted first), the prceeds of the tax do in substance fund
the subsidy. Of course, if this fact were changed-so that. for example, subsidy payments might or would
exceed the total tax revenues, or at least revenues from out-of-state sources-we would have a very
different case. In such a case, the combined lack of simultaneity of enactment and "source correlation"
would probably lead a court to find the subsidy constitutional Coenen & Hellestein. supra note 90. at
2216-17.
408. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263. 270 (1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
see also Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641. 654 (1994) ("lW]e repeatedly have focused our
Commerce Clause analysis on whether a challenged scheme is discnminatory in 'effect "') id. at 653 ("IA]
court need not inquire into the purpose or motivation behind a law to determine that in actuality it
impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce.")- Chemical Waste Mgmt.. Inc. v Hunt. 504 U S
334, 344 (1992) (noting that a finding of "economic protectionism" could flow from either discnminatory
purpose or effect (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437. 454 (1992)))- Minnesota v Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981) (allowing a finding of economic protectionism based on
"proof either of discriminatory effect ... or of discriminatory purpose" (citations omitted)).
409. There is some reason to believe that Justice Scalia would share this view in light of his dissenting
remarks in American Trucking Ass'ns it Schemer, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), In that case. out-of-state truckers
made the argument (not reached by the Court's majonty) that a flat-axle tax imposed on truckers by
Pennsylvania discriminated against interstate commerce because a simultaneously enacted law "'reduced
registration fees for Pennsylvania-based trucks by, for all practical purposes, precisely the amount of the
axle taxes." Id. at 304 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In rejecting this contention. Justice Scalia wrote.
[W]hat if Pennsylvania had enacted the axle tax without reducing registration fees, and then one
year later made a corresponding reduction in truck registration fees? This case, of course, is
more difficult than [the hypothesized one] because the tax reduction and axle tax .. .were
enacted simultaneously. However, to inquire whether a tax reduction is close enough in
time ... to another tax so that "in effect" the latter should be treated as facially discnminatory
is to ask a question that has no answer.
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This is not to say that nonsimultaneity of enactment will be irrelevant in
all cases. Unquestionably, our two-step hypothetical provides a less compelling
case for judicial intervention than does West Lynn Creamery. While courts
probably should reach the same result in both cases, this conclusion largely
flows from the precise equivalence of the two programs once the subsidy takes
effect. It is possible to envision cases in which additional differences exist: for
example, when there is nonsimultaneous enactment and the purported "rebate"
comes in the form of a nonmonetary benefit, such as agricultural extension
services. In such a situation, nonsimultaneity of enactment may combine with
the noncash nature of the subsidy to negate its characterization as a tax
rebate.4" ° In short, nonsimultaneity of enactment should and will count in
many cases.4 ' Sometimes, however, it will not count enough to negate
application of the West Lynn Creamery principle.
4. The Cumberland Farms II Conundrum
In Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Mahany (Cumberland Farms 1I),412 the
federal district court for Maine confronted a complicated tax-and-subsidy
problem. In January 1995, following the invalidation of the Maine milk
subsidy program in Cumberland Farms 1,4 13 the legislature adopted a new
Id. at 305. If simultaneity of enactment was not important to Justice Scalia in Scheiner, it is hard to see
why it should be important to him in West Lynn Creamery. The "question that has no answer"--as to how
simultaneous is simultaneous enough-is equally present in both situations.
410. Cf. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 n.16 (1980) (suggesting that agricultural extension
service programs are ordinarily permissible under the dormant Commerce Clause even though made
available only to in-staters).
411. Cf. Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 762 (Mont. 1993) (relying, in
characterizing increases in retirement benefits as tax rebates for purposes of the intergovernmental tax
immunity doctrine, on the simultaneity of enactment of the increases with the repeal of a discriminatory
tax exemption afforded to state but not federal retirees in violation of Davis v. Michigan Department of
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989)). In a similar vein, simultaneity of enactment of a tax and subsidy will not
always establish that the two are unlawfully linked. Assume, for example, that a state simultaneously
imposes a tax on all barge operators, principally headquartered outside the state, while simultaneously
enacting a subsidy for owners of transport trucks licensed within the state. (This hypothetical is based
loosely on a scenario described in Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 304-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).) In this situation,
can we say that the tax and the subsidy are linked in a way that produces prohibited discrimination against
interstate commerce? I think not. After all, even with simultaneity of enactment, there is no overlap at all
between taxed and subsidized businesses so that the "discriminatory" subsidy does not even remotely
resemble a rebate of the tax. In particular, West Lynn Creamery is readily distinguishable on this ground.
See Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 2229 n.296. Nor (without substantially more) would the in-
state transport-truck subsidy violate the Commerce Clause if both in-state and out-of-state truckers were
required to pay, both before and after adoption of the subsidy, state-imposed general corporate income
taxes. All corporations doing business within a state pay that state's corporate income tax. Thus giving cash
grants to some but far less than all in-state corporate taxpayers involves just the sort of "ordinary subsidy"
that is permissible under the general subsidy-protective rule.
412. 943 F. Supp. 83 (D. Me. 1996).
413. Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. LaFaver (Cumberland Farms 1), 33 F.3d I (Ist Cir. 1994); see supra
Subsection V.B.I.
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law that placed a tax on all wholesale milk transfers, with resulting proceeds
payable into the state's general treasury. Then, in February 1995 and June
1995, the legislature adopted two appropriations bills directing that a total of
$5,550,000 be distributed from the general treasury to fund subsidy payments
to Maine milk farmers. This tax-and-subsidy scheme promptly encountered a
constitutional challenge based upon West Lynn Creamern'.41
The court-evincing a sensitivity to the emerging law in this
area-described the issue as whether "the 1995 [tax] is legally separate from
any later appropriations of General Fund monies ' or whether "their alleged
relationship" rendered them invalid.4 16 In the court's opinion, the tax and
appropriations measures did not reflect the sort of "intentional[] link[]" present
in West Lynn Creamery because there was no "combination of the two
components within a single statute."4' 7 Having thus distinguished West Lynn
Creamery, the court concluded that the dispositive question was whether it
should "look beyond the 1995 Act itself to infer from the political and
legislative context that, in passing the 1995 Act, the Maine Legislature acted
with an improper purpose."4 '8 Turning to that question, the court
acknowledged that "it appears that the Legislature intended to circumvent the
Court's decision in West Lynn Creamery by simply pulling apart the two
components of the [previously invalidated] 1991 Act, and reenacting them
individually., 41 9 Nonetheless, the court refused to consider "the hidden
motives of the legislature. 42 ° Instead, citing a treatise on statutory
construction, the court declared that it could look only at "the face of the
statute" and had to assume that the legislature "acted with integrity and with
an honest purpose."4' ' Accordingly, the court found that the principle of
West Lynn Creamery did not apply to the revised tax-and-subsidy scheme and
proclaimed it constitutional. 2 "
Cumberland Farms II raises profoundly difficult issues of dormant
Commerce Clause linkage analysis, and in addressing those issues, the court
took two significant missteps. The court first floundered in its treatment of
legislative purpose. To be sure, there are cases that caution against judicial
inquiry into legislative motive. 23 Purposive analysis, however, is nowadays
414. For a more detailed descnption of the facts of Cumberland Fanns I. see 943 F Supp at 85-86.
415. Id. at 87.
416. Id. at 86.
417. Id. at 87.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. (citation omitted).
422. See id. at 89-90.
423. See, e.g., United States v. O'Bnen. 391 U.S. 367. 383 (1968) ("lnquincs into congressional
motives or purposes are a hazardous matter."); Henncford '. Silas Mason Co.. 300 U S 577. 586 (1937)
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commonplace in constitutional law, 424 including dormant Commerce Clause
cases.
4 25
As Professor Hellerstein and I have explained elsewhere426 (and the court
asserted in Cumberland Farms 1p27), the purposive-discrimination principle
applicable in Commerce Clause cases should not alone control the
constitutionality of a tax-and-subsidy scheme. There is, after all, an essential
difference between asking: (1) whether a single challenged law was enacted
with a "discriminatory purpose"; and (2) whether two different laws, each of
which would be constitutional standing alone, should be treated as a unitary
whole. To say that the ban on discriminatory purpose alone is not controlling
in linkage cases, however, is not to say (as the court also asserted in
Cumberland Farms IP28) that legislative purpose should have no role of any
kind in linkage analysis. Instead, as we shall soon see, legislative purpose may
play a part, at least in special circumstances, in a policy-driven appraisal of
dormant Commerce Clause subsidy cases.4 29 The court thus erred in ignoring
the purpose that lay behind Maine's enactment of its tax-and-subsidy scheme.
The court's second error was more fundamental. Having deemed legislative
purpose irrelevant to its inquiry, the court asserted that the 1995 tax act and
the ensuing appropriations measures raised no constitutional problem because
they constituted "a non-integrated statutory scheme., 430 But whether the
Maine program properly merited description as "non-integrated" was a highly
debatable proposition, given the contextual and temporal connections between
the Maine subsidy and the Maine tax. In essence, the Maine court simply
assumed its critical conclusion, leaving without explanation why the Maine
scheme was functionally distinguishable from the program invalidated in West
Lynn Creamery.
Proper analysis of a case like Cumberland Farms II requires consultation
of underlying dormant Commerce Clause policies, and a fair consideration of
those policies reveals why the Maine case was distinguishable from West Lynn
("[M]otives alone will seldom, if ever, invalidate a tax that apart from its motives would be recognized as
lawful.").
424. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Free
Exercise Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Establishment Clause); Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222 (1985) (Equal Protection Clause). See generally John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1208-12 (1970) (noting cases involving purposive
analysis).
425. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7, 471 n.15, 476 n.2
(1981).
426. See Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 2193-94.
427. See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Mahany (Cumberland Farms 11), 943 F. Supp. 83, 87-89 (D. Me.
1996).
428. See id.
429. See infra text accompanying notes 444-447.
430. Cumberland Farms 11, 943 F. Supp. at 87.
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Creamery. That analysis also reveals however that the Maine case presented
a distinctive problem that raises serious doubts about whether the court reached
the right result.
a. Fairness and Federalism
With respect to fairness and federalism, the revised Maine milk scheme
differed from the program struck down in West Lynn Creamery because, for
two separate reasons, the Maine program lacked so-called "source-based
correlation."43' First, unlike in West Lynn Creamery, Maine's milk tax
proceeds were placed in the general treasury and not "set aside ... to fund its
payment program. 432 Second, the subsidy payments made in Maine were a
fixed amount, and thus not (as in West Lynn Creamery) a floating "function
of tax receipts. 433 In particular, because the Maine legislature appropriated
monies for milk subsidies in the specific and limited amount of $5,500,000, it
was possible that future milk tax collections would not cover the cost of the
milk subsidy. Given this circumstance, it was easier to say in Cumberland
Farms II than in West Lynn Creamer' that the state was genuinely spending
its own money so as to allow its own citizens to reap where they had sown.
At the same time, these distinctions may not justify the different results in
Cumberland Farms H and West Lynn Creamery. First, the segregation of
subsidy-funding tax proceeds in West Lynn Creamer--although critical to
Justice Scalia-was not a point of significance for the Court's majority and
should count for little, if anything, in cases of this nature.4  In a like vein,
while it was possible that Maine's milk tax collections could fall short of
paying for the fixed amount of appropriated subsidies, there is no reason to
assume that this was so. If the facts showed that milk tax collections were sure
to exceed subsidy costs, the revised program, as a matter of "practical
effect, '435 would be marked by the same "wash-plus-tariff character" that
infected the West Lynn Creamery scheme. 36
b. Considerations of Form
Considerations of form also provide a possible basis for distinguishing
Cumberland Farms II from the West Lynn Creamery case. The Maine
431. Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90. at 2200.
432. Id. at 2201.
433. Id.
434. See supra Subsection V.B.2.
435. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274. 279 (1977),
436. See supra text accompanying note 345.
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program, in contrast to the Massachusetts program, was put in place by way
of separate legislative enactments instead of one unitary government
pronouncement. In essence, the court accorded this fact dispositive
significance.437 Such an approach, however, is wrong because it woodenly
emphasizes form over substance and would invite easy evasion of the West
Lynn Creamery rule through the readily available device of enacting two laws
rather than one.438
A better argument for removing Maine's subsidy payments from the "tax
rebate" category is that those payments were not marked by the sort of
"computational correlation" that exists, for example, when both the tax and the
subsidy are "a stated percentage of gross receipts." '439 Computational
correlation constitutes an important factor in linkage cases because it is hard
to deny that a linkage between a subsidy and a tax exists when, for each
favored taxpayer, what is received as a subsidy fluctuates in direct proportion
to what is paid as a tax."'
Yet, while computational correlation will often matter in tax-subsidy
linkage analysis, it was absent in West Lynn Creamery, just as it was in
Cumberland Farms 11.41 ' Thus, while this consideration may have served as
a background factor that weakened the case for linkage in Cumberland Farms
II, it cannot serve to distinguish that case from West Lynn Creamery.
c. Political Processes
The most important distinction between West Lynn Creamery and the
Maine case concerns differences of political dynamics. To begin with, the
Maine tax and the Maine subsidy were not enacted at the same time, while in
West Lynn Creamery, simultaneous enactment of the milk tax and subsidy
played a critical role because it facilitated the mollification of local milk
producers who would otherwise have opposed enactment of the tax. It is
doubtful, however, that the sort of nonsimultaneity present in the Maine case
ought to count for much because "literal simultaneity should not be required
to bring this factor into play.'442 Instead, "substantial simultaneity-like
substantial performance in the law of contracts-ought to suffice." ''
437. See supra text accompanying notes 417-422.
438. Cf supra note 252 and accompanying text (criticizing Justice Scalia for permitting easy evasion
of the West Lynn Creamery rule).
439. Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 2200.
440. See id. at 2218-19.
441. See id. at 2217 n.237.
442. Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 2199.
443. Id. (footnote omitted).
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In Cumberland Farms H, the case for finding substantial simultaneity was
strong because the appropriations measures that favored local farmers were
enacted within months of the milk tax." To be sure, "neither the legislators
nor the farmers could guarantee that the revenues generated by the 1995 Act
would be returned to the farmers in the form of a subsidy." ' But if it was
true that the 1995 Act "responded to the invalidation of the 1991 Act'" 6 and
that "certain legislators indeed hoped to enact appropriations in the wake of the
1995 Act"" 7 (points that the court declined to investigate), it is hard to view
the Maine case as involving the sort of strong nonsimultaneity that would
significantly distinguish it from the West Lynn Creamery case.
The Maine program, however, differed from the Massachusetts program
in another important way because the Maine program lacked what has been
called "durational correlation."" This factor was missing in Cumberland
Farms II because, unlike in West Lynn Creamery, the milk tax and milk
subsidy did not have a built-in common lifespan. Instead, while the Maine tax
came into being by way of ordinary-and thus presumptively permanent-
legislation, the Maine subsidy was put in place as a single one-year
appropriation of a limited, fixed amount. This fact meant that the subsidy in
Cumberland Farms II shared, in a strong way, two of the characteristics that
cause typical subsidies to present fewer dangers of overextension than the
typical discriminatory tax break. First, because the Maine subsidy was finite
as to time, it was necessarily subject to reexamination (and very possibly to
nonrenewal) in the high visibility and inherently competitive annual
appropriations process. Second, because the Maine subsidy was finite in
amount, it was subject to the empty cookie jar check that is inapplicable to the
ordinary open-ended tax break.
For all of these reasons, the Maine subsidy was sufficiently different from
the subsidy struck down in West Lynn Creamery that a court, without more,
could find the cases distinguishable. But, in fact, there was something more,
and this additional factor, although unmentioned by the Maine Supreme Court,
transformed Cumberland Farms II into a much more difficult case.
d. Constitutional Remediation
Cumberland Farms I presented a distinctive policy problem due to
444. See supra text accompanying notes 413-414.
445. Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Mahany (Cumberland Farms I1), 943 F Supp 83. 88 n I (D Mc.
1996).
446. Id. at 87.
447. Id. at 88 n.l.
448. Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90. at 2200.
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guiding principles of constitutional remediation. This problem arose because
Maine legislators did not write on a clean slate. Instead, they acted against the
backdrop of having previously implemented the tax-and-subsidy policy
specifically found to be unconstitutional in Cumberland Farms L The new
program thus might never have existed but for the legislature's adoption of its
constitutionally tainted predecessor. Yet a basic principle of constitutional
remediation requires the state "to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct
to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct. 4 49
In the Maine case, this principle would seem to require invalidation of the
1995 program if, in fact, it was passed only because the unconstitutional 1991
program had previously been put in place. A grave difficulty arises in applying
this principle, however, because it is impossible to know (in light of altered
private expectations, legislator loyalties, and other political dynamics) whether
"in the absence" of the 1991 legislation, the 1995 program would have come
into being.450
Some authority from analogous contexts suggests that, in these
circumstances, doubts should be resolved against the "wrongdoer" state.45'
There are cross-currents in the cases, however,4 52 and a less wooden and
more measured approach would treat this fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree risk as
only one factor to be weighed in the linkage calculus.453 From this
perspective, for example, Maine would not have violated the Commerce Clause
if in 1995 it had adopted a local dairy farmer subsidy payable from the general
treasury, without any new milk tax at all, even though that subsidy might well
not have been passed but for the earlier adoption of the 1991 tax-and-spending
program. In such a case, the stand-alone subsidy, when viewed in isolation, is
so far removed from the constitutional precipice that added fruit-of-the-
poisonous-tree concerns would fail to push it over the edge.
The tax-and-payment scheme at issue in Cumberland Farms 11, however,
was not a freestanding milk production subsidy. Instead, it bore an
unmistakable relationship to a specific milk industry tax. To be sure, a strong
449. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., United States v.
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2282 (1996).
450. See supra text accompanying note 449.
451. See Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (placing the burden of proof
on a defendant-employer to prove a lack of but-for causation when the plaintiff shows that retaliation for
exercise of free speech rights contributed to dismissal); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 124 (1969) (noting that in determining the measure of antitrust damages caused by the
defendant, juries are given broad discretion because "[any other rule would enable the wrongdoer to profit
by his wrongdoing at the expense of his victim" (quoting Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S.
251, 264 (1946))).
452. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 282 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[c]ommon-law approaches to causation often require proof of but-for cause" by a plaintiff).
453. See Coenen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 2224.
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case can be made for distinguishing the tax-subsidy relationship in Cumberland
Farms II from the tax-subsidy relationship present in West Lynn
Creamery.4 But it is fair at least to say that the case is close even if we put
concerns of constitutional remediation to one side. 5 In the end, while the
matter is one of judgment, policy concerns about ensuring full remediation of
constitutional wrongs bolster the view that the 1995 Maine tax and 1995 Maine
subsidy were sufficiently linked to give rise to a violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have dealt with the two main constitutional questions that
overhang state subsidy programs in the post-West Lynn Creamery era. The first
question is whether ordinary business subsidies-which, like typical spending
programs, are not distinctively connected to any particular tax-are
unconstitutional. Drawing on considerations of Commerce Clause policy,
which are touched on but not fully developed in the earlier literature, I argue
that the answer to this question should be "no." This conclusion should dispose
of most Commerce Clause issues in this area and will provide a safe harbor
for states that genuinely need to give financial aid to distinctively valued or
struggling local industries.
The second question is how to decide whether challenged subsidies that
have an arguable connection to a particular tax merit invalidation under West
Lynn Creamery or protection under the competing ordinary-subsidy principle.
I argue that the hand that draws this line should be guided by the same policies
that give rise to the basic distinction between the constitutional ordinary
subsidy and the unconstitutional discriminatory tax break. It is true that the
multifactor approach I propose will produce a measure of uncertainty and a
need for practical judgment in some cases. But that result is neither surprising
nor bad. When powerful, countervailing constitutional principles collide, some
measure of difficulty in doctrinal line-drawing is inescapable. In this Article,
I have not laid out how courts should decide each and every permutation of
West Lynn Creamery. I have, however, offered a structured, policy-driven
framework for applying a "law of linkage" in the dormant Commerce Clause
field.
454. See supra Subsection V.B.4.c.
455. See Note, supra note 31. at 1553-54 (challenging, without any reference to remediation concers.
the court's ruling in Cumberland Farms l1).
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